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In 1988, hundreds of federal district judges were suddenly confronted with the need
to render a decision on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act and the
newly promulgated criminal Sentencing Guidelines. Never before has a question of
such importance and involving such significant issues of constitutional lan, man-
dated the immediate and simultaneous attention of such a large segment of the fed-
eral trial bench. Accordingly, this event provides an archetypal model for exploring
the influence of social background, ideology, judicial role and institution, and other
factors on judicial decisionmaking. Based upon a unique set of written dccisions
involving an identical legal problem, the authors have produced an unprecedented
empirical study of judicial reasoning in action. By exploiting this treasure trove of
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data, the authors have looked deeper into the judicial mind and observed the emer-
gence of influences upon the manner in which a judge examined the constitutional
issues, adopted a constitutional theory, and engaged in legal reasoning.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Either it is not the same or it is not real-lack of comparability
among cases or the absence of authenticity are the Scylla and Charyb-
dis of empirical study of judicial decisionmaking.' A study of judicial
behavior based on a large sample of real decisions is inevitably weak-
ened by incomparability caused by differences in parties, time period,
issues, and facts. A study that escapes the pitfall of incomparability by
presenting a hypothetical case to judges disconnects from concrete
controversies with real consequences for real people, and relies on a
nonrandom sample of volunteers.
To these alternative frailties of incomparability or inauthenticity
may be added a third weakness, lack of depth in exploration of the
steps in judicial reasoning toward resolution of a legal problem.2 Lon-
gitudinal studies of multiple decisions focus upon aggregate "votes,"
not the reasoning process of the judges in reaching those outcomes.
Likewise, in a hypothetical experiment, persuading volunteer judges
in substantial numbers not only to "decide" the case but also to
devote substantial time and labor to drafting reasoned opinions is im-
practicable. Thus, researchers have been unable to probe thoroughly
the process of judging and explore the contours of decisional analysis
by fully engaged judicial actors.
Envisioning the ideal scenario for exploring social background,
ideology, judicial role and institution, and other influences on a
judge's reasoning in decisionmaking, one would design a study asking
every judge to render judgment on an identical case. The case would
raise significant, complex, and controverted issues. Further, authen-
I See infra Part II.A.2.
2 See infra Part II.A.2.
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ticity demands that, while being fungible in substance between judges,
the case could not be merely abstract in consequence. The ideal case
would be an actual controversy that would not vary in content from
the problem before every other judge in the study. Finally, to enhance
the opportunity for evaluation of judicial decisionmaking, the study
would demand a written opinion from each judge, giving the judge's
reasons for the outcome. The researchers thus would be able to look
beyond mere statements of outcome to peer closely into the "judicial
mind ' 3 at work on a legal question of moment. Having stated this
ideal, we might be accused of describing the impossible.4
Fortunately, although little known and less appreciated, such a
natural laboratory, or something quite close to it, does exist.5 The
equivalent of a single case was presented to hundreds of federal dis-
trict court judges during the "Sentencing Guidelines Crisis of 1988,"
when the federal judiciary faced an unprecedented conflict in the ad-
ministration of the criminal justice system. Pursuant to the Sentencing
Reform Act,6 the newly created United States Sentencing Commis-
sion established mandatory sentencing "guidelines" based upon the
offense and the characteristics of the crime and the offender.7 On No-
vember 1, 1987, the federal criminal Sentencing Guidelines took ef-
fect.8 As soon as the new regime was in place, the Sentencing
Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines it had authored were chal-
lenged on multiple constitutional grounds by criminal defendants in
the federal district courts.9
3 Cf. Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind (1965); Glendon Schubert, The Judicial
Mind Revisited (1974). Schubert developed a psychometric model of Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking under which the beliefs of the justices motivate their voting behavior. By con-
trast, we use the term "judicial mind" here more generically to describe the reasoning
process by which a judge reaches a result.
4 See Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal
Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. Pol. 596, 603 (1985) (stating that obtaining
responses by judges "to identical case stimuli ... will never be the case in studies of trial
court decision making"); see also Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 Judicature 48,51 (1986)
(stating that "the problem of comparability of cases cannot be completely resolved at the
lower federal court level"). As this study demonstrates, the prediction that this scenario
"never" would arise proved to be too pessimistic, but "rarely" would be true, as our arche-
typal scenario appears to be unique and is unlikely to be often, if ever, replicated.
5 See infra Part ILB.2-3.
6 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2034 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
7 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).
8 See United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy State-
ments (1987) [hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements].
9 See infra Part II.B.1.
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Accordingly, federal district judges across the nation were called
upon to decide whether to aiply the Guidelines when sentencing con-
victed criminal defendants or whether instead to strike down the
Guidelines as contrary to constitutional principles. While awaiting fi-
nal resolution of the constitutionality question, convicted criminal de-
fendants were variously sentenced under divergent sentencing
schemes depending on which federal district court or even which indi-
vidual federal judge had jurisdiction over the sentencing proceeding.
The result was chaos in the federal criminal justice system.10 The un-
certainty did not dissipate until the Supreme Court ruled in January
1989 that the Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines passed con-
stitutional muster."
During a period of less than a year, hundreds of judges rendered
constitutional opinions on a single matter of great public importance.
Never before has a question of such import and involving such signifi-
cant issues of constitutional law mandated the simultaneous attention
of such a large segment of the federal trial bench. Most importantly
from the standpoint of empirical analysis, the legal attacks upon the
Guidelines were independent of the facts in the individual defendants'
cases and the common constitutional issues were open questions, with
respected judges reaching opposing conclusions. Given the closely
controverted nature of the legal questions, we would expect that soci-
ological, ideological, or other factors would be most likely to play a
role in judicial decisionmaking here, if they do anywhere. Thus, this
situation provides an archetypal case for examining influences upon
judicial behavior.
From a database consisting of the universe of district court Sen-
tencing Guidelines constitutional decisions, involving a total of 293
judges, we constructed a standard set of independent variables (as
well as alternatives) including each judge's demographic characteris-
tics, party of appointing president, prior employment, and judicial role
or institutional factors, as well as the factors of potential for promo-
tion to the appellate court and precedential influence.'2 Most signifi-
cantly, and to our knowledge without precedent in empirical research
into judicial decisionmaking, we had the opportunity to study legal
reasoning in action through opinions written or joined by 188 judges
that resolved nearly identical legal questions.' 3
10 See United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1520 & n.12 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
(en banc) (Hupp, J., dissenting) (describing "chaos" caused by uncertainty in sentencing
practice and procedure during this period).
11 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
12 See infra Part III.
13 See infra Part IV.B.
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Toward that end, we created and implemented a strategy of cate-
gorizing and coding for statistical analysis the various veins of consti-
tutional reasoning and theory found in this rich lode of decisional
explanations. By mining this treasure trove of data, we have looked
deeper into the judicial mind and observed the influences upon the
manner in which a judge examines the constitutional issues, adopts a
constitutional theory, and engages in legal reasoning.
For decades, scholars have referred to "the inescapable conclu-
sion that judicial decisions-and particularly constitutional law deci-
sions-are at least partially attributable to the personal values and
experiences of the judges.' u 4 By contrast, our general hypothesis was
that extralegal factors have a modest influence and thus are poor
predictors of judicial behavior. In sum, we were skeptical of legal "ni-
hilism and its lesson that who decides is everything, and principle
nothing but cosmetic."15
Our findings provide greater support to the behavioral model of
judicial decisionmaking than we anticipated. While most of the social
background variables we explored proved insignificant, 16 some strik-
ing findings emerged that were consistent with a sociological or social
-construction model of decisionmaking, particularly with respect to the
prior employment variable.17 For example, prior experience as a
criminal defense lawyer was significant under several formulations of
our dependent variables as an explanatory variable for opposition to
the Sentencing Guidelines.' 8 On the other hand, prior experience as a
state or local judge was related to upholding the Guidelines as consti-
tutionally valid.19
In addition, a measure of a district judge's potential to be pro-
moted to the court of appeals consistently correlated with approval of
the constitutionality of the Guidelines,20 confirming an earlier study
involving a smaller set of decisions.21 Those judges most eligible for
elevation appeared motivated to approve the Guidelines, which were
the handiwork of the political branches with control over appoint-
14 Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 Harv. L
Rev. 1551, 1552 (1966). See generally infra Part II.A.1 (discussing mixed results of prior
studies seeking to find connection between judges' social backgrounds and voting
behaviors).
15 Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222, 227 (1984).
16 See infra Part V.A.
17 See infra Part V.C.
18 See infra Part V.C.1.
19 See infra Part V.C.3.
20 See infra Part V.E.
21 See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's -Unconstitutional"
about the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 183, 184 (1991) (conducting study
of Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality decisions by 196 judges).
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ments to higher courts. Together with evidence that judges were influ-
enced by the perceived impact of the ruling on future workload, our
finding provides empirical support for an economic model of judicial
decisionmakers. Yet the evidence was ambiguous, suggesting a more
complicated interaction. When we explored whether promotion po-
tential motivated judges, particularly those appointed by Republican
presidents, to adopt the preferred constitutional theory of the
Reagan-Bush administrations, the significance of the promotion po-
tential factor faded away.
When we moved beyond analysis of the outcomes (constitutional
versus unconstitutional) to the reasoning reflected in written opinions,
other influences emerged that had been obscured in the general result
stage of the analysis. For example, while minority race judges did not
rule differently on the overall question of constitutionality, race corre-
lated with the theory upon which that outcome was premised. Minor-
ity judges were significantly more likely to accept the novel concept of
a due process right to individualized sentencing, rather than ground-
ing a decision on the conventional separation of powers theories more
frequently articulated by nonminority judges.22 Other results were
also fascinating, such as the startling finding that use of originalist con-
stitutional reasoning correlated negatively with appointment by
President Reagan.23 In sum, our study demonstrates that prior empir-
ical studies of judicial decisionmaking, which focused upon outcomes
and generally neglected reasoning as reflected in opinions, have over-
looked the heart and soul of the judicial process.
Finally, our study confirmed that legal, as well as extralegal, vari-
ables are important and cannot be neglected. Contrary to a strict be-
havioral model, the prior rulings of their colleagues powerfully
influenced judges in reaching a decision.
22 See infra Part V.A.2.
23 See infra Part V.B.
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II
PRIOR STUDIES, THE PRESENT STUDY, AND THEIR VALUE
AND LIMITATIONS
A. Prior Empirical Research on Judicial Decisionmaking
1. Studies of Social Background and Other Factors Influencing
Judicial Decisionmaking24
Norman Dorsen aptly capsulizes the behavioral or social back-
ground model, which has dominated social science research into judi-
cial decisionmaking:
We must never forget that the boy is father to the man, that the
seeds of the fully mature person are long embedded in his character.
One need not embrace Freudian psychology to conclude that early
experience and training will be reflected in later actions and deci-
sions, and that flexibility and open-mindedness are themselves the
product of what has gone before. 5
The theory states that social background or personal attributes of
judges shape personal and policy values that directly influence judicial
decisions.26
However, empirical analyses of behavioral theory have been
largely disappointing, leading many researchers to question whether
the theory remains viable.2 7 Indeed, "mixed results" is the phrase re-
24 Specific results of prior studies are further developed in Part V of this article, which
discusses and interprets the results of this study by sets of independent variables.
25 Norman Dorsen, A Change in Judicial Philosophy?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 18, 1985, at 13;
see also S. Sidney Ulmer, Are Social Background Models Time-Bound?, 80 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 957, 957 (1986) (calling Dorsen's comment "about as concise a statement of the social
background theory as could be penned").
26 See C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal
Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88,35 Am. J. Pol. Sdi. 460,460-
61 & n.2 (1991); see also Henry R. Glick, Courts, Politics, and Justice 313 (3d ed. 1993)
("The study of judges' personal backgrounds assumes basically that people behave accord-
ing to who they are."). An alternative approach examines courts as the unit of analysis and
seeks to determine the influence of aggregate measures of a jurisdiction's characteristics
(e.g., method of judicial selection) on evolution of doctrine. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon &
Lawrence Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffu-
sion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 975, 975 (1981) (studying whether
judicial doctrines diffuse on regional basis, and whether organizations adopt innovations
consistently across issues, based on underlying characteristics of organization); Andrew P.
Morriss, Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on the Common Law: General
Principles and Case Studies of the Decline of Employment-at-Will, 45 Case V. Res. L
Rev. 999, 1020-56 (1995) (studying content of judicial opinions in context of evolution of
common law doctrine).
27 See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model 231-34 (1993) (concluding that empirical evidence provides little support for rela-
tionship between social background factors and judicial attitudes); Orley Ashenfelter, The-
odore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary. The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257,281 (1995) (concluding, in context of
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searchers most commonly select to describe prior attempts to connect
social or experiential attributes of judges to their voting behavior.28
For example, race and sex generally have appeared to have little ex-
planatory value for judicial decisionmaking. 29 Similarly, prior judicial
federal district court outcomes in civil rights cases, "that individual judge characteristics
cannot be assumed to influence substantially the mass of cases"); Gerard S. Gryski &
Eleanor C. Main, Social Backgrounds as Predictors of Votes on State Courts of Last Re-
sort: The Case of Sex Discrimination, 39 W. Pol. Q. 528, 528-29, 536 (1986) (describing
criticism of social background theory but concluding that theory remains viable with signif-
icant limitations); see also Peter J. Van Koppen & Jan Ten Kate, Individual Differences in
Judicial Behavior: Personal Characteristics and Private Law Decision-Making, 18 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 225, 225-41 (1984) (finding that Dutch judicial decisions in civil cases are only
moderately influenced by personality characteristics of judges, measured by psychological
tests through questionnaire to judges participating in simulation).
28 See Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 Judicature 129, 130 (1993) (describing prior empirical re-
search on behavior of women decisionmakers, including judges, as producing "mixed re-
sults"); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 491,496 (1975) (describing multitude of prior studies on relationship of
background variables to judicial voting behavior as having "mixed" results); John Gruhl,
Cassia Spohn & Susan Welch, Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 308, 311 (1981) (describing studies using judges' sex as independent variable as
yielding "mixed results"); Tate & Handberg, supra note 26, at 470 (describing results of
prior studies on influence of prior judicial experience as "mixed"); Ulmer, supra note 25, at
957 (describing prior research on social background influences upon judicial decisionmak-
ing as producing "mixed results").
29 See, e.g., Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 131-32 (finding no significant
differences between male and female judges in search and seizure and obscenity cases,
when controlling for party of appointing president, although finding female judges more
liberal in employment discrimination cases); Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appoint-
ments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 67 Judicature 164, 171-73 (1983) (finding relative similarity between
President Carter's male and female appointees to courts of appeals and, with exception of
criminal cases, minimal variances between black and white judges, even in racial discrimi-
nation cases); Gruhl, Spohn & Welch, supra note 28, at 318-20 (finding few significant
differences in conviction rates of male and female judges, although finding female judges
more likely to sentence female defendants to prison); Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M.
Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Dis-
position, Soc. Sci. J., April 1977, at 77, 86 (concluding that female judges "behave no differ-
ently than their male colleagues" in study of sentencing); Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing
Decisions of Black and White Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 1197, 1211-14 (1990) (finding "remarkable" similarities in sentencing decisions
of black and white judges and concluding that race of judge has little predictive power);
Thomas M. Uhiman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 884, 891-94 (1978) (finding no important differences between black and white
judges in criminal conviction rates and sentencing); Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 613-
15 (finding marked similarity in decisionmaking records between black and white federal
district judges in several fields and few differences between male and female judges, with
exception of tendency of female judges to rule in favor of government entities); Susan
Welch, Michael Combs & John Gruhl, Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 126, 131-35 (1988) (finding little impact of black judges in overall severity of criminal
sentencing, but finding evidence of more equal treatment by black judges of white and
black defendants in decisions to incarcerate); Richard L. Fox & Robert W. Van Sickel,
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experience has seldom been found significant 30 and, even on those oc-
casions where it has correlated with judicial behavior, has remained a
weak influence.31 While some studies have found prior criminal pros-
ecution experience to be influential, the influence has pointed in
somewhat inconsistent directions 32 Don Bowen's pronouncement
thirty years ago still holds force today: "A final inescapable conclu-
sion about the explanatory power of the sociological background char-
acteristics of [judges] is that they are generally not very helpful. ' '33
Still, behavioral theory has enjoyed at least occasional success.
Certain studies have produced intriguing results in discrete contexts
that cannot be dismissed. For example, one study found that female
judges were more deferential than their male counterparts to positions
taken by the government in personal rights and economic regulations
Gender Dynamics and Judicial Behavior in Criminal Trial Courts 12-13, 20-22 (1998) (un-
published manuscript on file with the New York University Law Review) (finding no clear
pattern of male and female traits or "voice" in exercise of judicial discretion by local crimi-
nal judges, although finding some gender differences, such as that female judges were more
likely to rely on prosecution while male judges were more likely to side with defense);
Kenneth Luis Manning, Como Decide? (How Do You Decide?): Decision-Making by
Hispanic Judges in the Federal District Courts 6 (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the New York University Law Review) (finding that "the difference in ideology of
Hispanic and Non-Hispanic judge decisions [on federal district courts] is virtually
nonexistent").
30 See J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System 182-
83 (1981) (finding in study of circuit judges' votes across multiple fields that prior judicial
experience was significant only on discrete issue of civil rights); Ashenfelter, Eisenberg &
Schwab, supra note 27, at 277-81 (finding that individual judge characteristics, including
prior judgeship, did not appear to influence substantially mass of cases decided by district
court judges); Gryski & Main, supra note 27, at 532 (finding that prior career cbaracteris-
tics of judges were "not useful predictors of state high court judicial behavior in sex dis-
crimination cases").
31 See Tate & Handberg, supra note 26, at 470 (describing finding in C. Neal Tate,
Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of United States Supreme Court Jus-
tices, 75 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 355, 361-63 (1981)).
32 For example, prosecutorial experience has been associated with a more conservative
behavior in civil liberties cases, see id. at 474-76, but with a more liberal or favorable re-
sponse to racial equal protection claims, see Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson,
The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 Cornell L Rev. 1151,
1190 (1991); see also Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 333, 336 (1962) (finding in early study that former prosecutors were
significantly more likely to vote against defense in criminal cases).
33 Don Bowen, The Explanation of Judicial Voting Behavior from Sociological Charac-
teristics of Judges (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with
author), quoted in S. Sidney Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator to the Votes of
Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases: 1947-1956 Terms, 17 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 622, 622
(1973); see also Howard, supra note 30, at 182 (finding, in study of decisions by circuit
judges in multiple fields, that "[n]o single background characteristic was a strong determi-
nant of voting outcomes across the board"); Gryski & Main, supra note 27, at 528 (ac-
knowledging that "social background factors have not proven to be particularly effective
means by which to explain judicial behavior").
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cases,34 and another found that female judges were more supportive
of claimants in employment discrimination cases.35 Another study
found a pronounced variance in voting by black and white federal ap-
pellate judges in criminal cases,36 although several studies found little
or no difference in adjudication of criminal cases by black and white
judges.3 7 Although findings of significant association between basic
background variables and judicial behavior have been fairly isolated
and rarely replicated in other contexts, they do exist.
In contrast to the sporadic findings of significant correlation on
other background variables, studies frequently (but not invariably3s)
have found political party identification to be a significant predictor of
judicial voting in ideologically divisive cases.39 Affiliation with the
Democratic party corresponds to more liberal patterns of voting be-
havior by judges,40 as does appointment to the federal bench by a
Democratic president.41 However, the influence of even this variable
34 See Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 604-11.
35 See Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 131-32. But see Gryski & Main, supra
note 27, at 531-32, 536 (finding sex not to be significant influence in study of state high
court judges in sex discrimination cases, although number of female judges was too small
for reliable conclusions).
36 See Gottschall, supra note 29, at 172-73.
37 See Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 613-15 (finding that "black and white [federal
district] judges displayed markedly similar decision-making records" in multiple legal
fields, including criminal law and procedure). Studies of trial judges have consistently
found little or no difference between black and white judges in adjudication of criminal
cases, including conviction rates and sentencing severity. See, e.g., Spohn, supra note 29, at
1211-14; Uhlman, supra note 29, at 891-94; Welch, Combs & Gruhl, supra note 29, at 131-
35.
38 See Howard, supra note 30, at 182-83, 186 (finding, in study of circuit judge decisions
across multiple fields, that party identification was weakest indicator on votes, and con-
cluding that "[t]he predictive power of political indicators was negligible and indirect");
Ashenfelter, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 27, at 281 (concluding in study of district
court decisions "that we cannot find that Republican judges differ from Democratic judges
in their treatment of civil rights cases").
39 See, e.g., C. K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and Judgment in Federal District
Courts 24-57 (1996); Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges' Attributes and Case Characteris-
tics: An Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 Judica-
ture 277, 278, 280 (1988); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale
L.J. 2155, 2175-76 (1998); Goldman, supra note 28, at 496-506; Gottschall, supra note 29, at
169-71; Gottschall, supra note 4, at 51-54; Gryski & Main, supra note 27, at 531, 533-34;
Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 843,
845 (1961); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,
83 Va. L. Rev. 1717, 1717-21, 1738-66 (1997). See generally American Court Systems 382
(Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 2d ed. 1989).
40 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 24 (noting that "Democratic judges are 1.42
times more likely to render a liberal decision than are judges of Republican back-
grounds"); Gryski & Main, supra note 27, at 534.
41 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 46 (finding that judicial "appointees of Dem-
ocratic presidents are clearly more liberal" in decisionmaking than judges chosen by
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should not be overstated; the most comprehensive study of federal
district court judges to date found relatively little overall difference
between Democratic- and Republican-affiliated judges.42 Moreover,
at least as of 1986, partisan-correlated behavior by federal judges was
declining.4 3
In addition, the focus of prior studies on outcomes over lengthy
periods of time in published opinions may have skewed the results
toward greater partisan influence: "[W]hen attention shifts from ag-
gregate patterns of case outcomes to individual, case-specific deci-
sions, the effects of political influences are less apparent.""* Thus,
Republicans); Gottschall, supra note 29, at 169-71; Gottschall, supra note 4, at 51. For a
discussion of the relationship between a judge's party identification and the party of the
appointing president, see infra Part II.B.
42 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 34 (finding difference of 10-13% between
Democratic and Republican cases for all types of cases). However, there were significantly
higher partisan voting differences in certain areas, such as race discrimination and religion.
See id. at 40 (finding difference between Democratic and Republican judges of 28% on
race discrimination cases and 24% on religion cases); id. at 48-50 (finding some dramatic
voting differences between Carter and Reagan appointed judges on such issues as race
(60%) and right to privacy (33%)); see also Gottschall, supra note 4, at 53 (finding, in
study of court of appeals judges, that when looking at results in universe of both unani-
mous and nonunanimous cases, margin of difference between appointees of Democratic
and Republican presidents was 20% in civil rights and liberties cases and 10% in economic
cases).
43 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 56. At least two studies of judicial behavior
post-1986 have confirmed the decline of partisan variance among federal judges. See
Nancy Scherer, Reexamining the Politics of Crime in the Federal Courts: Are Bill
Clinton's Judicial Appointees "New" Democrats or "Old" Democrats? 29 (1998) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review) (concluding that
"partisan affiliation is no longer sufficient to distinguish between the voting behavior of
federal appeals court judges, at least with respect to issues of criminal law and civil liber-
ties," and finding in study of search and seizure cases that voting behavior of Clinton's
judicial nominees to federal appellate courts is "virtually indistinguishable" from that of
appointees of his Republican predecessor); see also Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp &
Donald R. Songer, The Voting Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial Appointees, 80
Judicature 16, 19-20 (1996) (concluding that Clinton's appointees have demonstrated mod-
erate decisional tendencies, and finding small differences in -liberal" voting rates, gener-
ally under 10% across categories of cases, for both district and court of appeals judges).
However, another recent study found significant partisan voting on the multimember
appellate panels of the District of Columbia Circuit. See Revesz, supra note 39, at 1717-19.
Revesz concluded that "judges generally vote consistently with their ideological prefer-
ences only when they sit with at least one other judge of the same political party" and
therefore prior studies that "fail[ed] to control for such panel composition effects" have
"substantial[ly] underestimat[ed] the frequency of ideological voting." Id. at 1719-20.
However, Revesz acknowledged that "judges on the D.C. Circuit have a far higher political
profile than do federal judges generally" and "[t]hus ideology might have a greater-than-
average impact on the votes of these judges than on the universe of federal circuit court
judges." Id. at 1720-21.
44 Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 14.
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when lack of comparability is reduced by adhering to a case-specific
scenario, political affiliation as a predictor declines.45
In any event, political affiliation is different in kind from other
socioeconomic background factors because it involves a deliberate
adoption of values or attitudes.46 As Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth
explain:
[T]wo of the most important variables-partisanship and appointing
president-are probably best considered surrogates for judicial atti-
tudes, not causes of them-and, as such, are at least potentially
independent of social background. Thus they are useful for predict-
ing attitudes, but are of less help in explaining them. For instance,
President Reagan nominated Antonin Scalia [to the United States
Supreme Court] because Scalia is a staunch conservative; Scalia is
not a staunch conservative because he was nominated by Reagan.
Similarly, among political elites, ideology might influence party
identification at least as much as party identification influences
ideology.4
7
The limited success of behavioral research underscores the need
to develop a more sophisticated and comprehensive model. In addi-
tion, the behavioral model places undue emphasis upon extralegal fac-
tors, neglecting the mediating effect of judicial role orientation
45 This is especially true when most such studies rely on published opinions which, par-
ticularly at the federal district court level, are an unrepresentative sample of peculiarly
controversial cases. See id. at 16 (noting that less than five percent of district court deci-
sions are published and that "published decisions tend to be policy judgments with greater
political consequences than their unpublished counterparts"). See generally Susan M.
Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15
Just. Sys. J. 782 (1992) (arguing that published decisions are not representative of all dis-
trict court cases). When unpublished decisions are examined, partisan differences fade
considerably, although this may be at least partially attributable to the routine, precedent-
bound nature of such cases that leaves less room for expression by judges of political
proclivities. See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 134 (finding that while link between
political appointment and judicial rulings may extend to certain types of unpublished deci-
sions, "the magnitude and consistency of appointment effects on unpublished opinions do
not compare with appointment effects on published decisions"); Ashenfelter, Eisenberg &
Schwab, supra note 27, at 258-60, 281 (finding no partisan difference in district court rul-
ings in day-to-day docket). But see Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 21 (reporting other
studies finding that differences in partisan voting by district judges between published and
unpublished opinions were negligible); see also Morriss, supra note 26, at 1038-47 (summa-
rizing literature on unpublished decisions and their role in empirical work).
46 See Ulmer, supra note 25, at 961 (stating that, unlike other experiential variables,
party choice is "a surrogate for the aggregate of attitudes" that other experiences produce);
see also American Court Systems, supra note 39, at 382 (stating that party affiliation and
appointment by particular president are "likely reasonably accurate surrogates for atti-
tudes and values").
47 Segal & Spaeth, supra note 27, at 232; see also Ulmer, supra note 25, at 961 (stating
that "[ilt may not be strictly logical .. to argue that party 'causes' or influences judicial
votes" because party choice is "a surrogate for the aggregate of attitudes" possessed by
judge).
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(impartiality, suppression of personal predilections, attention to legal
doctrine) and precedent.48 There is a growing recognition that social
background or behavioral theory, even including partisan or political
linkage, is an insufficiently robust model for explaining judicial deci-
sionmaking. C. K. Rowland and Robert Carp, who have conducted
the most comprehensive empirical study of federal district judges,
have recently called for a new approach that "accommodate[s] polit-
ical and jurisprudential influences without assuming away the judicial
reasoning process. '49 While not retreating to a formalistic legal
model, researchers need to take more seriously both the legal dimen-
sion and the judge's role orientation as judicial officer.50 Moreover, it
is time for a revival of interest in the actual judgment process, as re-
flected in judges' explanations of their reasoning.
Another reason to focus effort on developing a model that incor-
porates additional factors is provided by public choice or rational ac-
tion theory. Thus far, public choice theory has had relatively little to
say about judges' behavior in deciding cases, in large measure because
[t]he structure of the 'independent' judiciary is designed to remove
judges from the day-to-day pressures and temptations of ordinary
political office, and with some qualifications it achieves that end. It
is a strategy that recognizes the forces of self-interest, regards them
48 See Howard, supra note 30, at xxiii (stating that "judicial roles become intervening
variables between institutional and personality factors in the judicial process"); Frank B.
Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdiscipli-
nary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251, 299 (1997) ("The judicial process is meant to create
a role orientation centering decisions on the legal model. while research into judicial role
orientation is somewhat limited, there is reason to think that role responsibilities play an
important part in judging.").
49 Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 136. They observe that, at least in terms of self-
perception, "many trial judges appear to be motivated primarily by their role orientation-
that is, their 'secondary' perceptions of what a judge should do-and not by their personal
preferences." Id. at 190. "A role orientation is a psychological construct which is the com-
bination of the occupant's perception of the role expectations of signilicant others and his
or her own norms and expectations of proper behavior for a judge." James L Gibson,
Judges' Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 911, 917 (1978). Gibson found that a judge's role orientation acts as an interven-
ing variable, such that a judge's belief about the legitimacy of allowing nonlegal criteria to
influence decisions does indeed affect "the relationship between attitudes and behavior."
Id. at 922; see also American Court Systems, supra note 39, at 437 (explaining that "the
judge's concept of role can inhibit the full flowering of political attitudes and values" in
exercise of judicial discretion).
50 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 150-73 (proposing new model of trial court
judgment as special case of "social judgment" within context of legal system that, %vhile
allowing discretion, also places meaningful constraints on judges' decisionmaking
authority).
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as potentially destructive, and then takes successfid institutional
steps to counteract certain known and obvious risks.51
Consequently, while public choice theory suggests examining legisla-
tors' votes and campaign contributions from special interest groups,
similar candidates for empirical research of judicial behavior are not
immediately obvious. Although public choice's predictive power with
respect to judicial decisions is limited (a view that is widely shared in
the literature5 2), it does suggest certain factors are likely to be impor-
tant. Because the institutional structure of the judiciary restricts pecu-
niary gain, "ambitious judges could seek to maximize their 'influence'
and 'prestige,' which are normally achieved by excellence in argument
and writing. '53 Although secure in their present positions, federal
judges may also seek career advancement within the judiciary.
Public choice theory thus suggests that empirical research into ju-
dicial decisionmaking needs to take into account not only sociological
background variables, but also the legal context and reasoning of the
opinions through which judges express their views. Further, the insti-
tutional structure, which provides judges with their independence
from the influence of more usual public choice factors, also "frees
them to develop whatever theories of statutory construction and con-
stitutional interpretation, wise or foolish, deferential or mischievous,
that captures their fancy."'54 It thus creates the space in which the
variation necessary for empirical analysis can arise.
2. The Problems of Incomparability, Inauthenticity, and
Superficiality in Prior Studies
By necessity, most empirical studies of judicial behavior have ex-
amined sample groups of judges and series of unrelated cases in gen-
eral areas of the law. For example, researchers have grouped federal
judges by appointing president or party of appointing president, com-
51 Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Pub-
lic Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 827, 831-32.
52 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 2 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, What
Do Judges Maximize] ("The economic analyst has a model of how criminals and contract
parties, injurers and accident victims, parents and spouses-even legislators, and executive
officials such as prosecutors-act, but falters when asked to produce a model of how judges
act."); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1399 (1996) ("[N]o stable [public
choice] theory has emerged to explain the behavior of judges because most Americanjudges, regardless of their substantive decisions, are insulated from monetary rewards or
punishments, guaranteed of their position[s], and unable to affect their own jurisdiction in
any direct fashion.").
53 Epstein, supra note 51, at 838.
54 Id. at 851.
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paring the voting records of different groups across a large sample of
different cases, often by labeling the outcome as "liberal" or "con-
servative."55 Other studies have examined background variable influ-
ences upon judicial behavior by looking at the propensity of judges to
vote for plaintiffs in civil rights cases, or for defendants in criminal
cases. 56 These longitudinal studies have the value of examining judi-
cial behavior over a period of time and in the context of a large
number of cases. However, such studies also share the assumption
that different cases over a period of years are sufficiently similar that
the results are comparable.5 7 A study of votes by judges for defen-
dants in criminal cases, for example, can lead to meaningful results
only if we assume that as a category criminal cases are sufficiently
similar in nature that the frequency of a judge's vote for a defendant
55 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 30, at xix, 173-84 (reviewing 4,941 decisions by 35
judges of Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits, from fiscal years 1965-1967, in
such categories as civil rights, criminal, and labor, with certain outcomes labeled liberal or
conservative); Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 18 (reviewing 45,826 published opinions
issued by 1500 district court judges from 1933-1987, categorized into 26 case types with
liberal/conservative dimension); Gottschall, supra note 29, at 167-68 (reviewing all court of
appeals decisions in criminal procedure, racial discrimination, and sex discrimination cases
over two-year period, labeling votes in favor of claims by criminally accused and discrimi-
nation claimants as liberal); Gottschall, supra note 4, at 51 (reviewing all court of appeals
decisions in multiple general fields, including racial or sexual discrimination and criminal
procedure, during year-and-a-half period, with certain outcomes assigned liberal label).
56 See, e.g., Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 130-31 (revieing votes of all
federal court of appeals judges from 1981-1990 in employment discrimination, criminal
procedure, and obscenity cases); Goldman, supra note 28, at 492 (reviewing decisions by
court of appeals judges in multiple issue areas, including criminal procedure, civil liberties,
labor, and government fiscal); Gryski & Main, supra note 27, at 529, 536 (reviewing state
high court rulings in sex discrimination cases from 1971-1981); Nagel, supra note 32, at 333
(reviewing criminal cases decisions from 1955 involving 313 state and federal supreme
court judges listed in directory).
57 See Van Koppen & Ten Kate, supra note 27, at 226 ("The problem in working with
actual decisions is to ensure that the different cases heard by different judges are compara-
ble on all relevant dimensions."). See generally John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr,
Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making in Informal
Courts, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 467,472-73 (1988) (discussing alternative problems of incompara-
bility among cases or unrealistic simulation in empirical research of judicial decisionmak-
ing). Conley and O'Barr also criticize prior quantitative studies as inadequate to "answer
the question of what caused the result in a particular case," id. at 473, and adduce the
limitations of a priori judgments by researchers in selecting the variables to be evaluated in
a study, see id. at 474-75. They propose an alternative method of observing judges as they
make decisions and then evaluating judicial statements of reasoning in a group workshop
discussion applying conversational analysis. See id. at 475-79. However, the Conley-
O'Barr method cultivates its own weaknesses, such as the absence of quantification, the
difficulty in replication by other researchers, and heavy dependence on the subjective in-
terpretations of the workshop participants. In any event, we have adhered to a traditional
quantitative statistical model, which requires developing (through review of the raw data,
prior research, and theory) independent variables for coding and analysis.
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reflects a general judicial attitude rather than individualized resolu-
tion of the unique facts in each particular case.58
Simulation experiments with judges exhibit the other primary
weakness of prior studies, an inauthenticity that fails to mirror the real
world of adjudication and judicial decisionmaking. As John M.
Conley and William M. O'Barr comment: "[E]xperiments involve
simulation. One can never claim with certainty to have captured all
the elements of a real case, nor can one be sure that subjects will re-
spond to stimuli in the same way as they would in the courtroom." 59
For example, Peter Van Koppen and Jen Ten Kate conducted a simu-
lation of the judicial decisionmaking task by submitting nine written
case problems to Dutch judges, along with questionnaires on role con-
58 See Aliotta, supra note 39, at 277 (observing that "[b]oth studies of judicial attributes
and judicial attitudes are concerned with judges' voting propensities over a large number
of cases," such that "the facts or legal principles involved in particular cases are not consid-
ered relevant"); Gottschall, supra note 29, at 169 n.13 (observing that "lower federal court
judges decide different cases in different settings and their votes are not directly compara-
ble" and thus "generalizations from such quantitative data" about relative attitudes of
lower court judges "must be assessed cautiously"). Even when the study focuses upon
United States Supreme Court decisions, thereby including generally the same set of judges
hearing the same cases, see, e.g., Segal & Spaeth, supra note 27; Tate & Handberg, supra
note 26; Ulmer, supra note 33, the incomparability problem persists through the assump-
tion that a justice's resolution of one discrete case in a field, such as criminal law, provides
evidence of an attitude on that subject rather than evaluation of anomalous facts, circum-
stances, or legal doctrinal implications of that individual case. Moreover, because the
number of justices included in a study of the Supreme Court is limited, such studies may
produce poignantly detailed descriptions of the attributes, experiences, attitudes, philoso-
phies, and predilections of a small, atypical collection of individual human beings, but add
little knowledge about the general subject of judicial decisionmaking. In other words, de-
tailed studies of Supreme Court justices may come dangerously close to biography rather
than sociology.
Some researchers have attempted to compensate for the incomparability of aggregate
votes in different cases by incorporating certain fact-pattern or other case-specific charac-
teristics to the analysis. See, e.g., Segal & Spaeth, supra note 27, at 216-21,229-31 (in study
of Supreme Court rulings in search and seizure cases, combining derived attitude values for
justices and twelve fact-based factors, such as justification for search, place of intrusion,
etc., as independent variables, resulting in greater prediction rate, although concluding that
justices' attitudes are more important than facts of case in predicting votes); Aliotta, supra
note 39, at 279-80 (devising case characteristic variables for equal protection cases, such as
whether case involved race, fundamental rights, or education, or was brought as class ac-
tion). While this approach is an important refinement of prior research techniques, the
case characteristics chosen remain those the researcher deems important (based in part on
prior research or content analysis of opinions) and cannot fully account for the mul-
tidimensional aspects of each individual case. Moreover, even while incorporating case
characteristics into the analysis, these studies continue to focus upon general outcome
votes, for example, in favor of or against a civil rights or an equal protection claim as the
dependent variable. See, e.g., Segal & Spaeth, supra note 27, at 242-55; Aliotta, supra note
39, at 278. The divergent paths that would lead to the same result, that is, the judges'
reasoning, are not explored.
59 Conley & O'Barr, supra note 57, at 474-75.
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ceptions and personality.60 They acknowledged the limitations of
their research design: "Our simulation was... unlike actual cases in
the brevity of the written materials [one-page summaries of facts] and
in the fact that our judges, like judges in self-report studies, knew that
the fate of actual litigants did not depend on their decisions." 61 In
addition, the facts as provided in the hypothetical problems were un-
disputed, whereas "the factual situations of actual cases [are] more
complex and ambiguous." 62
Moreover, in both longitudinal and simulation studies, research-
ers are less able to explore the reasoning process. In longitudinal
studies, researchers typically measure general outcomes in broadly de-
fined types of cases,63 leaving the process of judicial analysis in the
individual case unexamined. In an experimental study, in addition to
the unreality of the situation and the need to rely upon unrepresenta-
tive volunteers, the participating judges are unlikely to devote the sub-
stantial time, deliberation, and exposure to critique attendant to
preparation of a full-scale written opinion explaining resolution of a
legal problem6a4 In either situation, as Rowland and Carp note, past
empirical studies have "focus[ed] attention exclusively on aggregate
'vote' outcomes rather than on the individual judgment processes that
engendered those outcomes. '65
Accordingly, prior longitudinal studies are well-complemented by
a case study involving presentation of a single, identical legal problem
to a large number of judges, with an examination of the results in light
of background and other independent variables. Likewise, while ex-
perimental simulations and other self-reporting surveys of judicial ac-
tors substantially add to our knowledge, a confirmation test of
decisionmaking behavior must take place in the context of a real case,
demanding meaningful judicial attention to a genuine controversy.
Ideally, this model and authentic controversy scenario would also in-
clude judicial presentation of reasons for the decisions, in the form of
written opinions, which would provide richer data for analysis and
60 See Van Koppen & Ten Kate, supra note 27, at 225. Van Koppen and Ten Kate
explain that Dutch civil cases generally do proceed with exchange of written documents,
such that presentation of written protocols was a legitimate simulation of the tasks that
face trial judges in that nation. See id. at 227.
61 Id. at 227.
62 Id. at 240.
63 See Goldman, supra note 28, at 491 (explaining that outcomes in general issue areas
were examined in "basic political terms of who wins and who loses and by implication what
political values are seemingly being fostered").
64 See Van Koppen & Ten Kate, supra note 27, at 227 (explaining that study asked
participating judges "for their decisions but did not ask them to follow the common proce-
dure in actual cases of providing justifications for the decisions reached").
65 Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 149.
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may reveal influences that have been submerged at the general out-
come level.
Fortunately, the Sentencing Guidelines Crisis offers an unprece-
dented opportunity to conduct such an in-depth study in the context
of a uniquely fertile database. The history and litigation background
leading to this set of decisions, the nature of the database, and the
value and limitations of this episode in legal history for an empirical
study are described next.
B. The Sentencing Guidelines Crisis of 1988 as a Basis for the
Study of Judicial Decisionmaking
1. The Sentencing Guidelines Crisis of 1988
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198466 established the United
States Sentencing Commission as "an independent commission in the
judicial branch of the United States. ' 67 The Commission is a perma-
nent body with seven voting members, at least three of whom must be
federal judges chosen from a group of six recommended by the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States.68 The members of the Commis-
sion are chosen by the president with the consent of the Senate and
serve six-year terms.69 They are removable from the Commission by
the president for good cause.70
The Commission is charged with the task of developing determi-
nate "guidelines... for use of a sentencing court in determining the
sentence to be imposed in a criminal case. '71 Pursuant to its statutory
66 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2034 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
67 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994).
68 See id. The judicial members of the Commission are not required to resign as federal
judges while serving on the Commission. See id. § 992(c).
69 See id. §§ 991(a), 992(a).
70 See id. § 991(a).
71 Id. § 994(a)(1). Congress directed the Commission to formulate guidelines that
"provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing," while "avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct" and "maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences" where appropriate. Id. § 991(b)(1)(B). The Guidelines are to
establish, "for each category of offense involving each category of defendant.... a sentenc-
ing range." Id. § 994(b)(1). The range must be consistent with provisions of the federal
criminal code and may vary by no more than 25% or six months from the minimum to the
maximum, except that where the minimum sentence is 30 years or more, the maximum
may be life imprisonment. See id. § 994(b)(1)-(2). The Commission also has continuing
responsibility to review the Sentencing Guidelines regularly, including considering peti-
tions by defendants to modify the Guidelines. See id. § 994(o)-(u). Amendments to the
Guidelines take effect automatically unless, within 180 days after they are reported, spe-
cific legislation provides otherwise. See id. § 994 (p).
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mandate, the Sentencing Commission grouped criminal offenses and
defendants into categories and established a matrix or grid whereby
the sentencing range for each defendant is determined by reference to
the seriousness of the present crime and the defendant's criminal his-
tory.72 After a statutorily imposed six-month waiting period.7 during
which Congress took no negative action,74 the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines went into effect on November 1, 1987, and applied im-
mediately to most federal crimes committed after that date.7s
Contemporaneous observers described the Guidelines as "the
most dramatic change in our Nation's history" in the "Federal crimi-
72 See Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements, supra note 8, at 1.1-1.12.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are, in a sense, nothing more than a set of
instructions for one chart-the Sentencing Table. The goal of guidelines calcu-
lations is to arrive at numbers for the vertical (offense level) and horizontal
(criminal history category) axes on the Sentencing Table grid, which in turn
generate an intersection in the body of the grid. Each such intersection
designates a sentencing range expressed in months.
Frank 0. Bowman, HII, Coping With "Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal
Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 461, 472-73 (1998) (footnote
omitted). For a readable and concise explanation of the Sentencing Guidelines -grid" and
the calculation of a sentence under the Guidelines, see generally Frank 0. Bowman, Ill,
The Quality of Mercy Must be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L Rev. 679,693-704 [hereinafter Bowman, Qual-
ity of Mercy].
73 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2
§ 235(a)(1)(B)(ii)(llI), 98 Stat. 2032 (reprinted in note to 18 U.S.C. § 3551).
74 The House of Representatives defeated a proposal to delay implementation of the
Guidelines. See 133 Cong. Rec. 26,683-84 (1987).
75 See Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements, supra note 8 at 1.1, 1.12 (noting
that "[b]ecause of time constraints and the nonexistence of statistical information, some
offenses that occur infrequently are not considered in this initial set of guidelines," and that
Commission had also deferred promulgation of Guidelines pertaining to certain sanctions
for organizational defendants).
It is somewhat inaccurate to term the Commission's work as mere "guidelines." The
criminal code states that a sentencing court:
[S]hall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range [set forth in the
Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, that was not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines
[and] that should result in a sentence different from that described.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
The sentencing judge must state the reasons for imposing the sentence selected and
must give "the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that de-
scribed" in the applicable guideline. Id. § 3553(c). Congress expected that less than 20%
of sentences would be set outside the Guidelines. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 52 n.71
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235. On the power of sentencing judges to
depart from the Guidelines, see generally Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-100 (1996)
(expanding authority of district judges to depart downward from Guidelines by adopting
abuse of discretion as standard for appellate review of district court evaluation of whether
factors had been adequately considered by Commission in formulating guideline sentence).
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nal justice system. ' 76 As one member of Congress put it, the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act and the Guidelines "rewrite the face of sentencing in
this country as we know it, and have known it for over 200 years. '77
From an indeterminate sentencing system under which judges were
given broad authority to decide whether an offender would be incar-
cerated and for how long,78 the Sentencing Reform Act moved to a
binding sentencing guideline regime that substantially restrains judi-
cial discretion.79 As a leading federal judge later stated, "the Guide-
lines system is probably the most significant development in 'judging'
in the federal judicial system since the adoption in 1938 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
8 0
The Sentencing Guidelines, which generally were perceived as
imposing more severe punishment, especially for drug offenses,81
seized the attention of the criminal defense bar.82 Shortly after the
implementation of the new Sentencing Guidelines regime, criminal
defendants seeking plea bargains or facing sentencing filed challenges
to the Guidelines and to the Commission that promulgated them.8 3
76 133 Cong. Rec. 26,367 (1987) (remarks of Rep. Conyers).
77 Id. at 26,372 (remarks of Rep. Synar).
78 See Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 72, at 682 ("Prior to [enactment of the
Guidelines], the judge had virtually unlimited discretion to sentence a convicted defendant
anywhere within the range created by the statutory maximum and minimum penalties for
the offense or offenses of conviction.").
79 On the history of sentencing, the problems in disparities in sentencing among judges,
and Congress's conclusions in adopting a mandatory guideline system, see generally S.
Rep. No. 98-225, at 37-65 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3220-48. For con-
cise statements of the history and background of sentencing reform and the Sentencing
Guidelines from different positions (one favorable toward and one critical of the Guide-
lines), see Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 72, at 680-704 (favorable); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1938, 1940-51, 1951-60 (1988) (critical).
80 Jos6 A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11,
1992, at 2 [hereinafter Cabranes, Dismal Failure].
81 See Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 72, at 740 (stating that "the Guidelines,
taken together with mandatory minimum sentences, compel the imposition of very long
sentences on drug sellers," sentences that "are long relative to the previously settled expec-
tations of the participants in the federal system"); Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guide-
lines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 Yale L.J. 2043, 2047 (1992) ("[T]he
Commission produced guidelines that actually increase the overall severity [of federal
sentences.]"); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legisla-
tive History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 223, 284-85
(1993) (stating that, in keeping with congressional intent, "the percentage of defendants
being imprisoned and the length of prison terms have increased" under Sentencing
Guidelines).
82 Charles Fried, Order and Law 165 (1991) ("The defense lawyers... hated the guide-
lines, which meant stiffer sentences and less to bargain over.").
83 See Ruth Marcus, Federal Sentences in Limbo as Guidelines Challenged, Wash. Post,
Mar. 2, 1988, at A19 (reporting that defendants charged with crimes committed after No-
vember 1, 1987, effective date of new federal Sentencing Guidelines, were objecting to
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According to our data, the first district court to consider the constitu-
tionality of the Guidelines issued its ruling on January 25, 1988, and
the litigation continued until December 19, 1988, when the last district
court to consider the question issued its ruling.
The constitutional objections fell into four basic categories,84 gen-
erally raised together in a single case: First, and most prominently, the
Sentencing Commission was attacked on separation of powers
grounds as improperly exercising nonjudicial rulemaking powers when
the entity was statutorily located within the judicial branch. ss The
government was divided in its defense of the Commission against this
particular challenge.8 6 Adhering to the Reagan Administration's
traditional or formalist view of separation of powers,87 the Depart-
ment of Justice took the position that the Commission was indeed ex-
ercising an executive function-rulemaking-that cannot be
consigned to the judicial branch.88 However, the Department con-
their constitutionality, resulting in spreading "epidemic of challenges"); David G. Savage,
Court Fights Ahead Over New Sentencing Rules: Novel Attempt at Fairness is Attacked
as a Violation of Separation of Powers, L.A. Trimes, Apr. 8, 19S8, at 18 (reporting growing
number of challenges to Sentencing Guidelines filed by defense lawyers across country and
quoting leading participants from both sides as agreeing that result would be uncertainty,
even chaos, in sentencing procedures until Supreme Court resolved issue).
84 Each of these categories of constitutional attacks serves as a dependent variable unit
for statistical analysis in our study. See infra Part IV.B2.
85 See, e.g., United States v. Velez-Naranjo, 691 F. Supp. 584, 587 (D. Conn. 198)
(accepting defendant's argument that Sentencing Commission exercises executive power
and thus its placement in judicial branch offends Constitution); United States v. Tolbert,
682 F. Supp. 1517, 1523-25 (D. Kan. 1988) (holding that placement of Sentencing Commis-
sion within judiciary violates separation of powers as Commission's power to issue substan-
tive Sentencing Guidelines goes beyond scope of judiciary's authority to adjudicate cases
or controversies).
86 In this and the following paragraphs, we use the term "government" to refer to posi-
tions held both by the Department of Justice and by the Sentencing Commission. when-
ever the two entities differed on the appropriate understanding of the Sentencing
Commission's place in the constitutional scheme of government (the separation of powers
issue), we have identified them individually as the "Department" or "Department of Jus-
tice" and "Sentencing Commission" or "Commission."
87 "A formalist approach seeks to maintain three distinct branches of government, and
to prevent commingling of the three central powers of making the laws, executing the laws,
and interpreting the laws." The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 Harv. L
Rev. 137, 280 n.6 (1989) (citing Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of
Powers Controversies, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1253, 1254 (1988)).
88 Draft Brief on the Constitutionality of the Work of the Sentencing Commission, De-
partment of Justice, Civil Division (Redraft March 28, 1988) at 4, 8-17, 26-34 [hereinafter
DOJ Model Brief] (on file with the New York University Law Review). This model brief,
which was obtained from the Department of Justice under a Freedom of Information Act
request, was filed pursuant to the Attorney General's direction in every district court pro-
ceeding in which a constitutional challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines was made. We
rely on model briefs here for description of the parties' arguments for several reasons.
First, although the arguments underwent some refinement during the year, the essentials of
each party's position were clearly articulated in model briefs. Second, examining the ac-
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tended that the statutory assignment or "label" is merely precatory
and without substantive effect, so that the Commission could be up-
held as being essentially an executive branch agency.8 9 As amicus cu-
riae, 90 the Sentencing Commission participated in these cases to assert
that the Commission's guideline-promulgation activity is sufficiently
related to the judicial function to justify location in the judicial
branch.91 As a consequence, the Sentencing Guidelines cases
became three-cornered fights: defendants arguing the invalidity of
the [Sentencing Reform] Act on any terms, the Department arguing
the Act's validity only if the Commission were (contrary to the
words of the statute) viewed as being part of the Executive Branch,
and [the Sentencing Commission] arguing for the validity of the
scheme exactly as written. 92
Second, the mandatory participation of judges in an extra-judicial
capacity was criticized as impairing the work of the judicial branch
tual briefs from each of the hundreds of cases would not only be costly and inordinately
time-consuming (even if the briefs could be retrieved from federal records centers), but
would add almost no relevant information because most briefs followed the format of a
model brief with the exception of individually-tailored statements of the nature of the
charge and procedural history of particular defendant's cases. (In addition, the DOJ
Model Brief was supplemented, as appropriate, with argument addressing the "core" func-
tion nondelegation issue. See infra note 100.) Third, the written district court opinions,
which were reviewed for this study, confirm the continued adherence of the parties to the
positions articulated in the model briefs.
89 See id. at 4-5, 40-50; see also, e.g., United States v. Smith, 686 F. Supp. 1246, 1251-53
(W.D. Tenn. 1988) (holding that Sentencing Commission was actually in executive branch
despite recitation in statute that it was part of judicial branch); United States v. Ortega
Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1516 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (en banc) (Hupp, J., dissenting)
(accepting Department's position that judicial branch "label" is not controlling).
90 See Motion of the United States Sentencing Commission for Leave to File a Brief as
Amicus Curiae at 2, United States v. Allen, Cr. No. S-88-024-EJG (E.D. Cal. 1988) ("The
Department of Justice has consented to the Commission's request that it be allowed to file
a brief as amicus curiae in this and other cases involving a challenge to the Sentencing
Guidelines."). The Sentencing Commission also developed a model brief that it filed as
amicus curiae in district court proceedings. See infra note 91.
91 See Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, at 1-3, 25-27, 35-48 (Feb. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Sentencing Commission Model Brief]
(on file with the New York University Law Review); Fried, supra note 82, at 165 ("The
Chairman and the most influential members of the Commission were all judges, and they
resented any suggestion that they were now part of the Executive Branch as well as any
aspersions cast on their independence."); see also, e.g., United States v. Macias-Pedroza,
694 F. Supp. 1406, 1413-16 (D. Ariz. 1988) (en banc) (holding that Commission is properly
regarded as being located in judicial branch because it operates in aid of judicial function);
United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp. 1411, 1421-22 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (same).
92 Fried, supra note 82, at 166; see also Marcus, supra note 83, at 32 (describing differ-
ent approaches of Department of Justice and Sentencing Commission in defending Guide-
lines in district courts).
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and undermining the impartiality of the judiciary.93 In addition, the
president's power to remove members of the Commission for cause
was cited as a separation of powers violation, by allowing the execu-
five to dismiss a member of the judicial branch.94 The government
responded that, while the Commission membership must include
three federal judges, the service of any single judge is voluntary and
thus an incidental intrusion upon the judiciary.95 Citing historical pre-
cedent as early as the Washington and Adams administrations, the
government contended that judicial service in a nonjudicial capacity
would not impair the function or impartiality of the judicial branch. 96
Finally, the government justified the president's removal power as ap-
plying only to service on the Commission, not extending to the judge's
judicial position or role.97
Third, the Commission's statutory authority to promulgate
Guidelines was attacked as an improper or excessive delegation of
legislative power. Some defendants contended that Congress is pro-
hibited from delegating authority in the area of criminal sentencing,
asserting that this is a "core legislative field" in which any delegation
is impermissible.98 Other challengers claimed that the Sentencing Re-
form Act provides insufficient direction to the Commission in its
93 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 686 F. Supp. 284, 285-86 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (ac-
cepting defendant's argument that mandatory service of three judges on Commission im-
pairs their ability to perform their constitutional judicial role and undermines their
impartiality and independence); United States v. Elliott, 684 F. Supp. 1535, 1539-40 (D.
Colo. 1988) (accepting defendant's argument that mandatory participation of three Article
m judges on Sentencing Commission contravenes separation of powers doctrine).
94 See, e.g., United States v. Serpa, 688 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (D. Neb. 1988) (accepting
defendant's argument that president's removal power over commissioners, including judge
members, violates separation of powers doctrine); United States v. Cortes, 697 F. Supp.
1305, 1308-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
95 See DOJ Model Brief, supra note 88, at 18-19, 24-25; Sentencing Commission Model
Brief, supra note 91, at 6, 48-55; see also, e.g., United States v. Franz, 693 F. Supp. 637, 692
(N.D. IM. 1988) (holding that presence of Article III judges on Sentencing Commission is
not unconstitutional because judges serve voluntarily); United States v. Alves, 68 F. Supp.
70, 76-78 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that service of Article III judges as voluntary partici-
pants on Sentencing Commission does not impair judicial function).
96 See DOJ Model Brief, supra note 88, at 19-24.
97 See id. at 17-19; Sentencing Commission Model Brief, supra note 91, at 5, 63-64; see
also, e.g., United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp. 968, 985-87 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (holding that
president's power to remove commissioners does not impair independence of judiciary);
United States v. Landers, 690 F. Supp. 615, 623 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (same).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Dahlin, 701 F. Supp. 148, 150-51 (N.D. I11. 1998) (holding
that decisions involving policy choices on core fundamental liberties questions, such as
defining and punishing criminal conduct, are "nondelegable" and may be exercised only by
Congress); United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36, 41-53 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (en bane)
(holding that promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines that are binding on court is nondele-
gable legislative function because only Congress may fix punishment for engaging in crimi-
nal conduct).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1998]
HeinOnline -- 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1401 1998
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
work, that is, fails to provide an "intelligible principle" to guide the
Commission's judgment about the sentences that should be imposed
in particular types of cases.99 The government responded that the
courts have never invalidated a statute on the ground that certain
"core" legislative functions are nondelegable, 100 and that the statutory
delegation here provides sufficiently specific directives to the Com-
mission to pass muster under the nondelegation doctrine.101
Fourth, the very concept of binding Sentencing Guidelines was
directly questioned as violative of a purported substantive due process
right of criminal defendants to individualized sentencing.102 Under
this theory, each defendant is entitled to an individual evaluation of
his conduct and the particular circumstances of the case by a sentenc-
ing judge empowered with full discretion. 103 The government re-
sponded that there was no historical or precedential basis for a
99 See, e.g., United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1162 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (en banc)
(Aronovitz, J., specially concurring) (arguing that "the delegation of legislative power to
the Sentencing Commission is so excessive as to violate the basic premises of our constitu-
tional scheme of government" because "[flew meaningful restrictions on [the Commis-
sion's] discretion are set forth" in statute); United States v. Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941, 950
(D.D.C. 1988) (stating that Sentencing Reform Act "would probably fail to pass muster
[under delegation doctrine], for Congress has given to the Sentencing Commission a man-
date of such vagueness that it constitutes no real direction at all").
100 Although the DOJ Model Brief did not address the "core" function nondelegation
argument, government briefs filed in the district courts added that argument, and the gov-
ernment's response is well-stated in the briefs submitted to appellate courts during this
same time period. See Brief for the United States at 60-62, United States v. Frank, 864
F.2d 992, 1010-12 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 88-3220); Sentencing Commission Model Brief, supra
note 91, at 27-30; see also, e.g., United States v. Myers, 687 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (rejecting argument that any legislative function is per se nondelegable as "core
function"); United States v. Sparks, 687 F. Supp. 1145, 1150-51 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (same).
101 See DOJ Model Brief, supra note 88, at 50-56; Sentencing Commission Model Brief,
supra note 91, at 31-35; see also, e.g., United States v. Macias-Pedroza, 694 F. Supp. 1406,
1411-13 (D. Ariz. 1988) (en banc) (holding that Sentencing Reform Act set out intelligible
standards and statements of purpose and thus was constitutional delegation of legislative
power to Sentencing Commission); United States v. Richardson, 685 F. Supp. 111, 113-14
(E.D.N.C. 1988) (same).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 1354-57 (E.D. Ark. 1988)
(holding that Guidelines violate defendant's due process right to individualized sentenc-
ing); United States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 817-19 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (same).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (invalidat-
ing Guidelines on due process grounds, saying that "sentencing requires a specific assess-
ment of an individual and an individual's circumstances, as it involves an individual's
constitutionally protected right to liberty"); United States v. Martinez-Ortega, 684 F. Supp.
634, 636 (D. Idaho 1988) (holding that "the negation of the sentencing judge's discretion
violates the due process clause by preventing the defendant from having an opportunity to
convince the sentencing judge that there are circumstances which override the point alloca-
tions of the Guidelines").
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substantive right to individualized sentencing, outside of the unique
context of death penalty cases.1 4
During a period of less than one year,105 nearly 300 federal dis-
trict judges were compelled to address a question of major constitu-
tional importance and significant public concern. The federal district
courts were sharply divided in their responses to these legal chal-
lenges. Each district judge was forced to decide independently
whether to sentence defendants under the pre- or post-Sentencing Re-
form Act system; indeed, even different judges within the same district
followed conflicting sentencing approaches based on divergent views
of the validity of the Guidelines. 06 Ultimately, as noted in our study,
179 judges (60.9%) invalidated the Guidelines, while 115 judges
(39.1%) sustained the Guidelines against constitutional challenge. 107
This series of constitutional challenges fomented a crisis in the federal
criminal justice system, as the widespread and entrenched division
among district courts created uncertainty about the sentencing process
nationwide. As one district judge commented at the time, federal
criminal sentencing had dissolved into chaos. 08
To resolve this intolerable situation, the Supreme Court took the
unusual step in Mistretta v. United States'09 of granting certiorari
"before judgment,"110 that is, accepting a case immediately upon ap-
104 See Brief for the United States at 67-75, United States v. Frank. 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.
1988) (No. 88-3220); see also, e.g., United States v. WVeidner, 692 F. Supp. 968.971-72 (N.D.
Ind. 1988) (rejecting due process right to individualized sentencing); United States v.
Seluk, 691 F. Supp. 525, 539 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that congressional choice to reduce
exercise of discretion by judges was not offensive to due process standards).
105 The district court level Sentencing Guidelines litigation continued from January 25,
1988 (the first district court ruling) to December 19, 1988 (the last district court ruling).
106 Compare United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp. 1411 (S.D. Cal. 1983) (up-
holding Guidelines), with United States v. Lopez-Barron, 685 F. Supp. 725 (S.D. Cal.
1988), and United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (both invalidating
Guidelines); compare United States v. Knox, 694 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Wash. 1988) and
United States v. Amesquita-Padilla, 691 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (both upholding
Guidelines), with United States v. Wylie, No. CR88-04T (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 1988).
United States v. Hines, No. CR88-004WD (W.D. Wash. May 11, 1988), United States v.
Dalton, No. CR88-2C (V.D. Wash. June 16, 1988), and United States v. Nordall, No.
CR87-067TB (W.D. Wash. April 21, 1988) (all invalidating Guidelines). Based upon our
research, judges divided internally over the validity of the Guidelines in 28 district courts.
107 See infra Table 3.
108 See United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1520 & n.12 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
(en banc) (Hupp, J., dissenting).
109 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
110 Id. at 371 (explaining that Supreme Court had granted certiorari before judgment
"[b]ecause of the 'imperative public importance' of the issue" and "because of the disarray
among the Federal District Courts"). The Mistretta case was selected as the vehicle for a
certiorari petition because it was one of the first district rulings that had been perfected for
appeal, because it raised the central separation of powers and nondelegation doctrine is-
sues, and because both the Department of Justice and Mistretta's counsel agreed to seek
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peal from the district court and without the intervening step of a court
of appeals disposition."'
Prior to the Supreme Court's resolution of the dispute, but after
the grant of certiorari in Mistretta, two courts of appeals addressed the
issue, reaching opposite conclusions. 112 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in August 1988, invalidated the Sen-
tencing Guidelines on separation of powers grounds." 3 In an opinion
authored by Judge Alex Kozinski, a prominent Reagan appointee, the
court held that mandatory appointment of judges to an entity engaged
in political policymaking, rather than judicial functions, undermines
the actual and perceived independence and impartiality of the judici-
ary.114 By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in November 1988, sustained the Guidelines against constitu-
tional challenge. 15 The Third Circuit rejected arguments that the
Sentencing Guidelines violate substantive due process by circumscrib-
ing the individualized discretion of the sentencing judge'1 6 and that
Congress had unlawfully delegated legislative power to the Commis-
sion.1 17 The court also held that the composition and location of the
Commission neither aggrandizes the powers of the judiciary nor im-
pairs its functions.118
Supreme Court review. As the coauthor of this study who was involved in the litigation of
these cases reports, the Solicitor General's office had initially identified another case as the
candidate to bring this matter to the Supreme Court's attention, but the defendant's coun-
sel in that case proved uncooperative. Solicitor General Charles Fried, on behalf of the
United States, concluded that it would both expedite resolution of this pressing matter and
enhance the likelihood that the Court would accept review of a case off the ordinary track
through the court of appeals if both sides joined in petitioning for review.
111 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1994), the Supreme Court may grant a petition for a writ
of certiorari to review any case that is "in" the court of appeals, even if a final judgment
has not yet been entered by that court. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-92
(1974). If a notice of appeal has been filed from the district court, and it is properly dock-
eted in the court of appeals, then a party may seek direct review by the Supreme Court
before judgment in the court of appeals. See id. The Supreme Court grants "certiorari
before judgment" about once a decade and only in cases of pressing importance. See, e.g.,
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 667-68 (1981) (Iran hostage agreement); Nixon,
418 U.S. at 691-92 (subpoena to president); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (steel seizure case); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (president's assign-
ment of jurisdiction over trial of belligerent saboteurs to military tribunal).
112 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371 n.6 (1989) (observing that two courts of appeals had
addressed issue since it had granted certiorari, one invalidating Guidelines and another
upholding them).
113 See Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom.
United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989).
114 See id. at 1251-66.
115 See United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988).
116 See id. at 1008-10.
117 See id. at 1010-12.
118 See id. at 1012-16.
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On January 18, 1989, the Supreme Court resolved the crisis when
it held in Mistretta v. United States"19 that the Sentencing Guidelines
were constitutional, neither amounting to an excessive delegation of
legislative power nor violating the separation of powers by locating
the Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch.120 The Court de-
termined that the Sentencing Reform Act provides the Commission
with sufficiently specific and detailed guidance in the intricate task of
formulating Sentencing Guidelines, thus satisfying the "intelligible
principle" test for congressional delegations of power. 2 1 Further, ap-
plying a "flexible understanding of separation of powers,' 22 the
Court endorsed the Commission as a constitutionally valid entity,
both in its location in the judicial branch and in its judicial member-
ship.123 While acknowledging that "the Commission wields rulemak-
ing power and not the adjudicatory power exercised by individual
judges when passing sentence," 124 the Court ruled that "Congress may
delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not
trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appro-
priate to the central mission of the Judiciary."' 25 Given the longstand-
ing primary role of the judiciary in the field of sentencing, 126 the Court
concluded that "the placement of the Sentencing Commission in the
Judicial Branch has not increased the Branch's authority" at the ex-
pense of the other branches. 27
The Court also approved the voluntary service of judges on the
Commission. In light of the historical practice of the Founders,
continuing into the modem era, the Court found no absolute constitu-
119 488 U.S. 361, 311-19 (1989). For relatively contemporaneous scholarly comment on
Mistretta, see Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta,
Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. Chi. L Rev. 357 (1990); Martin H. Red-
ish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of Article Ill: The Troubling
Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 299, 311-19 (1989); Julia L Black,
Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 After Mistretta v. United States, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 767 (1990); Mary Buffington,
Comment, Separation of Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After
Mistretta v. United States, 50 La. L Rev. 117 (1989); Mark Nielsen, Comment, Mistretta v.
United States and the Eroding Separation of Powers, 12 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol'y 1049
(1989); Kristin L. Timm, Note, "The Judge Would Then Be the Legislator": Dismantling
Separation of Powers in the Name of Sentencing Reform-Mistretta v. United States, 65
Wash. L. Rev. 249 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 87,
at 279-90.
120 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-97.
121 See id. at 372-79.
122 Id. at 381.
123 See id. at 380-411.
124 Id. at 395.
1z Id. at 388.
126 See id. at 390-91.
127 Id. at 395.
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tional prohibition of judges undertaking extrajudicial duties.128 Fram-
ing the question as "whether a particular extrajudicial assignment
undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch,"'1 29 the Court found
that enlistment of judges is appropriate where the subject lies close to
the judicial function,130 describing sentencing policy as "a matter
uniquely within the ken of judges.' 13' Finally, the Court rejected the
challenge to the president's removal power. 32 Because the president
has the power to remove members of the Commission only for cause,
and has no authority to remove or diminish the status of the judges as
judges, the Court found no risk that the president could exercise un-
due influence over the judiciary or threaten judicial independence. 133
Justice Scalia, a Reagan appointee to the high Court, was the sole
dissenter. 34 He contended that a judicial branch entity with the
power to establish "legally binding prescriptions governing application
of governmental power against private individuals"1 35 is incompatible
with constitutional separation of powers principles.1 36 As a conse-
quence of the Court's decision, he said, there henceforth "may be
agencies 'within the Judicial Branch' (whatever that means), exercis-
ing governmental powers, that are neither courts nor controlled by
courts, nor even controlled by judges."'1 37 More fundamentally, he
criticized the Sentencing Reform Act as a "pure delegation of legisla-
tive power" unrelated to the exercise of executive or judicial power1 38
Arguing that the Commission's function is substantive lawmaking
"completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the law
or adjudication of private rights under the law,"139 he described the
Commission as "a sort of junior-varsity Congress. 1 40
128 See id. at 397-404 (citing simultaneous service of first Chief Justice, John Jay, as Am-
bassador to England; of Chief Justice Ellsworth as minister to France; and of Chief Justice
Marshall as Secretary of State; service of five justices on election commission that resolved
disputed election of 1876; service of Justice Jackson as prosecutor at Nuremberg trials;
presiding of Chief Justice Warren over commission investigating assassination of President
Kennedy).
129 Id. at 404.
130 See id. at 407-08.
131 Id. at 412.
132 See id. at 409-11.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 413-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 413.
136 See id. at 413, 422-27.
137 Id. at 425.
138 Id. at 420.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 427.
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2. The Sentencing Guidelines Cases Database
The database of district court decisions on the constitutionality of
the Sentencing Guidelines during the 1988 period draws primarily
upon a list maintained by the Sentencing Commission staff, consisting
of decisions made by district judges across the nation, both upholding
and striking down the Sentencing Guidelines. As decisions were ren-
dered by district courts during 1988, the Sentencing Commission staff
received reports from the district courts, from the United States At-
torneys' offices and the Department of Justice, and from counsel for
the Sentencing Commission who participated in district court hearings
on the validity of the Guidelines. Commission staff supplemented the
list through a confidential telephone survey of probation offices and
district courts in late 1988 and early 1989, asking whether or not indi-
vidual judges were applying the Guidelines.141 We also searched the
141 John Steer, the General Counsel of the Sentencing Commission, generously granted
us access to this list, subject to an agreement not to publicly release the names of those
ruling judges who had not issued written decisions. A caveat should be noted concerning
the Sentencing Commission information. When the Commission staff conducted the sup-
plemental telephone survey, they focused primarily upon district judges who were not fol-
lowing the Guidelines. Thus, when an individual district judge ,ras not applying the
Guidelines, the staff recorded information about any case decision by that judge invalidat-
ing the Guidelines on constitutional grounds. But when an individual district judge was
applying the Guidelines, no additional information was solicited. In substantial part, this
reflects the fact that many judges applying the Guidelines did so as a matter of course and
without a formal decision upholding the constitutionality of the Guidelines. Thus, the fact
that a judge followed the Guidelines in sentencing did not necessarily mean that the judge
had ruled favorably or at all upon a constitutional challenge to the Guidelines. By con-
trast, nearly all judges who declined to apply the Guidelines in sentencing did so by reason
of a constitutional objection. (The Sentencing Commission staff did note a few judges who
had made no formal ruling on the constitutionality question but were not applying the
Guidelines to sentences. These judges have not been included within this study, which is
limited to study of constitutionality rulings.) In sum, the supplemental information ob-
tained from the telephone survey provides rather complete information about a few addi-
tional district judges who had invalidated the Guidelines, which information is included in
the database for this study. However, a judge who was recorded in the supplemental sur-
vey as applying the Guidelines is included in our database only if there is an independent
confirmation (either from the primary Sentencing Commission decision list or written
decisins available on Westlaw or Lexis) that an actual decision addressing the constitution-
ality of the Guidelines had been rendered.
For this reason, the database prepared for this study should be complete (or as com-
plete as humanly possible) with respect to decisions by district judges invalidating the
Guidelines. However, the database may fall short of perfect completeness with respect to
decisions by district judges upholding the Guidelines. Nevertheless, the Sentencing Com-
mission staff's telephone survey added only 18 judges to the list of judges invalidating the
Guidelines, and we therefore assume that a similarly small number of additional judges
would have been added to the list of judges upholding the Guidelines had sufficient infor-
mation been available to designate them. In any event, at this point in time, it would be
impossible to replicate the original sources of information and create a more complete
database.
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Westlaw and Lexis electronic research databases to confirm that all
rulings were included in the list.142
The resulting database includes a total of 293 district court judges
and 294 observations (one judge having issued a ruling upholding the
Guidelines only to reverse himself in another case four months
later).143 Although information is not complete in every instance, the
Sentencing Commission list contains the name of the judge, the dis-
trict, the name of the criminal case, the case number, the date of the
decision, and the outcome ("constitutional" or "unconstitutional") of
the challenge to the Guidelines. This list includes tallies of oral rul-
ings from the bench and unpublished written decisions that are not
available in case reporters or electronic databases.
For the judicial reasoning component of our study, we drew pri-
marily from a file of written opinions maintained by the Sentencing
Commission during 1988. In addition, we searched the Westlaw and
Lexis electronic databases for other opinions, discovering only a
couple of additional relevant opinions. The Sentencing Commission
also tallied 26 judges as having issued written opinions which were not
included in the Sentencing Commission's file. By writing to the clerks
of the various district courts, obtaining documents from the Federal
Records Centers, and researching on Westlaw and Lexis, we were able
to obtain 22 of these unpublished opinions and discovered that two of
the listed judges had issued oral, not written, decisions. 44
142 The Westlaw and Lexis electronic databases were searched for all rulings on the con-
stitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines. These databases primarily contain decisions
that were officially reported in the Federal Supplement, although quite a few unpublished
decisions are also included.
143 For purposes of our study, three judges were eliminated from the database: (1) a
district judge from the Virgin Islands for whom crucial data were unavailable or nonexis-
tent given the anomalous locale; (2) a district judge who was included in the Sentencing
Commission's tally as upholding the constitutionality of the Guidelines but who, as we
discovered upon review of his written opinion, had applied the Guidelines without address-
ing the constitutionality question; and (3) a court of appeals judge who ruled on a constitu-
tional challenge to the Guidelines while sitting as a district court judge by designation. See
United States v. Estrada, 680 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1988) (Heany, J.), rev'd, 873 F.2d
1449 (8th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision). Only six court of appeals judges ruled
upon the constitutionality of the Guidelines, including Judge Heaney, the members of the
panels in the Third Circuit (one of whom dissented on other grounds without addressing
the constitutionality issue), and the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992
(3d Cir. 1988); Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated sub
nom. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989). Accordingly, court of ap-
peals judges were excluded from our study. Moreover, many of the variables included in
our study are relevant only with respect to district court judges.
144 We were unable to retrieve opinions for only two judges who we had at least some
indication may have prepared written opinions. These two judges are necessarily treated in
our study as though they issued unwritten decisions.
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Based upon this database, 188 (63.9% of the 294 observations)
participated in written opinions upholding or invalidating the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines that could be classified.' 45 Of these, 98 judges sitting
individually issued written decisions, and 90 judges either authored or
joined multiple-judge opinions issued by en bane district courts.146
3. The Value and Limitations of the Sentencing Guidelines
Decisions for Empirical Study
a. Resolving the Problem of Incomparability: The Identical
Legal Problem. The fungible nature of the legal problem in this
unique series of cases resolves the comparability problem that has
plagued prior empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking. 147 In addi-
tion Ito the virtually identical nature of the legal problem, the presen-
tation of model briefs to the many district judges hearing the
constitutional challenges to the Guidelines'4 effectively controlled for
145 Upon reviewing the written decisions, we determined that a few decisions included
in the initial set from the Sentencing Commission were so cursory and lacking in analysis as
to amount to nothing more than written confirmations of bench announcements. Because
these documents provided no basis for analyzing the judge's reasoning, we removed them
from the opinion content analysis stage of the study. However, if an opinion provided any
statement of reasons, even if limited to the adoption by reference of another judges opin-
ion, the opinion was included in our content analysis at least for some purposes. A few
judges issued more than one written decision, but with only one exception these multiple
decisions were identically-worded opinions rendered in different cases within a few days of
one another. On the view that the more important decision is the one upon which the
judge initially "took a stand" for or against the Guidelines, the first opinion is used for
dating purposes. For the one judge who issued a second opinion supplementing the sub-
stance of the first, both opinions were reviewed together as divulging the judge's overall
reasoning and treatment of the panoply of constitutional issues. Judge Edward Devitt of
the District of Minnesota initially upheld the Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines
on July 27, 1988, ruling that the Commission was properly regarded as an independent
commission in the judicial branch and holding that the presidential removal power did not
intrude unconstitutionally upon the judiciary. See United States v. Wlhitfield, 6S9 F. Supp.
954, 956-57 (D. Minn. 1988). Two months later, on September 13, 1988, Judge Devitt reaf-
firmed his earlier ruling and supplemented his analysis, primarily by addressing (and re-
jecting) the government's argument that the Commission should be conceived as an
executive branch agency. See United States v. Roy, 694 F. Supp. 635, 637-41 (D. Minn.
1988).
146 For a discussion of the role of en banc district courts in the Sentencing Guidelines
Crisis, see infra note 172.
147 Questions of sampling and potential bias are avoided in this study because (with the
qualifications mentioned in notes 141-45) we have evaluated the entire universe of judicial
decisions on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines in 19S8. While the 293
judges involved do not constitute the entire population of district judges, the inclusion of a
judge within this universe of decisions was based on the presumably random factors of a
particular criminal case being assigned to that judge and the defendant raising a challenge
to the Sentencing Guidelines.
148 See United States v. Thomas, 699 F. Supp. 147, 148 (V.D. Tenn. 1988) ("The same
arguments are presented to each court, resulting in decisions for and against the guidelines
on varying grounds."). As discussed earlier, the Department of Justice and the Sentencing
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varying quality in legal work among the United States Attorneys' of-
fices and between government and criminal defense counsel. 149 In
sum, the problem of incomparability has been eliminated without sac-
rificing authenticity.
b. Deepening the Search: Analyzing the Content of Judicial Rea-
soning in Opinions. Of equal value, and to our knowledge without
precedent in empirical research into judicial decisionmaking,150 we
had the opportunity to study legal reasoning in action through written
opinions authored or joined by 188 judges, all resolving the same legal
problem. Thus, we not only analyzed the outcomes of the Sentencing
Guidelines decisions, but also investigated the reasoning in the large
number of district court decisions that were reduced to writing. A
more complete understanding of judicial behavior requires considera-
tion of both the outcome and the means by which the judicial actor
Commission drafted model briefs to be presented to all district judges addressing chal-
lenges to the Sentencing Guidelines. See DOJ Model Brief, supra note 88; Sentencing
Commission Model Brief, supra note 91. In addition, members of a team of attorneys from
Main Justice in Washington, D.C., including one of the authors of this article, specially
appeared to argue on behalf of the government in many of the cases in the district courts.
Although the criminal defense bar did not present a single model brief, the cooperative
efforts of two organizations ensured a fair degree of comparability in the legal work
presented on behalf of defendants challenging the Guidelines. Public Citizen Litigation
Group frequently appeared as counsel for defendants challenging the Guidelines. See,
e.g., United States v. Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941, 942 n.2 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v.
Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp. 1411, 1412 (S.D. Cal. 1988); see also Marcus, supra note 83,
at 31 (reporting involvement of Public Citizen in challenges to Guidelines by criminal de-
fendants). Alan Morrison of Public Citizen ultimately argued the case against the Guide-
lines before the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,362 (1989). The
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers routinely submitted amicus curiae
briefs attacking the Guidelines in these cases. See, e.g., United States v. Swapp, 695 F.
Supp. 1140, 1149 (D. Utah 1988); United States v. Macias-Pedroza, 694 F. Supp. 1406, 1414
(D. Ariz. 1988) (en banc); United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp. 968, 970 (N.D. Ind.
1988); United States v. Amesquita-Padilla, 691 F. Supp. 277, 279 (W.D. Wash. 1988);
United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (en banc); United States v.
Perez, 685 F. Supp. 990, 992 n.1 (W.D. Tex. 1988); see also Cohen, supra note 21, at 184 n.3
(referring to "significant amount of 'sharing' of legal briefs and arguments on both sides of
the [Sentencing Guidelines] issue").
149 See Posner, What Do Judges Maximize, supra note 52, at 26 ("[J]udicial outcomes
reflect both the judges' preferences going in and the quality of the briefing and argument
in particular cases.").
150 For another, likewise unique, example of content analysis of opinions in an empirical
study of judicial behavior and judge characteristics (in that case, gender), although involv-
ing comparison of a sample of opinions in different cases by appellate judges on panels
with shifting membership, see Sue Davis, Do Women Judges Speak "In a Different
Voice?": Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal Theory, and the Ninth Circuit, 8 Wis. Women's
L.J. 143 (1992-1993). For an example of empirical study of the content of judicial opinions
in another context, that of the evolution of a common law doctrine, see Morriss, supra note
26.
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reached that outcome.151 Toward that end, we employed a system of
categorization and coding for statistical analysis that would allow con-
sideration of the various reasoning approaches and constitutional the-
ories that characterized Sentencing Guidelines decisions.
We could be criticized for our willingness to infer judicial reason-
ing from written opinions. We recognize that, as Frank Cross reports,
"[1legal realists and critical legal scholars have long maintained that
opinions are post-facto rationalizations of results dictated by judicial
ideology."15 2 Edward Rubin states that, in writing an opinion, "the
judge is not trying to recreate her actual thought patterns, but to jus-
tify her conclusion by showing that it proceeds from accepted sources
by legitimate, properly argued steps. 15 3 However, while a judicial
opinion may not be a transcript of the judge's stream of consciousness
in reaching a conclusion, we do not share the cynical view that the
judge's construction of an opinion is wholly divorced from meaningful
reasoning. Indeed, because any judge's ruling remains tentative until
reduced to writing and filed with the clerk of the court, the opinion-
writing stage is a continuation of the decisionmaking process. Indeed,
having observed the judicial process as clerks to federal judges, two of
the authors can contribute further confirmation to the existing anec-
dotal evidence that judges sometimes find "that certain opinions sim-
ply 'won't write': where, after initially making a decision, the judge
finds herself unable to craft an opinion justifying that decision."' 1S4 As
scholars in particular recognize, writing is thinking. Thus the drafting
of an opinion may enforce, undermine, or modify an initial
conclusion.1 55
151 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 172 (encouraging revival of interest by em-
pirical researchers in opinions as "judges' codified explanation of their judgment proto-
cols"); Davis, supra note 150, at 151-52 (explaining that study of hypothesized gender
differences in judging "may not be readily quantifiable in terms of voting behavior" and
must instead "focus at least as much on judges' methods of reasoning as... on the way
they vote").
152 Cross, supra note 48, at 267.
153 Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89
Mich. L. Rev. 792, 801 (1991).
154 Cross, supra note 48, at 270 (citing Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L
Rev. 633, 652 (1995)); see also Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 37 J. Legal Educ. 307, 311 (1987); Kathleen Waits,
Values, Intuitions, and Opinion Writing- The Judicial Process and State Court Jurisdiction,
1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 917, 931.
155 Some might question our assumption that these written district court decisions re-
flect the reasoning of the judges themselves. Among federal appellate judges, informed
commentators believe that few judges still write their own opinions. "[Tihe tendency has
been for more and more of the initial opinion-drafting responsibility to be delegated to law
clerks, transforming the judge from a draftsman to an editor." Richard A. Posner, The
Federal Courts 141 (1996) [hereinafter Posner, Federal Courts]. However, in contrast to
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Moreover, as Cross notes, "[e]ven if an opinion's justifications are
not an authentic replication of a judge's reason for decision, the writ-
ing may still have practical significance .... The requirement of justi-
fication may preclude certain rulings, which cannot be justified
under the traditional legal model. ' 15 6 Whether an opinion is viewed
as a faithful record of judicial reasoning in action, as an exercise in
post-hoc justification, or, as we believe, as having elements of both,
the drafting judge's choice of legal rationale, method of described rea-
soning, and style of analysis in the opinion-when contrasted with the
choices of other judges writing about the identical legal problem-
should teach us something significant about the judicial process. If
opinions truly were nothing more than "a mode of couching the per-
sonal legislative preferences of unelected judges in the publicly vener-
ated language of a judicial decree,"1 57 then we might expect all
opinions reaching the same result to be clothed in the same justifica-
tory rhetoric, steering the same safe course to avoid the shoals of pub-
lic criticism. Instead, as our study revealed, judges reaching the same
outcome adopted different constitutional theories, manifested alterna-
tive styles of analysis, and applied different modes of legal reasoning.
c. The Strength and Weakness of Using a Single Legal Prob-
lem. Paradoxically, the strength of our study is also its major weak-
ness. While we avoided the problems of incomparability and
inauthenticity, we necessarily did so in the context of a single legal
problem. Thus, another goal of social science research-repli-
cability-is significantly impaired. The rich database of Sentencing
Guidelines decisions remains available for further exploration by
other researchers (and ourselves) in other directions or under differ-
ent models. But it is only one matter and, at least at the moment, the
court of appeals judges who generally are obliged to render written decisions in appeals,
district court judges produce a written ruling on a particular matter only when they so
choose to record their opinions. Thus, we believe it is more likely that a district judge
takes a personal interest and a hand in drafting on the special occasions in which an opin-
ion is produced. Indeed, we believe this is particularly likely when the issue is one of great
significance-such as the Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality issue-and the judge
wishes to publicly participate in the legal debate. In any event, even when a judge dele-
gates drafting responsibilities to a law clerk, the judge maintains control over the basic
structure of the opinion and the grounds upon which the issue is resolved. As discussed
below, see infra Part IV.B.2, we coded opinions primarily on the basis of the constitutional
theories raised and resolved by each judge. Whether the judge acts as author or architect
of the opinion, our coding should be adequate to uncover the judge's underlying views.
156 Cross, supra note 48, at 268.
157 Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting Indeterminacy with One
Bold Thought, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 113, 118 (1990).
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Sentencing Guidelines Crisis remains a unique and unparalleled epi-
sode in American legal history.
Two factors rebut the argument of atypicality. First, the case
raises fundamental questions of constitutional law, especially separa-
tion of powers, that have engaged jurists since the founding of our
constitutional republic. The Sentencing Guidelines Crisis did not in-
volve a marginal set of issues, on the periphery of legal concern, but
rather occupied the center stage of the legal system.158 The continued
attention of the Supreme Court to separation of powers concerns in
recent terms strongly validates our selection of this subject matter as
the basis for an empirical study of judicial decisionmaldng. 15 9
Second, the Sentencing Guidelines themselves remain a source of
legal tension in the criminal justice system. In the decade since the
Supreme Court purportedly laid the constitutional validity of the
Guidelines to rest in Mistretta v. United States, 1 60 controversy over the
Guidelines continues to simmer.161 A leading federal judge has de-
clared the Guidelines a "dismal failure,"' 62 characterizing them as "a
Byzantine system of rules" that "ignore individual characteristics of
defendants and sacrifice comprehensibility and common sense on the
altar of pseudoscientific uniformity."1 63 Surveys of federal district
judges persistently have found a majority supporting elimination of
158 See supra Part HI.B.1-2.
159 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (dismissing for lack of standing law-
suit brought by individual members of Congress challenging constitutionality of Line Item
Veto Act on separation of powers grounds); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 6S1 (1997) (holding
doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions
against president while in office); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (holding
that separation of powers principles do not preclude Congress from delegating its constitu-
tional authority to president to define aggravating factors that permit imposition of statu-
tory penalty of death in military capital cases).
160 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
161 For a recent description of the continued controversy over the Sentencing Guide-
lines, including the views of both critics and defenders of the system, see generally Mary
Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Justice by the Numbers (pts. 1-5), Wash. Post, October 6,
1996, at Al, October 7, 1996, at Al, October 8, 1996, at Al, October 9, 1996, at Al, Octo-
ber 10, 1996, at Al. For scholarly treatment of the subject, see generally Symposium on
Federal Sentencing, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 99 (1992).
162 Cabranes, Dismal Failure, supra note 80, at 2; see also Michael Tonry, Sentencing
Matters 11 (1996) ("Few outside the federal [sentencing] commission would disagree that
the federal guidelines have been a disaster.").
163 Jos6 A. Cabranes, Letter to the Editor:. Incoherent Sentencing Guidelines, Wall St.
J., Aug. 28, 1992, at All [hereinafter Cabranes, Letter to Editor]; see also Kate Stith &
Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L Rev.
1247,1254 (1997) (decrying reduction of trial judges' sentencing discretion and substitution
of "bureaucratic penalization" under Guidelines regime); Naftali Bendavid, Breyer's Role
as Sentencing Pioneer Still Rankles, Legal Tunes, May 16,1994, at 7 (quoting district Judge
Jack Weinstein as saying that Guidelines "require, in the main, cruel imposition of exces-
sive sentences and unnecessary micromanaging of sentencings").
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the Sentencing Guidelines. 64 Defenders assert that the Guidelines
are "on balance, a notable, albeit certainly imperfect, success," con-
tending that the Guidelines wisely reduce and structure judicial discre-
tion, improve predictability in sentencing, and impose appropriately
stern punishment.165
Indeed, even constitutional objections to the Guidelines have not
faded away entirely: In a few recent decisions, courts have resur-
rected separation of powers and due process objections to the Guide-
lines.1 66 Although these rulings were subsequently overturned, such
164 See Don J. DeBenedictis, The Verdict is In, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 78-79 (finding
majority of judges and equal number of federal judges supported "scrapping" the Guide-
lines); Henry J. Reske, Judges Irked by Tough-on-Crime Laws, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 18
(finding that more than 50% of district judges supported elimination of Sentencing Guide-
lines); see also Bendavid, supra note 163, at 7 (describing opposition of federal judges to
Guidelines, even to point that "[m]any judges regard as a traitor any colleague who serves
on the U.S. Sentencing Commission"). One federal judge resigned from the bench in pro-
test of the Sentencing Guidelines, see Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1990, at A22, and two federal senior judges declared they would
refuse to impose sentences in drug cases to avoid the Guidelines and mandatory minimum
sentences, see DeBenedictis, supra, at 78.
165 See Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 72, at 680, 707-20, 748-49 (rebutting criti-
cisms that Guidelines are too rigid); see also Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals? An Empirical and Case
Law Analysis, 40 Emory L.J. 393, 444 (1991) (concluding, after statistical study of Guide-
lines sentences, "that the Guidelines generally are meeting their goal of reducing dispar-
ity," although "disparity persists on a more limited scale as a result of differing approaches
to ambiguous Guidelines provisions"); Andrew J. Kleinfeld, The Sentencing Guidelines
Promote Truth and Justice, 55 Fed. Probation 16 (1991) (supporting, as a federal court of
appeals judge, the federal Sentencing Guidelines system); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1342,
1343-44 (1997) (stating that, although Guidelines have produced structure that, "judging
from the scholarly commentary, virtually everyone loves to hate," the system is "a signifi-
cant advance in sentencing practice [that] is workable in the day-to-day administration of
justice"); Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of Federal Sentencing: Beyond the Criticism,
91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1574, 1581, 1598 (1997) ("The [Guidelines] system is rigid enough to
demand compliance with congressional statutory mandates, complex enough to capture
culpability in a multitude of criminal behaviors in consistent fashion, and flexible enough
to consider significant individual characteristics when appropriate."); cf. Paul H. Robinson,
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years Later, An Introduction and Comments, 91
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1231, 1235, 1241 (1997) (concluding that Sentencing Reform Act estab-
lishes "appropriate balance" between goal of consistency through system of Guidelines
that all judges must work from and power of judges to depart from Guidelines in cases
differing from the paradigm envisioned by applicable Guidelines, although criticizing
Guidelines as promulgated because "the Commission did not deduce sentencing guidelines
from principles of justice, or logical principles of any sort," but rather "based its sentences
on mathematical averages of past practice of federal sentencing judges").
166 As recently as 1994, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in an unpublished opinion questioned the dual role of one district judge as both a
member of the Sentencing Commission and a sentencing judge. See Ira Bloom, The After-
math of Mistretta: The Demonstrated Incompatibility of the United States Sentencing
Commission and Separation of Powers Principles, 24 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 2-3, 9-11 (1996)
(discussing United States v. McLellan, 28 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table
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episodes as well as continued scholarly attention 67 reveal a persistent
constitutional disquiet about the Guidelines and the authoring Com-
mission. If Mistretta laid constitutional objections to the Sentencing
Guidelines to rest, it is a somewhat troubled sleep.
d. Federal District Judges as a Subject of Study. It also must be
emphasized that this is a study of the district court, that is, federal trial
judges. Using trial, rather than appellate, judges for a study of judicial
resolution of a complex question of constitutional law may seem pecu-
liar. But, while the primary task of trial judges is factfinding, 168 legal
reasoning and interpretation of legal texts remains a vital part of the
work of a federal district judge. Indeed, some researchers have con-
cluded that the federal trial bench is a better-suited laboratory for
study of judicial discretion than the federal appellate courts.1 69 Fed-
eral district judges have "solo versus collective responsibility" for their
decision)); Ann Woolner, Sentencing Panel Hit Over Dual Role, Legal Times, March 20,
1995, at 2 (same). The panel hinted that the constitutional question was not closed, saying
that the Supreme Court's Mistretta decision "'was decided ... before the Commission's
practices and powers had been developed much."' WvooIner, supra. at 2 (quoting
McLellan) (ellipsis in original). In a subsequent published opinion, the Eleventh Circuit
"emphatically disavow[ed]" adoption of the earlier panel's suggestion of a general conflict
for a judicial member of the Sentencing Commission, leaving the issue of recusal from
sentencing duties for future resolution. In re United States, 60 F3d 729,731 n.2 (11th Cir.
1995); see also Ann Woolner, 11th Circuit Rebuffs Sentencing Challenge, Legal Tunes, July
31,1995, at 8 (reporting on Eleventh Circuit's ruling). With respect to the constitutionality
of the Commission, the court stated that "[t]he Mistretta decision sweeps broadly, and if it
is to be overruled, the Supreme Court itself will have to do it." In re United States, 60 F.3d
at 733 n.4.
In 1993, a district judge renewed the substantive due process line of attack upon the
Sentencing Guidelines-which the Supreme Court had not addressed in its Mistretta opin-
ion-by holding that the Guidelines unconstitutionally imposed a 30-year prison sentence
on a drug dealer without allowing the judge to take into account the minor nature of prior
convictions or extenuating circumstances. See United States v. Spencer, 817 F. Supp. 176,
181-84 (D.D.C. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 25 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also
United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1534-35 (6th Cir. 1992) (Martin, J., dissenting)
("I now.., see the error of my early endorsement of the goals of the guidelines.... I now
believe I was wrong in endorsing the guidelines [because they] have become more than just
guidelines; they are rigid mandates [that] disregard fundamental notions of due process.").
167 For recent scholarly critiques of the Sentencing Guidelines on constitutional
grounds-separation of powers and due process, see generally Bloom, supra note 166;
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and Morrison
Revisited, 38 Win- & Mary L Rev. 417 (1997); Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor's New
Clothes: Due Process Considerations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 60 Tenn.
L. Rev. 467 (1993).
168 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 145.
169 See Ashenfelter, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 27, at 263-64 ("On many is-
sues .... district judge discretion governs... [and] in their isolation, district judges may
feel less constrained by legal doctrine and thus be more likely to follow political inclina-
tions .... "); see also Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at vii (stating that political scientists
have recognized that "federal trial courts [are] highly politicized policy-making institutions
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decisions,170 whereas the discretion of appellate judges is checked
(although hardly eliminated) by group voting.17 1
The individual responsibility of federal district judges for their
decisions is somewhat complicated in our study by the unusual mani-
festation of en banc district court proceedings resulting in collegial
opinions. 172 However, both their unfamiliarity with the constraints of
collective decisionmaking and the propensity of the district judges to
enter dissents and even special concurrences from these en banc opin-
ions suggest that individual discretion was not muted much in these
circumstances. 7 3 Nonetheless, we took the precaution of coding vari-
ables reflecting individual style or theory (originalism and practical
versus theoretical) only for judges who personally authored opinions;
judges who merely joined an opinion were coded only on the substan-
tive constitutional grounds that were the basis for the opinion joined
(separation of powers, nondelegation doctrine, or due process).
and .. trial judges, like their appellate counterparts, [are] influenced by their personal
values and policy preferences").
170 Howard, supra note 30, at 135.
171 See id. at 178-221; Ashenfelter, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 27, at 263-64 ("Ap-
pellate judges decide cases in panels of three or more. Multiple decision makers may
check judicial discretion. If one's fellow judges evaluate the legal arguments a certain way,
concern for collegiality and respect pushes one to conform to these views ....").
172 See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unaccept-
able Limitations on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1719 (1992) (describ-
ing how, during 1988, "[s]ome district courts held unprecedented en banc hearings to
receive arguments from the Department of Justice and the Commission... and from de-
fense attorneys"). In our study, 90 of the 293 judges participated in en banc decisions. The
en banc proceedings by district court judges were themselves unusual, interesting, and ar-
guably unauthorized. While the efficiency of a single proceeding is clear, the validity of a
district judge's compliance with an en banc order with which he disagrees is not. Some of
these purported en banc proceedings were nothing more than joint hearings of argument in
which the participating judges reserved the right to determine whether to join the en banc
opinion and follow that ruling in future cases. However, in some districts, the judges
agreed in advance to adopt the ruling of the majority on the constitutionality of the Guide-
lines, even if one or more judges dissented. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F.
Supp. 1506, 1515 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (en banc) ("This decision is binding upon the members
of this Court in all relevant cases unless and until we receive a contrary ruling from the
Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court."). Since there is no general statutory authorization
for federal trial judges to reach decisions as panels and apply those decisions as mandatory
precedent for all judges in the district, the validity and merit of these en banc proceedings
warrant further examination.
173 See, e.g., United States v. Macias-Pedroza, 694 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (D. Ariz. 1988)
(en banc) (Carroll, J., concurring in part); id. at 1419 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting); United
States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (en banc) (Aronovitz, J., specially
concurring); id. at 1163 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); id. at 1164 (Nesbitt, J., dissenting);
Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. at 1515 (Hupp, J., dissenting).
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I
Tim INDEPENDENT VARIABLES1 74
We obtained background information on judges from several
sources, including standard biographies on federal judges,175 indepen-
dent research into the records of Senate judicial confirmation hearings
at the National Archives, surveys of federal judges on certain subjects
where the information was uncertain, and the generosity of other re-
searchers. 76 When special sources of information were used, these
sources are identified below in a description of the variables.
A. Demographic Variables
SEX-For each judge, SEX is coded as "1" for Female and "0"
for Male.
RACE-For each judge, RACE is coded as "1" for racial or eth-
nic minority and "0" for white, non-Hispanic.: 7  Although this data
was initially recorded by each individual ethnic or racial group, the
small numbers of nonwhite judges in each discrete category precluded
separate classification.
CRIME-RATE-The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) col-
lects information on crime rates through the Uniform Crime Report-
ing program, a nationwide effort of city, county, and state law
enforcement agencies voluntarily reporting data on crimes brought to
their attention.178 Our CRIME-RATE variable is based on the total
crime index by state,'179 which provides the crime rate per 100,000 in-
174 This part of the Article describes how we translated the information on each
independent variable into a format suitable for statistical analysis. Discussion of the
theoretical basis for study of the particular variable, relevant prior research findings on
that variable or type of variable, and an interpretation of the findings in this study are
provided in Part V of this Article.
175 Sources checked include various editions of: Almanac of the Federal Judiciary; The
American Bench; Who's Who in American Law.
176 In particular, Sheldon Goldman generously shared information on each judge's ra-
cial background and American Bar Association rating.
177 28 minority judges were included in our dataset, 10 appointed by Republican presi-
dents and 18 appointed by Democratic presidents.
178 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Crime in the United
States: Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 1988, at 1-6 (1989). Although Con-
gress directed federal law enforcement agencies to participate in this program, implemen-
tation at the federal level had not yet occurred in 1988, the subject date for this study. See
id. at 6.
179 We had initially hoped to use a crime index for each of the nation's metropolitan
statistical areas, believing this would be the best measure of the level of criminal activity in
the area surrounding each judge's courthouse. (The crime index for metropolitan statisti-
cal areas is reported in Appendix IV of the 1989 report. See id. at 324-50.) Unfortunately,
data were missing for a large number of the judges because no crime rates were included
for Illinois cities as its reporting methods did not comport with FBI standards, see id. at 350
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habitants. 80 The crime index includes the violent crimes of murder
and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggra-
vated assault, and the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, mo-
tor vehicle theft, and arson.181
LAW-SCHOOL-For each judge, attendance at an "Elite Law
School" was coded as "1," and attendance at a "Non-Elite Law
School" as "0".182 For the study, we denominated the following seven
law schools as "Elite": Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Stan-
ford, Virginia, and Yale. Although any classification of law schools by
prestige is unavoidably subjective, we attempted to add some objectiv-
ity by synthesizing rankings in the Chicago-Kent Law Review's list of
the schools with the most prolific (publishing) faculty, 8 3 the U.S.
News & World Report ranking,184 and the Gourman Report rank-
ing, 85 thereby including measures of faculty activity, popular reputa-
tion, and other factors in evaluating status.18 6 In addition, we
n.4, no report was made for Florida, see id. at 350 n.5, and several judges did not maintain
their chambers in metropolitan statistical areas for which crime rates are calculated. Crime
rate data by metropolitan statistical area were missing for 61 of the 291 judges in the larg-
est regression analysis, which we regarded as an unacceptable number of missing cases.
However, we did prepare an alternative regression analysis using the crime rate by metro-
politan statistical area for the 241 judges for whom data was available. This analysis pro-
duced no significant findings with respect to crime rate influence. The documentation for
this alternative analysis is available from the authors.
180 The crime index by state is reported in Table 5 of the 1989 FBI report. See id. at 60-
70. Although the Illinois report did not comply with FBI guidelines and no report was
made by Florida, the FBI provided estimated crime counts at the state level. See id. at 70
nn.5-6.
181 See id. at 320.
182 Judges were coded according to the law school from which they received their first
legal degree, thus we did not consider advanced legal degrees. Our theory is that the pri-
mary socializing effect of legal education is felt during the basic three-year experience lead-
ing to the initial legal degree.
183 See, e.g., James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and
Faculties, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 781, 793-94 (1996).
184 See, e.g., The Top 25 Law Schools, U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 1996, at 82.
18s See, e.g., Jack Gourman, The Gourman Report: A Rating of Graduate and Profes-
sional Programs in American and International Universities 90-91 (8th ed. 1997).
186 We adopted the following formula: Using the three most recent rankings from each
of the three sources, we set up two sets for scoring, one based on position in the top five
and one based on position in the top ten. Then, we assigned one point to each law school
for each time it is listed in the top five or the top ten of these rankings. Accordingly, we
created a total of nine lists (three for each year, thus making 9 points the maximum score),
and each source was given equal weight. Based upon listings among the top five law
schools, we found that four schools stood out: Chicago (9), Yale (9), Harvard (8), and
Stanford (5). See also Ashenfelter, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 27, at 274 n.44 (classi-
fying these four as elite law schools for empirical study of judicial decisionmaking). Look-
ing at listings among the top ten law schools, we added Columbia (9) and Michigan (7) to
the list; both schools also had ranked just after Stanford in the top five listings. Two very
recent entries into the surveys of law schools, both based upon scholarly productivity and
impact, confirm our choice of elite law schools. First, one professor has assembled a rank-
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developed a separate ranking based upon the number of federal
judges in our study who graduated from a law school and who were
appointed to a district court outside the state where the law school is
located. Under this rough estimate of which lav schools have a na-
tional rather than regional character, one additional school-Vir-
ginia-was distinctive in the large number of federal judges for whom
it was alma mater and thus was added to our select list of elite law
schools.'8
B. Political Variable
PARTY-For each judge, appointment by a Republican presi-
dent is coded as "1," and by a Democratic president as "0". In addi-
tion, although not included in the standard set of variables, dummy
variables were also created for each individual president, with the ex-
ceptions of Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. These three were
combined because the number of judges in our study who were ap-
pointed by those presidents was so small.
ing of law schools that emphasizes the scholarly distinction of a school's faculty, measured
by the volume of publication and citations to publications. See David F. Rovella, A Sur-
vey of Surveys Ranks the Top U.S. Law Schools, Nat'l .J., June 2, 1997, at Al (discussing
the "Ranking of U.S. Law Schools by Educational Quality" produced by Professor Brian
Leiter of University of Texas School of Law). Of the seven law schools designated as
"elite" for our study, six fall within this new survey's top six law schools, with our seventh
"elite" school, Michigan, being ranked tenth in the new survey. See id. Second, Professors
Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells measured the academic reputations of 32 law
schools by citations to their faculties' works. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Martin
T. Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. Legal Stud.
373 (1998). Their study identified Yale, Chicago, Harvard, and Stanford as standing alone
at the top of the ranking for scholarly impact. See id. at 374.
In developing a list of elite law schools for federal judges, one would ideally use a
historical classification, that is, the ranking of the school at the time that a particular judge
attended law school and began his or her legal socialization. Unfortunately, such an effort
to create historical rankings would likely prove impossible and would certainly be unduly
burdensome, both because of the difficulty of remeasuring the ranking, judge-by-judge,
year-by-year, and because the sources we relied upon for law school rankings did not exist
during those periods. Accordingly, we began with current rankings (1995-97) to create our
list. Because status as an elite law school depends primarily upon reputation, a characteris-
tic that develops over substantial periods of time and changes slowly, these rankings should
be roughly accurate. Moreover, as noted infra note 187 and the accompanying text, we
supplemented and confirmed this process with a separate ranking based on the number of
federal judges who graduated from a particular law school, thus distinguishing "national"
from "regional" law schools. This latter ranking should correspond with historical reputa-
tion at the relevant point in time.
187 Virginia (11) was second only to Harvard (25) in the number of out-of-state gradu-
ates represented among the federal judges in our sample, and ranked well above Michigan
(7), Yale (6), Columbia (3), Stanford (3), and Chicago (2).
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C. Prior Employment Variables
PROSECUTOR-For each judge, prior employment as a crimi-
nal prosecutor is coded as "1," and the absence of such experience as
"0".188 Because standard biographical listings were not always dispos-
itive in verifying whether a position involved prosecutorial duties, 189
we also consulted other biographical sources and Senate confirmation
hearings. In cases of continuing uncertainty, we sent survey letters to
the judges.190
DEFENSE-For each judge, prior legal practice as a criminal de-
fense lawyer is coded as "1," and the absence of such experience as
"0". Unfortunately, criminal defense experience was difficult to glean
from the traditional biographical sources, as a judge's prior position
with a law firm may or may not have involved criminal defense work.
Criminal defense experience was recorded only if there was a clear
indication in biographical information to that effect. In addition,
when we surveyed certain judges to confirm criminal prosecution ex-
perience, we asked on the same form for any criminal defense experi-
ence, which allowed us to positively code several more judges.
Although our coding undoubtedly understates the number of judges
with some criminal defense background, we have a high degree of
confidence that those so coded did have the experience. 19'
MILITARY-For each judge, military service is coded as "1,"
and the absence of such service as "0".
LAW-PROF-For each judge, prior employment as a law profes-
sor is coded as "1," and the absence of such employment as "0". We
included only full-time members of a law school faculty, indicated by
188 We included in this category those who had prosecution experience at the state or
federal level, those who acted as prosecutors in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps
of a military service branch, and those who had served as agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
189 For example, while the listing of a judge's previous position as an Assistant United
States Attorney (AUSA) likely reflects criminal prosecution experience, some AUSAs
handle civil litigation against the federal government. Based on the responses we obtained
to our survey, we determined that this was the one position that we could safely treat as a
proxy for criminal prosecution; the few judges who had been AUSAs in a noncriminal
capacity were so designated in biographies.
190 Of the 34 surveyed judges, we received responses from 30, a return rate of nearly
90%. The surveys were sent to all judges whose biographies listed service as an AUSA
without additional information confirming criminal prosecution (as to whom the returned
surveys uniformly confirmed prosecutorial duties), service in the military JAG Corps, or
municipal or county official positions whose description was unclear. With the exception
of AUSAs, from whom the survey response was uniform, thus justifying treatment of that
service as a proxy for prosecution, judges who did not respond to the survey or, in the case
of one judge who was deceased, were coded as nonprosecutors.
191 Of the 293 judges in our study, 39 are coded as having criminal defense experience.
See infra Table 3.
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both rank (professor, associate professor, or assistant professor) and
by absence of other apparent full-time employment during the same
time period.
POLITICAL-For each judge, prior political experience was
coded as "1," and the absence of such as "0."192 For this variable, we
included judges who had held state or federal elective office, other
than elected judgeship, or appointment to a high-level administrative
position at the state or federal level. 93 For purposes of classifying an
administrative office as high-level, we included the selected state ad-
ministrative offices listed by the Council of State Governments in The
Book of the States1 94 and federal administrative positions that were
subject to Senate confirmation1 95
JUDGE-For each judge, we coded prior service as a state or
local judge as "1," and the absence of such as "0."196
D. Judicial Role or Institutional Variables
ABA-AQ/ABA-BQ-The American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary evaluates the qualifications of
persons considered for appointment to the federal courts.197 At the
time of the appointment of the judges included in this study,193 the
192 We also created alternative variables ELECTED (consisting of state and federal
elected positions), APPOINTED (consisting of high-level appointed administrative posi-
tions in state and federal government), EXECUTIVE (consisting of elected or appointed
high-level administrative positions in both state and federal government), and LEGISLA-
TIVE (consisting of members of Congress or a state legislature). For these alternative
variables, judges vho had experience at both the executive and legislative level were coded
for both EXECUTIVE and LEGISLATIVE, and judges who had held both ELECTED
and APPOINTED office were coded for both.
193 See Aliotta, supra note 39, at 279 (describing similar variable for study of judicial
decisionmaking). For determining which state offices were elective (other than service as
legislator, which was presumed elective), we referred to Table 2.9 in Council of State Gov-
ernments, 31 The Book of the States 33-34 (1996-97).
194 Council of State Governments, supra note 193, at 35-39 (Table 2.10).
195 For a list of leading administrative and independent agency positions and the type of
appointment, see generally Senate Comm. on Govt. Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Policy
and Supporting Positions (Comm. Print 1992). For information on type of appointment for
the defunct Civil Aeronautics Board, we referred to House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Service, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Policy and Supporting Positions (Comm. Print 1976).
196 This category thus includes state, county, and municipal judgeships, but not federal
adjunct judicial positions such as bankruptcy judge or magistrate.
197 For a description of the Standing Committee and its rating of potential nominees for
federal judgeships, see Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,443-45
(1989).
198 The Standing Committee has since modified its rating of prospective nominees to
eliminate the "Exceptionally Well Qualified" rating, thus leaving three possible ratings,
"Well Qualified," "Qualified," or "Not Qualified." See American Bar Association, The
ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary- What It Is and How It Works 7 (1991)
(explaining three possible ratings of prospective judicial nominees).
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Committee rated prospective nominees on the following
scale: "Exceptionally Well Qualified," "Well Qualified," "Qualified,"
and "Not Qualified."'199 In addition, if a minority of the Standing
Committee rates the prospective nominee differently, that minority
conclusion is reported as a "split rating." For example, a "split rating
of Qualified/Not Qualified means that a majority or substantial major-
ity of the committee votes a Qualified designation but one or more
members dissent and vote Not Qualified. °200
For coding purposes, we created three dummy variables: (1)
ABA-AQ, which consists of those judges receiving either of the two
above qualified ratings, i.e., Exceptionally Well Qualified and Well
Qualified; (2) ABA-Q, which was the reference variable and consists
of those judges who were rated Qualified; and (3) ABA-BQ, which
consists of those judges receiving a below qualified rating of either
Not Qualified or the split rating of Qualified/Not Qualified. 201
CASELOAD-The Annual Report of the Director of the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts provides statistics on work-
load in each of the district courts.202 For our study, we used the civil
and criminal filings per district court judge for each individual federal
district as reported for the twelve month period ending June 30,
1989.203 These filings are weighted based upon a time study con-
ducted by the Federal Judicial Center concerning the time required by
a judge for a particular type of case. 2°4 The CASELOAD variable
included in our standard set consists of the combined civil and crimi-
nal filings.
199 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary:
What It Is and How It Works 4 (1983) (briefly describing each rating); American Bar Asso-
ciation, Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: What It Is and How It Works 4-5 (1980)
(same); American Bar Association, The ABA's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary:
What It Is and How It Works 9-10 (1977) (same).
200 Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing
Up, 72 Judicature 318, 320 (1989) (italics omitted).
201 A "split rating" reflected a division on the committee between any two ratings, and
the dissenting minority may have believed the prospective nominee deserved a higher, as
opposed to a lower, rating than did the majority. For purposes of this study, we have only
recorded split ratings when the Standing Committee divided between "Qualified" and
"Not Qualified" (recorded for this study as "Q/NQ"). As Sheldon Goldman explains:
"The ABA committee insists that anyone receiving a Qualified rating, even if there is dis-
sent among some members, is fully qualified for the federal bench. Yet there is the suspi-
cion that those receiving this split rating are only marginally qualified." Id. at 320.
202 See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (1989) [hereinafter Annual Report of Admin. Office].
203 See id. at 456-57 tbl.X-1; see also Cohen, supra note 21, at 192 n.21 (using same
source for measuring caseload in study of Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality
decisions).
204 See Annual Report of Admin. Office, supra note 202, at 457 n.1.
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For several alternative regression analyses, reported in two of the
tables set out below, we also created a CRIM-CASELOAD variable
that is a ratio of the criminal filings to the overall caseload per judge
in that district, thus measuring the relative portion of the judge's over-
all docket that consists of criminal cases.
SENIORITY-The factor of seniority on the federal bench has
been coded by number of months from date of appointment 0 5 to the
date of the judge's Sentencing Guidelines decision 206
E. Promotion Potential
In his landmark work on the economic influences upon judicial
behavior in the context of the Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality
decisions, Mark Cohen hypothesized that a judge's behavior is influ-
enced by the possibility of being promoted from district court to the
court of appeals 207 He identified three variables to measure the like-
lihood that any one district judge may soon be positioned for eleva-
tion to the appellate court-the ratio of district court judgeships to
court of appeals judgeships in that state, the existence of current va-
cancies in the court of appeals, and the age of the oldest active circuit
judge from that state.208 To combine these three variables into a sin-
gle promotion potential score, Cohen used a factor analysis to create a
proxy variable.209
205 The source for the appointment date is Volume 700 of the Federal Supplement. This
volume, which is dated early in 1989, lists those judges on the bench as of the end of 19S8,
including the date of appointment for each judge.
206 For nine judges, the Sentencing Commission had information concerning how each
judge had ruled upon the Guidelines but had no date for the decisions. Because these did
not involve written decisions, there was no way to recover this information. Rather than
lose nine judges as missing cases in our regression analyses, we adopted an estimated date
of decision, choosing the mid-year date of June 30, 1988 as the default. Because all of the
Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality decisions occurred during an eleven-month period
during 1988, our estimated date is off, at most, by five-and-a-half months. Moreover, since
most of the decisions cluster around the middle of the year, it is likely that the deviation
from the estimated June 30 date is smaller. Compared to a mean seniority figure of 113.12
months, see infra Table 2, we believed this estimation was acceptable and preferable to the
alternative of excluding nine judges for whom we had otherwise complete data. In any
event, as a check, we ran an alternative regression analysis in which these nine judges were
excluded, with no effect on the correlation for SENIORITY. In addition, not having par-
ticipated in written opinions, these nine judges are necessarily excluded from all analyses
involving dependent variables, other than the basic outcome variable reported in Table 4.
2X See Cohen, supra note 21, at 188-89.
208 See id. at 192.
Mo9 See id. at 193. Subsequently, in a study of federal district judge behavior in the
context of criminal antitrust sanctions, Cohen developed a more sophisticated set of eight
different variables to measure promotion potential. See Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of
Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 13,19,27-
29 (1992). Some of these variables reflect the longitudinal nature of that study, such as the
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Following Cohen's pioneering work, we adopted the same three
variables and performed a factor analysis to create a proxy variable
(PROMO-POT). However, because Cohen's article does not provide
a complete description of his three variables and because we made
some different choices in measuring these variables, our implementa-
tion may differ in the details and should be described.
Ratio of Circuit Court Judgeships to District Court Judges in Each
State. This ratio reflects the number of district court positions author-
ized for the judge's state210 per number of circuit court positions nor-
mally reserved for that state. Because court of appeals judgeships are
not officially designated as located within a particular state, it was nec-
essary to determine which active judges (and, for vacant positions, re-
cently retired or deceased judges) had maintained chambers in the
state;21' this number is fluid and changes as new judges are confirmed
and determine whether to locate their chambers in the same state as
the judge they replaced.212
availability of newly created court positions over time, that are not relevant to our fixed-
time study. See id. Another variable-the age and length of a subject judge's judicial
service, which theoretically may either enhance or decrease a judge's promotion potential
or responsiveness to that influence in decisionmaking-did not prove useful in that study.
See id. at 23. Cohen also introduced variables taking into account the party affiliation of
the judge and the party of the President at the time of a vacancy. See id. at 27-29. We have
controlled for political party somewhat differently in our study by conducting alternative
regression analyses that select only for judges appointed by Republican or Democratic
Presidents. In the final analysis, we adhered to the simpler promotion potential scheme in
Cohen's earlier study as better suited for our study and also as allowing more direct com-
parison of his results with ours.
210 The number of district court positions authorized for a state was taken from Table X-
1 of the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts covering the 1988 period. See Annual Report of Admin. Office, supra note 202, at
456-57.
211 This determination was a two-step process: First, we identified all active circuit
judges listed in volume 700 of West's Federal Supplement reporter of decisions. Based on
the state in which each such active judge had his or her chambers, that circuit court judge-
ship was treated as reserved to that state. (The assumption is that any vacancy in thatjudgeship will be filled by a nominee from that state, although this is not invariably the
case.) Second, because there were unfilled vacancies in the circuit courts at the end of
1988, the listing of active judges in volume 700 of the Federal Supplement is not a complete
listing of all authorized circuit court judgeships and the states from which they are nor-
mally appointed. To finalize the list, we also examined each court of appeals vacancy listed
in the December 1988 release of "Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary" published by the
Administrative Office of the Courts. For each such vacancy listed, we looked at earlier
volumes of the Federal Supplement to determine where that judge had his or her chambers
when still sitting as an active judge.
212 For example, determination of the number of circuit judge positions treated as re-
served for California changed during 1988. Judge Joseph Sneed, who had his chambers in
California, retired in 1987. His successor was Judge Stephen Trott, who was confirmed on
March 25, 1988, but who set up his chambers in Idaho. Thus, the Sneed/Trott position was
counted as a California position prior to March 25, 1988, but counted as an Idaho position
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 73:1377
HeinOnline -- 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1424 1998
JUDICIAL REASONING
Current Vacancies. For each district court judge, we determined
whether there was a current vacancy in one of the circuit court judge-
ships normally reserved for that state at the time of the judge's deci-
sion on the validity of the Guidelines.213 This component factor was
recorded as one of three possibilities or a combination thereof: (1)
"No Vacancy" if there was no vacancy listed that month in a circuit
court judgeship normally reserved for that state; (2) "Vacancy-
Nominee" if there was a vacancy listed that month in a circuit court
judgeship normally reserved for that state and if there was also a nom-
inee for that judgeship submitted by the President to the Senate
before the date of the district judge's Guidelines decision;2 14 or (3)
"Vacancy" if there was a vacancy listed that month in a circuit court
judgeship normally reserved for that state and if there was no nomi-
nee listed for that judgeship. For some states, there was more than
one vacancy in court of appeals judgeships normally reserved for that
state, and those vacancies might be with or without nominees.
To implement this component factor, we assigned weights to each
of the three possibilities: (1) "0" for "No Vacancy," (2) "0.5" for
"Vacancy-Nominee," and (2) "1.0" for "Vacancy." For example, if, as
was true for California at one point during 1988, there were two va-
cancies with nominees and one vacancy without a nominee, the va-
cancy score was 2.0. As noted, we treated a vacancy without a
nominee as a fully open position, while a vacancy with a nominee was
after that date. Thus, for the few California decisions dated prior to March 25, 19S8, the
ratio was 16147 (034), but after that date was reduced to 15147 (0.32). reflecting competi-
tion over fewer circuit seats reserved for that state.
213 Existence of a vacancy was determined by use of the "Vacancies in the Federal Judi-
ciary" mimeographs from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts from 1988.
For each district judge, we looked at the edition of "Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary"
dated at the beginning of the month following the month in which the judge's decision on
the Guidelines was rendered (i.e., if the decision upholding or invalidating the Guidelines
is dated in June, 1988, then we looked to the July 1 edition of "Vacancies in the Federal
Judiciary"). If a vacancy appeared on the court of appeals for the circuit in which that
district judge sat, then we determined from which state the court of appeals judge who
created the vacancy came (that is, we determined whether the vacancy was in a circuit
court judgeship that was normally reserved for the state in which the district court judge
sits). In addition, to prevent double-counting of the same circuit court judge for both a
vacancy and the age of the oldest circuit judge, the judgeship was recorded as vacant only if
the circuit judge was listed as retired or declaring an intention to retire by the date of the
particular district judge's Sentencing Guidelines decision. If the judgeship was listed as
vacant on that date, then that retiring circuit judge was not considered in terms of age of
the oldest circuit judge. Thus, there is no overlap between the vacancy factor and the age
of the oldest circuit judge factor.
214 Thus, in addition to identifying the existence of a nominee for the position, we noted
also the actual date of the nomination and determined whether that nomination predated
the date of the district court decision (if the nomination was made after that date, then we
recorded this factor as a "Vacancy").
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effectively treated as half-open, half-closed. Because 1988 was a presi-
dential election year, and a change of parties in the White House
would obviously result in withdrawal of all pending nominations, and
because a nomination is not a guarantee of confirmation (indeed, sev-
eral pending nominations were withdrawn during the course of the
year), the fact of nomination did not necessarily mean that the va-
cancy would be filled.
Age of Oldest Active Circuit Judge. The final promotion potential
factor is the age of the oldest active appeals court judge from the dis-
trict judge's state. 215 As Cohen observes, "[i]n general, the older the
current appeals court judge, the sooner the next vacancy will
appear." 216
Factor Score. We hypothesize that these three observed variables
are linear combinations of an underlying and unobserved factor, spe-
cifically a judge's potential for promotion. 217 Each of the three ob-
served variables was calculated so that its increase would suggest an
increase in a judge's potential for promotion. We performed a factor
analysis, whereby a promotion potential factor score was estimated,218
and we included this estimation in our standard set of variables.
In his study, Cohen excluded senior judges and judges from the
District of Columbia district court,219 on the presumable basis that
215 To determine this factor, we first determined who were the active court of appeals
judges holding circuit court judgeships normally reserved for that district judge's state at
the time of the district judge's decision. This required several steps: First, by looking at
volume 700 of the Federal Supplement, we identified the active circuit judges with cham-
bers in that state (that is, active judges in circuit court judgeships normally reserved for
that state) as of the end of 1988. Second, we also reviewed earlier and subsequent volumes
of the Federal Supplement to ensure that no recently retired or retiring judges were omit-
ted and that all active or retiring circuit judges during this period were accounted for under
either the age of oldest circuit judge factor or the vacancy factor. Third, we eliminated
those judges whose appointments were dated after the date of the district court's decision
on the Guidelines. (These judges thus would not have been sitting at the time the district
judge made the decision). Fourth, we looked at the "Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary"
for the month following the district court decision. If there was a vacancy listed for a court
of appeals judgeship normally reserved for that state, we looked at the date the vacancy
was created to determine whether the judge would have been an active court of appeals
judge at the time of the district court decision. If so, that judge was added to the list.
Finally, for each of those court of appeals judges who were active at the time of the district
court decision and who had chambers in that state, we determined the date of birth. We
recorded the age of the oldest active circuit judge in a judgeship in that state by a whole
number for number of years. For convenience, we simply subtracted the year of birth from
the year 1988 (i.e., for a birthdate of 1946, the number to be recorded would be 42).
216 Cohen, supra note 21, at 192.
217 See Jae-On Kim & Charles W. Mueller, Factor Analysis: Statistical Methods and
Practical Issues 8 (1978) (describing factor analysis assumption that "observed variables
are linear combinations of some underlying (hypothetical or unobservable) factors").
218 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 193.
219 See id. at 190.
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these judges were effectively ineligible for and thus unlikely to be mo-
tivated by promotion to the court of appeals. Although we agree with
the presumption, we did not exclude them from the study. 0 Pre-
cisely because these judges are least likely to be influenced by the
possibility of promotion, they should be retained in the study as a
point of comparison. 2 1 Accordingly, we assigned the lowest promo-
tion potential factor score derived to these judges, rounding slightly
downward.m
F. Precedent
We created a variable measuring the strength of persuasive prece-
dent in the form of rulings by other district judges for or against the
validity of the Guidelines during the Sentencing Guidelines Crisis.
We settled upon a measure of the persuasive precedent available
within the same circuit, reflecting our hypothesis that judges will be
more aware of and more influenced by their closer neighbors' rul-
ings. Using a chronological chart of district judge rulings, this
220 As noted earlier, see supra note 206, the Sentencing Commission lacked information
on the date of decision for nine judges. Rather than lose nine judges as missing cases in
our regression analyses, we adopted an estimated date of decision--choosing the mid-year
date of June 30, 1988 as the default. Theoretically, this selected date was relevant not only
to seniority but also to whether there were court of appeals vacancies at the crucial point of
the district judge's decision. Fortunately, this theoretical concern was not borne out in
practice. For four of the judges, there were no vacancies in their circuits all year. For four
other judges from the same state, the vacancy situation was stable through most of the year
and changed only at a late point after which no other district judge in that circuit issued a
Sentencing Guidelines opinion, thus leading us to believe it is most unlikely that our de-
fault date (which precedes the date of change) affects the calculation. For the single re-
maining district judge, the only change during the year was from a vacancy to a vacancy
with a nominee. This judge was coded more conservatively as seeing a single vacancy with
a nominee. In any event, we also conducted an alternative regression analysis on the out-
come dependent variable excluding these nine judges with no effect on the PROMO-POT
variable's significance.
221 For purposes of this study, we used volume 700 of the Federal Supplement to deter-
mine if the judge was listed as active or senior as of the end of 1988. To some extent, the
list of senior judges determined in this manner will be overinclusive, as some judges may
have been active as of the time of a decision on the Guidelines earlier in the year and then
changed to senior status later in the year. However, this overinclusiveness is actually a
more accurate measure for our purposes. We essentially are using senior status as a con-
trol for promotion potential, recognizing that senior status judges certainly will not be can-
didates for nor motivated by the possibility of promotion to the court of appeals. This
same analysis applies directly to judges, who while active at the time of a decision, were
plainly contemplating an imminent change in status as demonstrated by their transfer to
senior status by the end of the year.
222 The lowest promotion potential factor score derived was -2.17 and the highest 2.94,
with a mean of-.39. We assigned a score of -2-20 to senior and District of Columbia judges.
223 Believing that judges would be most influenced by and aware of other decisions
within their own district, we initially created a "Within District Precedent" variable based
upon a chronological chart of decisions by district. Unfortunately, this variable was flawed
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PREC-CIR (precedent within a circuit) variable is coded by sub-
tracting the number of prior2 4 judges 225 within each circuit finding the
Guidelines unconstitutional from the number finding them constitu-
tional, multiplying that by the absolute value of the difference, and
dividing the result by the total number of decisions within the circuit.
Using the absolute value preserved the sign of the result,226 and in-
cluding the total number of decisions as the denominator distin-
guished between situations where a single prior opinion existed and
because of lack of variation. A solid majority of the judges had no prior rulings by other
judges in their district, because judges in many districts issued or joined rulings simultane-
ously with other judges in the district, several judges were the only ruling judges in their
particular district, and, of course, every district had to have an initial ruling by a judge.
Accordingly, after preliminary tests, we abandoned this variable. An attempt to analyze
this variable by excluding all judges for whom there was no prior Guidelines ruling in the
district was unsatisfactory-we lost 187 of our 294 cases and, in any event, had no signifi-
cant results.
224 A precedent was treated as "prior" for a particular judge's decision only if the for-
mer preceded the latter by at least seven days. The reasons for our "rule of seven days"
were necessity and reality. The dates for decisions included in the information received
from the Sentencing Commission were not necessarily precise; in some instances, the date
is the date upon which the judge signed the order, but in other cases it is the date upon
which the order was entered on the court docket. The difference between the date of
signature and date of docketing was ordinarily less than a week. For a precedential factor,
however, it means that a decision recorded as issued by Judge A on March 15, and a deci-
sion recorded as issued by Judge B on March 18, may as a practical matter have been
issued slightly in opposite chronological order. In any event, decisions that were issued
only seven or fewer days apart were essentially the equivalent of issuing simultaneous or-
ders in which neither is precedent for the other. We concluded that a district judge: (1)
may be unlikely to know about another district judge's decision entered on the docket only
a week previously; (2) is less likely to be influenced by another decision that is so new as to
be barely entered upon the docket sheet as compared to a decision entered earlier; and (3)
is likely to have already been well along in the process of reaching a conclusion on such a
momentous issue as the constitutional validity of the Guidelines when that decision is
dated within a week of another judge's decision. Moreover, if a judge were profoundly
influenced by a ruling that was issued just before he had intended to issue his own, his
likely reaction would be to delay issuance of his opinion until it could be rewritten to take
into account the new decision, thereby probably separating the date of issuance from the
new precedent by at least seven days.
For purposes of this precedential variable, we excluded, both as precedential for other
judges and in terms of measuring the influence of precedent upon them, the nine judges for
whom we did not have a specific date of decision. To avoid treating them as missing cases
in the regression, we coded these nine judges as facing zero precedential influence. For the
one judge who reversed himself by issuing decisions on both sides of the issue-separated
by about one month-both decisions were counted for precedential purposes in opposite
directions.
225 We counted precedent by judge, not by decision. This was important because of
decisions like United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (en banc),
where 14 judges of the Central District of California joined in an en banc opinion invalidat-
ing the Guidelines and 10 joined in a dissent arguing the Guidelines' constitutionality.
Counting only decisions would have underestimated the impact of such opinions.
226 For example, where there were 3 constitutional rulings and 7 unconstitutional rul-
ings, the value would be (3-7) * 13-71 / 10 = -1.60.
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situations where there was merely a margin of one among multiple
decisions.22 7
Thus, the formula used for the PREC-CIR variable accounts for
both the ratio of constitutional to unconstitutional rulings and,
through squaring, the proportionally changing weight of the prece-
dent. A positive value indicates that within the circuit at the time of a
particular judge's ruling, more judges were finding the Guidelines
constitutional than unconstitutional; a negative value indicates the re-
verse. We included the PREC-CIR variable in the standard set of
independent variables only with respect to the general outcome de-
pendent variable because we measured precedent solely by basic out-
come, and not by any other measure3m
G. Summary of Independent Variables
Table 1 provides a short description of the variables included in
our standard set, and Table 2 provides a statistical summary of these
variables including means and standard deviations.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTION OF STANDARD VARIABLES
Variable
OUTCOME
SEX
RACE
LAW-SCHOOL
CRIME-RATE
PARTY
PROSECUTOR
DEFENSE
MILITARY
LAW-PROF
POLITICAL
JUDGE
ABA-AQ
ABA-BQ
CASELOAD
SENIORITY
PROMO-POT
PREC-CIR
Definition
Judges' decision re: constitutionality of Guidelines (1=constitutional)
Gender (1=female)
Racial or ethnic origin (1=racial or ethnic minority)
Graduation from an elite law school (l=yes)
Total state crime index (rate per 100,000 inhabitants), 1988
Political party of appointing president (1=Republican)
Prior employment as a government prosecutor (1=yes)
Prior employment as a defense attorney (1=yes)
Prior service in military (1=yes)
Prior employment as a full-time law professor (1=yes)
Prior employment in an elected or appointed political position
(1=yes)
Prior employment as a state or local judge (1=yes)
ABA rating of "Well Qualified" or above (1=yes)
ABA rating of "Qualified/Not Qualified" or below (1=yes)
Total (civil + criminal) weighted caseload, per judge
Number of months on bench from appointment to date of decision
Judicial promotion potential factor score
Ratio of conJuncon. Guidelines decisions wvithin circuit
227 For example, where there was a prior single-judge decision finding the Guidelines
constitutional, the value would be (1-0) * I1-01 / I = 1.0. By contrast, where there were
three prior single-judge decisions, two finding the Guidelines constitutional and one find-
ing them unconstitutional, the value would be (2-1) - 12-11 / 3 = 0.33.
228 We are in the beginning stages of further work on the influence of precedent which
would extend to measuring precedent by theoretical category.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF STANDARD VARIABLES
Variable Mean SD
OUTCOME .39 .49
SEX .1 .29
RACE .1 .29
LAW-SCHOOL .26 .44
CRIME-RATE 5983.65 1625.86
PARTY .61 .49
PROSECUTOR .41 .49
DEFENSE .13 .34
MILITARY .62 .49
LAW-PROF .04 .19
POLITICAL .1 .29
JUDGE .37 .48
ABA-AQ .51 .5
ABA-BQ .06 .25
CASELOAD 474.54 97.65
SENIORITY 113.12 80.17
PROMO-POT 
-. 39 1.22
PREC-CIR 
-1.94 4.26
IV
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES-OUTCOME
AND REASONING
A. Analysis of Judicial Decisions-Outcome as a
Dependent Variable
In 1988, 293 judges rendered 294 decisions on the constitutional-
ity of the Sentencing Guidelines. As Table 3 illustrates, the federal
judges were roughly split, with 115 decisions (39%) ruling the Guide-
lines constitutional, and 179 (61%) declaring the Guidelines
unconstitutional.229
Our judicial utility maximization model predicts that the
probability of a federal district judge finding the Guidelines constitu-
tional depends on six groups of factors: a judge's general background,
political ideology, prior employment, judicial role or institution,
potential for promotion, and precedent. Because we analyzed the
229 Table 3 reports only the distribution of categorical variables. Other important, non-
categorical variables are included in our standard set of variables as summarized in Tables
1 and 2 and reflected in later tables reporting results from logistic regression analyses.
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON CONSTITUTIONAL/
UNCONSTITUTIONAL OUTCOME
Con. Uncon. (N)
All Judges 115 (.39) 179 (.61) 294
By Sex
Male 105 (.40) 161 (.61) 266
Female 10 (.36) 18 (.64) 28
By Race/Ethnicity
White (non-Hispanic) 107 (.40) 159 (.60) 266
(other) 8 (.29) 20 (.71) 28
By Law School
Elite Law School 25 (.33) 50 (.67) 75
Non-Elite Law School 90 (.41) 129 (.59) 219
By Party of Appointing President
Republican 75 (.42) 103 (.58) 178
Democrat 40 (.35) 76 (.66) 116
By Prior Employment
Prosecutor
Yes 48 (.40) 72 (.60) 120
No 67 (.39) 107 (.62) 174
Defense Lawyer
Yes 10 (.26) 29 (.74) 39
No 105 (.41) 150 (.59) 255
Military
Yes 67 (.37) 115 (.63) 182
No 48 (.43) 64 (.57) 112
Law Professor
Yes 3 (.27) 8 (.73) 11
No 112 (.40) 171 (.60) 283
Political Experience
Yes 11 (.39) 17 (.61) 28
No 104 (.39) 162 (.61) 266
Judge
Yes 49 (.45) 59 (.55) 10S
No 66 (.36) 120 (.65) 186
By ABA Rating
Above Qualified 56 (.38) 93 (.62) 149
Qualified 53 (.42) 72 (.58) 125
Below Qualified 6 (.32) 13 (.68) 19
influences of multiple variables, a multiple regression model was nec-
essary. Within the array of appropriate regression models, we settled
on logistic regression. 30
230 Our selection of logistic regression may warrant some discussion. Our dependent
variable-OUTCOME-is dichotomous, coded "1" if the judge ruled the Guidelines con-
stitutional and "0" if not, and, as such, the usual linear regression models, such as Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS), are not appropriate. OLS models, for example, allow the predicted
values to fall outside the 0 to 1 range of our dependent variable. Moreover, OLS is rela-
tively less efficient as the error cannot be normally distributed nor can it have constant
variance. For a fuller discussion of these points, see Michael 0. Fmkelstein & Bruce Levin,
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Along with a statistical model, we also needed to generate a stan-
dard set of independent variables (as described earlier and summa-
rized in Tables 1 and 2). In addition to the issues discussed above,
multicollinearity influenced our selection of our standard variable
set.23' We could not, of course, include together related variables that
were highly collinear.232 We adopted a conservative approach toward
this problem.Z23
Statistics for Lawyers 447-52 (1990); John Fox, Applied Regression Analysis, Linear Mod-
els, and Related Methods 442 (1997).
In contrast to OLS models, logit and probit models deal quite well with a dichotomous
dependent variable and either model is generally appropriate. We settled on a logit model
for two reasons. First, logit models possess the practical advantages of relative ease and
interpretability. See Fox, supra, at 444-46. Second, the weight of the empirical literature
favors logit models. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 32, at 1185 n.155; Vicki
Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of
the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1073, 1121 (1992).
In logistic regression, the dependent variable is the natural log of the odds ratio of the
probability that an event occurs to the probability that it does not occur [L=log[p/(1-p)]].
For more on logistic regression models, see generally John H. Aldrich & Forrest D. Nelson,
Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models (1984) (deriving equations for logit and
probit models); Alfred DeMaris, Legit Modeling: Practical Applications (1992) (describ-
ing use and application of logit model); Eric A. Hanushek & John E. Jackson, Statistical
Methods for Social Scientists 179-216 (1977) (explaining discrete variable problem and de-
riving logit and probit models). Although logit and probit models both transform the ac-
tual proportion responding on the independent variables, probit models do so by replacing
the observed proportions with the value of the standard normal curve below which the
observed proportion of the area is located.
231 Through data gathering (and subsequent statistical manipulation) we generated
more than 100 variables, most different formulations of the same type of variable.
232 For example, as discussed in Part V.A.3 infra, we generated a variable AGE for a
judge's age. Not surprisingly, a judge's age was closely related to the length of a judge's
tenure on the bench, which was coded in the SENIORITY variable. Thus, for multicol-
linearity reasons, we could not, of course, include both variables in a single regression.
Moreover, multicollinearity concerns precluded the inclusion of both ELECTED and
POLITICAL or of both REAGAN and PARTY in the same logistic regression equation.
233 We adopted a two-fold approach to guard against multicollinearity: First, for every
model presented we generated bivariate correlation matrices for all independent variables.
No firm "rule" exists within the literature. See, e.g., George W. Bohmstedt & David
Knoke, Statistics for Social Data Analysis 407 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting exclusion of vari-
ables where coefficients exceed 50%); Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 230, at 352 ("A
simple (but not foolproof) test for multicollinearity involves looking for high correlations
(e.g., in excess of .9) in pairs of explanatory variables . ... "); Michael S. Lewis-Beck,
Applied Regression: An Introduction 60 (1980) ("For diagnosis, we must look directly at
the intercorrelation of the independent variables. A frequent practice is to examine the
bivariate correlations among the independent variables, looking for coefficients of about
.8, or larger."). In every instance, we adopted the more conservative approach. Thus,
where two potential independent variables' coefficients exceeded 50%, we excluded one of
the related variables. Second, even where coefficients did not exceed the 50% threshold,
variables were excluded if two or more were intended to serve as proxies for the same idea
or where, in theory, two variables were too closely linked. For example, although the bi-
variate coefficient for variables CASELOAD and CRIM-CASELOAD (-.15) did not ex-
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TABLE 4
PROBABILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL OUTCOM,1E
(CONSTITUTIONAL = 1)
Standard Crim. Caseload Alternative
Demographic
SEX
RACE
LAW-SCHOOL
CRTME-RATE
Political
PARTY
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR
DEFENSE
MILITARY
LAW-PROF
POLITICAL
JUDGE
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ
ABA-BQ
CASELOAD
CRIM-CASELOAD
SENIORITY
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT
Precedent
PREC-CIR
(constant)
% accurately predicted by model
McFadden's pseudo R2
N
--56
(.50)
-. 67
(.50)
-. 17
(.31)
-2.4(e-05)
(834)(e-05)
.24
(.29)
.24
(.28)
-. 75
(.43)
-. 28
(.30)
-. 53
(.72)
.11
(.45)
.62*
(.28)
-. 19
(.27)
-. 60
(.58)
-. 00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.28*
(.12)
.07*
(.03)
.47
(.99)
63.57
.06
291
-. 53
(.51)
-. 71
(.50)
-. 11
(.32)
-7.7(e-05)
(8.88)(e-os)
.20
(.29)
.30
(.28)
-. 90*
(.44)
-. 35
(.30)
-.49
(.73)
.14
(.45)
.60*
(.28)
-. 18
(.27)
-.58
(.59)
3.44*
(1.64)
.00
(.00)
.25*
(.12)
.07*
(.03)
-.30
(.73)
68.04
.07
291
* p <.05
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Table 4 presents the results of our logistic regression analyses that
test the influence of each independent variable on a judge's likelihood
of ruling the Sentencing Commission Guidelines constitutional, while
simultaneously controlling for all other independent variables. A pos-
itive coefficient for a variable indicates that, controlling for all other
independent variables, the presence of that particular independent va-
riable increased the likelihood of a positive constitutional decision.
Conversely, a negative coefficient signals that a variable decreased the
likelihood of a decision sustaining the constitutionality of the
Guidelines.
The first column of the table presents the results of a regression
analysis with our standard set of independent variables. The second
column presents the results of an alternative regression analysis in
which we replaced our standard workload variable (CASELOAD)
with a substitute variable (CRIM-CASELOAD) that is designed to
assess the relative influence of a judge's criminal docket.
Part V presents an integrated interpretation of the significant
findings for all the independent variables, standard and substitute,
across all of the dependent variables included in our study.
B. Analysis of Judicial Decisions-Reasoning Categories as
Dependent Variables
1. Method of Analyzing Opinions
To create our dependent variables for the content analysis com-
ponent of our study, we had to analyze each opinion for both constitu-
tional theories addressed and general reasoning approach.234 Two of
us separately read and coded each opinion, usually in groups of ten
opinions over the course of a week. We then exchanged results and
discussed any differences. We divided the opinions into five binders
by circuit and constitutional outcome, and we alternated constitu-
tional and unconstitutional volumes. We were concerned that our
opinion analysis should be as objective as possible and so constructed
a relatively elaborate review mechanism involving the third coauthor
and colleagues. As it turned out, our disagreements were few and all
were resolved without troubling the third coauthor. Only a small
number required substantive discussion.
ceed our .5 threshold, we did not include both variables in the same equation as both were
designed to serve as proxies for a judge's workload.
234 To create the categories and codes, we initially analyzed a more or less random sam-
ple of opinions and discussed the possible codes. As we coded and discovered the need for
additional codes, such as unusual variations or combinations of other codes, we added
them.
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Coding appeared to be straightforward when we began, and for
the most part it was. There were a few opinions that simply defied
analysis on any grounds except outcome; those we coded only for the
basic constitutional/unconstitutional result. Many opinions were
straightforward, in part because their authors made good use of sec-
tion headings or topic sentences. Some of the more opaque opinions
could be coded by examining which precedents were cited. Most chal-
lenging were the opinions that adopted numerous other opinions by
reference. We left those to be coded last and attributed to the ana-
lyzed opinion each theory present in the referenced opinions. Be-
cause we could not know in advance how the distribution of opinions
would develop, we decided to code the opinions for as many varia-
tions as possible. We therefore created codes for each issue, subissue
and combination thereof. When we began the regression analysis, we
collapsed these codes into binary dependent variables.
We feel confident that our coding is an accurate reflection of the
opinions' content235 Our cautious approach to attributing character-
istics, duplicate coding, and close agreement on the results ensured
that the coding was not simply the projection of our own views onto
the opinions.
Table 5 summarizes the coding of our four constitutional theory
claim variables and the two reasoning approach variables. The diver-
sity of theoretical bases for the judges' rulings is apparent, with the
separation of powers claims the most common rationale for finding
the Guidelines unconstitutional.
TABLE 5
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Con. Uncon. (N)
All Judges 115 (.39) 179 (.61) 294
Constitutional Claims
SOP - Branch Location 63 (.36) 112 (.64) 175
SOP - Judge Members 60 (.35) 110 (.65) 170
Non-Delegation Doctrine 89 (.69) 41 (.32) 130
Due Process Claim 30 (.42) 42 (.58) 72
Reasoning Approach Present Not Present
Practical 33 (.34) 64 (.66) 97
Originalism 33 (.34) 64 (.66) 97
One question that naturally arises is the relationship among the
various dependent variables we used. Table 6 presents summary sta-
tistics on the correlation between the various constitutional theory
235 A complete list of opinions and their codes is available from the authors on request.
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variables. Our constitutional theory variables differ from the overall
outcome variable in two ways. First, as described earlier, not every
opinion discussed all four legal theories. The subset of data available
for analysis of judges' rulings on the Non-Delegation Doctrine there-
fore differed significantly from the subset available for analysis of
judges' rulings concerning the location of the Sentencing Commission
in the tripartite federal system (Separation of Powers-Branch). To the
extent that consideration of different constitutional theory dependent
variables meant we were considering different subsets of the data, the
second and third lines of each cell in Table 6 show the percentage of
opinions coded on each variable that were coded on both. The second
line shows the percentage of cases coded for the dependent variable
listed in the row that is also coded for the dependent variable in the
column. The third line shows the percentage of cases coded for the
dependent variable listed in the column that is also coded for the de-
pendent variable in the row. Thus, for example, in comparing the
Non-Delegation Doctrine variable with the Separation of Powers-
Branch variable, there were 130 opinions coded for the Non-
Delegation Doctrine and 175 opinions coded for Separation of
Powers-Branch. Of these, 94% of the Non-Delegation Doctrine opin-
ions were also coded for Separation of Powers-Branch, and 70% of
the Separation of Powers-Branch opinions were also coded for the
Non-Delegation Doctrine. As Table 6 shows, there are large differ-
ences between the data subsets used for each dependent variable, dif-
ferences caused by the relatively frequent incidence of opinions which
did not address all four issues.236 Although we would have preferred
that each judge give us his or her views on each issue, we do not think
that their failure to do so had a significant impact on our results. In-
deed, a judge's decision to adopt one constitutional theory for resolu-
236 A judge upholding the Sentencing Guidelines would have to address and reject all
constitutional theories raised by the defendant, while a judge invalidating the Guidelines
could seize upon a single theory to accomplish that end. However, any bias in the data is
likely minimized by the following four factors. First, a judge upholding the Guidelines was
obliged to address only those constitutional theories actually raised by a defendant in chal-
lenging the application of the Sentencing Guidelines in his or her case, and many defen-
dants did not raise the due process theory. Second, a judge invalidating the Guidelines
would often apply a "belt-and-suspenders" approach, striking the Guidelines on more than
one ground. Third, several judges affirmatively rejected certain challenges to the Guide-
lines, even when ultimately accepting another as a basis for invalidation. Fourth, in the
end, there were only four theories in the universe of possible constitutional challenges, and
the two separation of powers arguments were frequently combined in presentation and
resolution.
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ion of the case versus another conveys significant information in
itself3 7
The second type of difference in the constitutional theory vari-
ables concerns opinions that addressed multiple grounds for invalidat-
ing the Guidelines. For each pair of constitutional claims, we
examined the correlation between the judge's resolution (constitu-
tional versus unconstitutional) of the two claims. The correlation co-
efficient is shown in the first line of each cell in Table 6. Thus, for
example, the correlation coefficient for judges addressing the Non-
Delegation Doctrine claim and the Separation of Power-Branch claim
is 0.60, indicating a relatively large weak correlation between judges'
views about the two claims, while the correlation coefficient for the
two separation of powers theories is a high 0.95. This is unsurprising,
since the two separation of powers theories relied upon many of same
legal precedents and lines of constitutional analysis and the judges'
views of the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines under
those theories would likely be similar. Thus, overall, as Table 6 indi-
cates, the four constitutional theory dependent variables do indeed
measure different things.
TABLE 6
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (SELECTED) CORRELATION MATRIX
SOP-Br SOP-J NDD
SOP-J .95**
% Row (.97)
% Column (.94)
NDD .60** .60*
% Row (.94) (.91)
% Column (.70) (.69)
Due Process .94** 1.0 .56 *
% Row (.96) (.96) (.92)
% Column (.39) (.41) (.51)
** p < .01
The constitutional claims dependent variables and the reasoning
approach dependent variables are further explained immediately be-
low, together with tables reporting the results of regression analyses.
Further explanation and interpretation of those results follow in Part
V.
237 See infra Part V.A.2 (discussing disproportionate numbers of minority judges who
adopted due process constitutional theory in invalidating Sentencing Guidelines).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1998]
HeinOnline -- 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1437 1998
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. Methodology and Summary of Results
a. Constitutional Claims Rulings. We explored the particular
constitutional claims that the judges addressed in their rulings and
their choice of theories to resolve those challenges23~8 The opinions
were coded into four general categories of constitutional claims fol-
lowing the arguments made by the parties:23 9 (1) Separation of Pow-
ers-Branch Location; (2) Separation of Powers-Judge Members;
(3) Non-Delegation Doctrine; and (4) Due Process. To reduce the
subjectivity of the opinion coding process, we followed the judges'
written signals about what constitutional claims the judges thought
they were addressing and what theories they thought they were apply-
ing, rather than imposing an outside analytical framework upon the
judges' reasoning. Thus, for example, if a judge purported to address
a separation of powers issue, even though the analysis seemed more
suited to a due process evaluation, we coded the opinion as a separa-
tion of powers resolution.2 40
i. Separation of Powers-Branch Location As discussed ear-
lier, the leading constitutional challenge to the Sentencing Commis-
sion was grounded in the separation of powers doctrine.24'
Opponents contended that the Sentencing Reform Act assigned an
executive function-rulemaking-to a judicial entity in violation of
Article III of the Constitution. The Department of Justice in the Rea-
gan Administration argued that, while Congress had erred in designat-
ing an entity with the attributes of an executive agency as a body in
the judicial branch, that designation is without substantive meaning.
Accordingly, the Department effectively requested reassignment of
238 The set of independent variables we employed to generate results for the content
analysis dependent variables is structured quite similarly to that used for the general out-
come dependent variable. See supra Part IV.A. However, because the precedent variable
(PREC-CIR) was measured solely by outcome, see supra Part III.F, this variable is
dropped from our standard set.
239 See supra Part II.B.1.
240 For example, in United States v. Christman, No. CR88-4-2 (D. Vt. Nov. 19,1988) (en
banc), three district judges invalidated the Guidelines in part on the grounds that judicial
authority in the sentencing process includes the discretion "to apply reasonable and appro-
priate factors in the light of the circumstances of the case presented to the court" and that
the Guidelines improperly "replace the judicial discretion vested in the courts by substitut-
ing the sentencing factors and punishment structured by the Sentencing Commission." Id.
at 7-8. Although this reasoning is very similar to the due process claim of a right to individ-
ualized sentencing by a judge with full discretion, these judges had expressly refused to
consider the due process argument, holding that the claim would not be ripe until a Guide-
lines sentence was actually imposed. See id. at 4-5. Thus, despite our impression that the
reasoning fit more comfortably under a due process analysis, these judges considered their
holding to be based upon a separation of powers violation, and we coded it as such.
241 See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 7
SEPARATION OF POWERS - BRANCH LOCATION
(CONSTITUTIONAL OR LOCATION IN BRANCH = 1)
General Outcome Executive Branch Judicial Branch
Demographic
SEX -. 09 -1.02 .13
(.67) (129) (.75)
RACE -. 82 -8.51 -82
(.65) (28.53) (.80)
LAW-SCHOOL -. 30 .26 -. 60
(.41) (.77) (.53)
CRIME-RATE -. 00 -. 00** 9.98(e-05)
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Political
PARTY -. 24 -. 91 -.o
(.39) (.75) (.48)
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR .43 -
(.38)
DEFENSE -1.13 .04 -1A8
(.62) (1.16) (.85)
MILITARY -. 54 -1.40* -.28
(.39) (.71) (.46)
LAW-PROF -. 17 -1.74 .21
(.98) (1.90) (125)
POLITICAL .10 -
(-55)
JUDGE .51 .75 .25
(.36) (.68) (.43)
EXECUTIVE - 3.46 -120
(1.77) (1.40)
LEGISLATIVE - -1.95 .72
(1.69) (.66)
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ -. 36 .33 -.82
(.36) (.67) (.44)
ABA-BQ -. 90 -7.92 -.77
(39) (36.32) (.91)
CASELOAD .00 -.00 -.00
(.00) (.00) (.00)
SENIORITY -. 00 -.00 -.00
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT .31 -.50 29(.17) (A41) (.21)
(constant) .90 3.61 -.05
(1.41) (2.40) (1.68)
% accurately predicted by model 64.57 93.14 78.05
McFadden's pseudo R2  .08 .32 .09
N 175 175 164
* p <.05; ** p <.01
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the Commission to the executive branch. By contrast, the Sentencing
Commission defended the statute on its own terms and argued that
the Commission is properly located within the judicial branch.242
In coding the opinions we explored three different alignments of
judicial reasoning. Table 7 presents those results:
First, as reported in Column 1 ("General"), we coded opinions as
either upholding or invalidating the Guidelines on separation of pow-
ers grounds by reason of the branch location of the Commission. A
constitutional ruling was coded "1" (63 judges), and an unconstitu-
tional ruling was coded "0" (112 judges).
Second, as reported in Column 2 ("Executive Branch"), we coded
opinions for whether they adopted the Department of Justice's posi-
tion that the Commission should be regarded as validly located in the
executive branch (code="1", 16 judges). For purposes of this analysis,
any ruling that differed from the Department's approach-whether by
invalidating the Commission as unconstitutional or upholding the
Commission on an alternative ground such as proper location in the
judicial branch-was coded as a rejection of the Department's pre-
ferred position (code="O", 159 judges). Moreover, in testing the influ-
ence of the Justice Department's approach, we replaced the
POLITICAL variable with two substitute variables-EXECUTIVE
and LEGISLATIVE. 243
Third, as reported in Column 3 ("Judicial Branch"), we coded
opinions for whether they adopted the Sentencing Commission's posi-
tion that the Commission is properly designated as a judicial branch
entity and is constitutional (code="1", 36 judges). For purposes of this
analysis, any ruling that differed from the Conunission's approach-
242 If a judge found that the Sentencing Commission was appropriate in terms of func-
tion and operation in either the judicial branch or the executive branch, but objected to the
mandatory participation of judges upon the Commission, the opinion was classified for
branch location purposes without considering the deciding judge's view of the validity of
judges serving on the Commission. The question of mandatory judicial participation upon
the Commission was analyzed in the Separation of Powers-Judge Member category dis-
cussed below. Thus, for example, if a judge concluded that relocation of the Commission
to the executive branch would not be enough to make the Commission constitutional only
because of the participation of judges in an executive branch entity, the judge was treated
for branch location purposes as concluding that the Commission would be constitutional in
terms of function and operation in the executive branch. The invalidation of the Commis-
sion by reason of judge membership was reserved for separate analysis in that distinct
phase of the study. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.ii.
243 We substituted these two variables for POLITICAL rather than adding them to our
set of variables due to multicollinearity concerns. See supra notes 192-95 and accompany-
ing text. Out of an abundance of caution, we also excluded the PROSECUTOR variable
in this regression as well. Although EXECUTIVE was not defined to include federal pros-
ecutors, we believe the variables are theoretically correlated and thus properly treated as
though collinear.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 73:1377
HeinOnline -- 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1440 1998
JUDICIAL REASONING
whether by invalidating the Commission as unconstitutional or up-
holding the Commission on an alternative ground such as relocation
to the executive branch-was coded as a rejection of the Commis-
sion's preferred position (code="O", 128 judges). However, we omit-
ted any ruling that upheld the constitutionality of the Commission
while avoiding discussion of the branch location issue, as such a ruling
could not be categorized as either an adoption or rejection of the
Commission's position.
ii Separation of Powers-Judge Members As discussed earlier,
another standard challenge to the Sentencing Commission concerned
the required membership of three federal judges.244 Criminal defen-
dants criticized this mandatory judicial participation in an extrajudi-
cial capacity as impairing the work of the judicial branch and
undermining the impartiality of the judiciary.245 Judges who found re-
quired judicial participation on the Commission constitutionally per-
missible were coded "1" (60 judges); judges who invalidated the
Commission by reason of mandatory judicial membership were coded
"0" (110 judges).
Results from our logistic regression analyses of this dependent
variable are reported in Table 8. Column 1 contains the results from
our standard set of independent variables. For Column 2, we replaced
CASELOAD with CRIM-CASELOAD for comparison due to
slightly different results.
iiL Non-Delegation Doctrine Rulings
The third category of constitutional challenge to the Sentencing
Commission's work fell under the label of nondelegation doctrine.
Defendants attacked the Commission's statutory authority to promul-
gate Sentencing Guidelines as an improper or excessive delegation of
legislative power. 246 Those rulings that upheld the Guidelines against
nondelegation doctrine attacks were coded as "1" (89 judges). Those
rulings that invalidated the Guidelines on this ground, whether on the
theory that Congress may not delegate the core function of sentencing
244 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
245 The question of whether the Sentencing Reform Act validly authorizes the President
to remove the judge members from the Commission was classified as a branch location
concern for our study, rather than as a judge members concern. The removal question
asked whether it was appropriate for the head of one branch to exercise removal power
over officials in another branch, which thus focused upon the purported location of the
Commission in the judicial branch. By contrast, the requirement that judges serve upon
the Commission, whatever its branch location, raised other issues about judges participat-
ing in a lawmaking or regulationissuing body and whether that participation impaired the
impartiality of the individual judges or the judiciary as a whole.
246 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 8
SEPARATION OF POWERS - JUDGE MEMBERS
(CONSTITUTIONAL = 1)
Standard Crim. Caseload Alternative
Demographic
SEX .03 
-.21
(.71) (.73)
RACE 
-. 81 
-.84
(.69) (.69)
LAW-SCHOOL 
-. 29 
-.32
(.44) (.45)
CRIME-RATE 
-8.3 (e-05) -.00
(.00) (.00)
Political
PARTY .14 .08
(.41) (.41)
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR .71 .90*
(.40) (.42)
DEFENSE 
-2.55** 
-3.07**
(.89) (1.04)
MILITARY 
-. 30 
-. 42
(.41) (.42)
LAW-PROF .24 .24
(1.02) (1.09)
POLITICAL 
-.02 .06
(.60) (.61)
JUDGE .54 .53
(.37) (.37)
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ 
-.57 
-. 60(.38) (.39)
ABA-BQ 
-.84 
-.82(.80) (.80)
CASELOAD -. 00 -(.oo)
CRIM-CASELOAD - 5.53
(2.83)
SENIORITY 
-. 00 .00
(.00) (.00)
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT .40* .47*
(.19) (.19)(constant) .52 .19
(1.66) (1.02)
% accurately predicted by model 69.41 68.24
McFadden's pseudo R2  .12 .14
N 170 170
* p < .05; ** p < .01
rules at all, or that the statute failed to provide an intelligible principle
to guide the Commission's work, were coded as "0" (41 judges). Re-
suits from our logistic regression analysis of this dependent variable
are reported in Table 9.
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TABLE 9
NON-DELEGATION DOcTRINE RULINGS
(CONsTxrrUIONAL = 1)
Standard
Demographic
SEX
RACE
LAW-SCHOOL
CRIME-RATE
Political
PARTY
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR
DEFENSE
MILITARY
LAW-PROF
POLITICAL
JUDGE
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ
ABA-BQ
CASELOAD
SENIORITY
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT
(constant)
% accurately predicted by model
McFadden's pseudo R2
N
.75
(1.23)
-. 20
(.95)
-.47
(.56)
.00
(.00)
.19
(.52)
-. 60
(.50)
-.41
(.73)
-.59
(.57)
7.62
(24.67)
.03
(.69)
.36
(.51)
-1.08*
(.50)
-1.82
(1.10)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.93**
(.27)
-. 22
(2.07)
79.23
.28
130
* p < .05; ** p <.01
iv. Due Process Claim Rulings A fourth and less typical cate-
gory of constitutional challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines invoked
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
as guaranteeing an individual right to be sentenced by a judge with
discretion to evaluate the circumstances of the crime and the charac-
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teristics of the offender.2 47 While the vast majority of judges ad-
dressed the separation of powers challenges, and most judges
addressed the nondelegation doctrine, only 72 of the 188 judges (38%)
issuing or participating in written opinions addressed the due process
question. 248 Accordingly, conclusions and inferences should be drawn
from Table 10 with some care.
Results from our logistic regression analysis examining how the
Guidelines fared against a due process claim are reported in Table 10.
Rulings that upheld the Guidelines against due process challenges
were coded as "1" (30 judges). Those rulings that invalidated the
Guidelines on this ground were coded as "0" (42 judges).
b. Reasoning Approach
i. Practical Versus Theoretical Reasoning. In coding the opin-
ions, we distinguished between reasoning primarily concerned with
the practical effects of the decision from that primarily concerned with
more abstract constitutional theory.2 49 In the "Practical" category, we
placed opinions that focused, with concrete examples of a largely fac-
tual nature, on the consequences of applying the Guidelines to defen-
dants or the effects of judges serving on the Commission to the
independence of the judiciary.250 In the "Theoretical" category, we
placed opinions that focused on constitutional theory, generally
divorced from real world consequences or nitty gritty practical
247 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
248 For coding purposes, we treated claims by defendants that the availability of proba-
tion as a sentence is compelled by due process as a species of the individualized sentencing
right theory. The purported requirement that a judge be able to consider a certain sentenc-
ing option-whether it is probation or a shorter period of years-is inescapably an individ-
ualized sentencing claim.
249 We had and still have doubts about whether this categorization effort was fully suc-
cessful and made objective and adequate distinctions. See infra Part V.A.6 (discussing
correlation between law school education and practical reasoning). One reviewer criti-
cized our practical/theoretical dichotomy, suggesting we may have confused formalism with
theoretical reasoning. In his view, for example, we may have mistakenly characterized a
formalistic discussion of separation of powers as theoretical although it did not evidence
high-minded thinking. However, it was not our intent in this study to distinguish legal
formalism from other theoretical forms of reasoning, but rather to distinguish both from
the nitty gritty, "street smarts" practical legal thinking displayed from the bench by some
trial judges. Nonetheless, the critique is well-taken, both in expressing some dissatisfaction
with our implementation of this variable and in prompting us to undertake further explora-
tion. Recognizing that the Sentencing Guidelines decisions are a treasure trove of data, we
intend in a future study to further examine legal reasoning by coding these opinions by
such analytical categories as legal formalism, legal realism/political, and aspirational/
prophetic.
250 See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 692 F. Supp. 331, 337-40 (D. Del. 1988) (engag-
ing in pragmatic analysis of Sentencing Commission activities).
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TABLE 10
DuE PROCESS CLAIM RULINGS
(CONsTr IONAL = 1)
Standard
Demographic
SEX 131
(1.51)
RACE -3.90 0
(1.49)
LAW-SCHOOL -1.48
(.89)
CRIME-RATE -.00
(.00)
Political
PARTY .11
(.91)
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR .54
(31)
DEFENSE -328*
(1.49)
MILITARY .12
(.74)
LAW-PROF 1.34
(1.63)
POLITICAL -. 89
(1.91)
JUDGE .43
(.70)
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ -1A1*
(.71)
ABA-BQ .12
(1.35)
CASELOAD .01
(.01)
SENIORITY -.01
(.01)
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT .07
(-36)
(constant) -.48
(3.14)
% accurately predicted by model 76.39
McFadden's pseudo R2  .32
N 72
* p < .05; ** p < .01
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effects?-5' Although the existence of both in a single opinion was not
uncommon, we looked for what reasoning approach predominated in
the balance. 2
We classified the reasoning of 97 judges authoring opinions, with
24 adopting a practical approach and 73 adopting a theoretical ap-
proach. Table 11 reports the results of our logistic regression analysis
on the Practical versus Theoretical dependent variable.
ii. Originalist Versus Nonoriginalist Reasoning. Through cod-
ing of the opinions, we explored use of originalist versus nonoriginalist
approaches to constitutional interpretation. We adopted this particu-
lar theory of constitutional interpretation for closer examination not
because the originalist versus nonoriginalist dichotomy is the objec-
tively correct general theory for categorizing constitutional thought,
either normatively or descriptively.25 3 We fully appreciate that con-
temporary constitutional interpretation involves a pluralism of meth-
ods and theories, including originalism, textualism, fundamental fights
analysis, civic republicanism, and prudential argument or pragma-
tism.Z2 4 Rather, we have examined originalism in this study for rea-
sons of interest, historical context, and practical feasibility.
First, originalism as a theory of interpretation has been a center-
piece in constitutional debate in the last two decades, by both advo-
cates and critics.25 5 Thus, however incomplete it may be for a full
251 See, e.g., United States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 797-802 (E.D. La. 1988)
(engaging in theoretical analysis of separation of powers issues).
252 When an opinion authored by a judge contained more than a de minimis amount of
analysis, we coded it by reasoning approach, both in terms of practical versus theoretical
reasoning and originalist versus nonoriginalist reasoning (as discussed infra Part
IV.B.2.b.ii). When a judge recited that he was adopting the holding of another opinion,
but offered no further analysis, we were unable to classify that opinion by reasoning ap-
proach. Thus, those opinions were coded only by the constitutional claims addressed and
theories adopted in the cited opinion and are not included in this study of practical versus
theoretical reasoning or the following study of originalist versus nonoriginalist reasoning.
Likewise, when a judge participating in an en banc proceeding merely joined an opinion
written by another judge, the joining judge was coded according to the constitutional
claims addressed and theories adopted by the authored opinion, but not by reasoning
approach.
253 See Stephen M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism 155 (1996) (arguing that tex-
tual, doctrinal, and prudential approaches to constitutional interpretation cannot be cap-
tured in originalist/nonoriginalist dichotomy).
254 See generally id. at 143-91.
255 Compare Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law (1990), Earl M. Maltz, Rethinking Constitutional Law: Originalism, Interventionism,
and the Politics of Judicial Review (1994), Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1995), Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981), and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989), with Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Read-
ing the Constitution 8-13, 97-117 (1991), Speech by Justice William J. Brennan to the Text
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understanding of modem constitutional theory, it is worthy of empiri-
cal study. Second, the Sentencing Guidelines Crisis of 1988 erupted
nearly contemporaneously with the failed 1987 Supreme Court nomi-
nation of Judge Robert H. Bork, a prominent advocate of an original-
ist approach to constitutional interpretation as6 Accordingly, public
attention was sharply focused on originalist constitutional theory dur-
ing this period,257 a matter of which the judges deciding the Guide-
lines cases naturally were aware. Moreover, Justice Scalia, another
leading proponent of originalism, later cast his judicial vote on the
Sentencing Guidelines in the negative in a dissent that had a definite
originalist tone.258 Finally, and crucially for empirical study, among
the plethora of theories of constitutional interpretation, originalism
was most amenable to reasonably objective classification. Because of
its formalist nature and its emphasis on text and history, an originalist
analysis may be more readily identified in a judicial opinion.
For purposes of our study, we defined originalism as an analysis
that rests primarily (but not exclusively259) on the purported original
and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (1985), reprinted in The Great Debate:
Interpreting Our Written Constitution 11 (1986); see also Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L Rev. 204 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, The
Arduous Virtue of Fidelity- Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L Rev.
1249 (1997); and Mark Tushnet, The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers, 36
Buff. L. Rev. 217 (1987). See generally Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 10-42, on file with the
New York University Law Review) (presenting history of originalism, living constitutional-
ism, and historical fidelity as theories of interpretation, prevalent in many eras, including
period between 1973 and 1997).
256 For commentary on the Bork nomination to the Supreme Court, see generally Bork,
supra note 255, at 267-349; David G. Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist
Supreme Court 133-46 (1992); Stephen M. Griffin, Politics and the Supreme Court: The
Case of the Bork Nomination, 5 J.L. & Pol. 551, 551-604 (1989).
257 See Griffin, supra note 256, at 567-604 (concluding that Senate rejected as unduly
strict Bork's judicial philosophy of neutral principles and original intent, but more gener-
ally that Bork was defeated because of his criticism of Supreme Court decisions on funda-
mental rights and civil rights that had come to be generally accepted as legitimate
achievements); Tribe & Doff, supra note 255, at 3 (claiming that "the Senate's decision to
withhold its consent was based in large part on its rejection of Judge Bork's belief that a
quest for the 'original intent' of the Framers of the Constitution is the only proper method
of interpreting the Constitution"). But see Bork, supra note 255, at 9 (arguing that "the
difference about the proper role of the courts is what the battle over [Bork's] confinmation
was underneath" but that "the public campaign, designed to influence senators through
public opinion polls, consisted of the systematic distortion of [his] academic writings and
[his] judicial record and, it must be said, employed racial and gender politics of a most
pernicious variety").
258 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259 Cf. Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 Wash. U. LQ. 535, 540 (1993) (declining, for pur-
poses of study of Supreme Court opinions, to define "textualism" as theory of statutory
interpretation so narrowly as to exclude any opinion that includes discussion of legislative
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TABLE 11
PRACTICAL V. THEORETICAL REASONING
(PRACTICAL = 1)
Standard
Demographic
SEX -1.68
(1.33)
RACE 1.35
(1.76)
LAW-SCHOOL 1.44*
(.73)
CRIME-RATE -.00
(.00)
Political
PARTY 
-.24
(.67)
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR .64
(.65)
DEFENSE .02
(.92)
MILITARY 
-.34
(.68)
LAW-PROF 
-7.07
(25.38)
POLITICAL 
-2.53
(1.41)
JUDGE .81
(.67)
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ .75
(.67)
ABA-BQ .02
(1.70)
CASELOAD -. 01*
(.00)
SENIORITY .01*
(.00)
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT .35
(.26)
(constant) 3.53
(2.20)
% accurately predicted by model 82.47
McFadden's pseudo R2  .28
N 97
* p < .05; ** p < .01
understanding as reflected by a primary concern with the text, linguis-
tic understanding of the framing period, and history of the framing
history even if only to confirm result "gleaned from a close examination of the text," saying
that "[t]he Justices, like all good lawyers, attempt to marshal all possible arguments for
their side").
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period (including founding era Supreme Court decisions). 2 ° An
opinion that includes a discussion of history subsequent to the found-
ing period, policy concerns, or Supreme Court precedent would con-
stitute an originalist opinion only if these matters were adduced to
confirm the original meaning and did not dominate the analysis
2 61
In examining the opinions for classification as "Originalist" or
"Non-Originalist," we looked at such factors as: (1) the professed
weight given to original understanding and founding era history; (2)
the amount of space devoted in the opinion to original understanding
and founding era history as contrasted with subsequent history, policy,
and court precedent not from the founding era; and (3) the priority of
placement in the opinion of original understanding and founding era
history, that is, whether it serves as the starting point for analysis
rather than as supplemental argument.262 Furthermore, an opinion
that addressed any significant constitutional claim in an originalist
manner was classified as Originalist, even if other constitutional
claims were discussed differently. Thus, for example, a judge who ap-
plied an originalist approach to the nondelegation doctrine issue was
coded as an Originalist, even if the separation of powers discussion
did not follow an originalist approach.
We classified the reasoning approaches of 97 judges authoring
opinions by reasoning approach, fourteen of whom adopted an
originalist interpretation and 83 of whom adopted a nonoriginalist in-
terpretation. 263 Table 12 presents the results of our logistic regression
260 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 39 (1997) (observing that constitu-
tional discussion is rarely "addressed to the text of the constitutional provision that is at
issue, or to the question of what was the originally understood or even the originally in-
tended meaning of that text"); Richard S. Kay, "Originalist" Values and Constitutional
Interpretation, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 335, 336-40 (1996) (describing four methods
advanced as originalism: (1) original text, (2) original intention, (3) original understanding,
and (4) original values, and arguing that method of original intentions is most consistent
with originalist values).
261 See Scalia, supra note 260, at 39 (stating that typical "starting point" for constitu-
tional analysis today is "Supreme Court cases, and the new issue will presumptively be
decided according to the logic that those cases expressed, with no regard for how far that
logic, thus extended, has distanced us from the original text and understanding").
262 The results must be qualified both because we are looking at trial judges who may be
less likely to be concerned with interpretation theory than appellate judges and because
lower federal courts must follow Supreme Court precedents that may restrict the ability of
a lower court judge to engage in originalist analysis.
263 We coded 14 judges as using an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.
All 14 originalists were independently coded as also engaging in theoretical (as opposed to
practical) reasoning, as described in the previous subsection. This finding is not remarka-
ble, as originalism by definition is a theoretical mode of analyzing a constitutional problem.
Nonetheless, the two reasoning categories are not congruent and do not measure the same
aspect of judicial reasoning. Of 59 judges who were coded as engaging in theoretical rather
than practical reasoning, only a minority of 14 adopted an originalist as opposed to a no-
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TABLE 12
ORIGINALIST v. NONORIGINALIST REASONING
(ORIGINALIST = 1)
Demographic
SEX
RACE
LAW-SCHOOL
CRIME-RATE
Political
PARTY
REAGAN
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR
DEFENSE
MILITARY
LAW-PROF
POLITICAL
JUDGE
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ
ABA-BQ
CASELOAD
SENIORITY
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT
(constant)
% accurately predicted by model
McFadden's pseudo R2
N
* p < .05
Standard Reagan Alt.
.09
(1.43)
-. 87
(1.45)
-. 96
(1.04)
.00
(.00)
-3.76*
(1.82)
-. 13
(.85)
1.03
(.92)
.63
(1.02)
-8.28
(42.75)
.74
(.97)
-. 65(.82)
-.49
(.86)
-7.60
(49.19)
.00
(.00)
-. 04
(.02)
-.28
(.37)
.82
(3.36)
86.60
.32
97
.36
(1.41)
-. 83
(1.45)
-.84
(1.02)
.00
(.00)
-4.44*
(1.89)
-. 18
(.83)
1.21
(.91)
.78
(1.01)
-8.20
(41.92)
.84
(.95)
-.61
(.80)
-.24
(.83)
-7.43
(48.85)
.00
(.00)
-. 05*
(.02)
-. 25
(.35)
1.51
(3.43)
85.57
.30
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analysis of this content analysis dependent variable. Column 1 con-
tains the results from our standard set of independent variables. In
the regression analysis reported in Column 2, we replaced PARTY
with REAGAN, the dummy variable for judges appointed by Presi-
dent Reagan.
V
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION
One of the strengths of this study lies in its robust set of explana-
tory factors. However, that very feature complicates the task of re-
porting and interpreting the findings due to a host of intriguing results
involving a multitude of both dependent and independent variables,
with a wide range of theoretical and practical implications. For that
reason, while certain general themes will become apparent, we deter-
mined that the most efficient way to present our findings is variable-
by-variable, gathered into broad categories. Moreover, this structure
allows us to discuss findings with respect to a particular variable or
group of variables, not only in terms of the general constitutionallun-
constitutional outcome, but also by evaluating whether the influence
of the variable appeared in the more nuanced context of judicial rea-
soning as studied through the opinion content analysis stage of our
study.
A. Demographic Variables
1. Sex
Building upon the "different voice" theory of psychologist Carol
Gilligan,264 feminist legal theorists have postulated that female judges
would present a different perspective and behave differently from
men in deciding cases.265 Under this theory, "women tend to perceive
moral conflicts as a problem of care and responsibility in relation-
ships," while "men tend to emphasize rights and rules."26 While es-
chewing the feminist label as invoking a political agenda, Suzanna
Sherry postulates a feminine attitude that "define[s] human existence
in terms of relationships to others and [favors] contextual societal val-
ues and individual virtues," as contrasted with "the male emphasis on
rights" and the consequent "reliance on an abstract rule-based
264 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Develop-
ment (1982) (suggesting that men and women develop different forms of moral reasoning,
with women tending to apply an interdependent "ethic of care" while men focus on rights-
based abstract moral principles).
265 See Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 129-30 (describing theories of gender
difference and judging); Fox & Van Sickel, supra note 29, at 2-7 (same).
266 Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 129.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1998)
HeinOnline -- 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451 1998
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
method" for resolving disputes.267 Thus, under this theory, female
judges should be more concerned about "connection, care, response,
substantive fairness, communitarian values, and context" than about
"correctly applying appropriate legal rules. '268
This theory leads directly to a hypothesis that female judges
would resist the federal Sentencing Guidelines system because it im-
poses strict and rigid sentencing rules with little regard to context or
fairness in the individual case.269 Indeed, feminist scholar Lucinda
Finley's description of the contrast between male and female legal
reasoning-"[r]ationality, abstraction, a preference for statistical and
empirical proofs [male reasoning] over experiential or anecdotal evi-
dence [female reasoning] "270 -directly parallels the conflict in views
about application of the "statistical and empirical" Sentencing Guide-
lines as opposed to individualized sentencing by judges with discretion
to consider "experiential or anecdotal evidence" about defendants.
This study is therefore a good test of the role of "different voice" or
267 Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 582 (1986). Subsequently, Sherry has described her view as "moder-
ate"-that life experiences and gender "may have a subtle effect on beliefs, attitudes, or
approaches"-and has sharply criticized the more radical feminist view "that women have
an entire world view that differs substantially from that of men and that is in some sense
generally inaccessible to men." Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason:
The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law 16, 30 (1997). Our study, especially in the
context of other studies mentioned below, casts substantial doubt upon the viability of
even this "moderate" view of a distinctive "feminine" approach to judicial decisionmaking.
268 Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 130; see also Fox & Van Sickel, supra note
29, at 9-11 (describing theorized female voice traits of "community" and "context" and
male voice traits of "individualism" and "rules").
269 See Gruhl, Spohn & Welch, supra note 28, at 311, 318-20 (hypothesizing that
"women judges would be slightly more lenient than men judges," but actually finding little
difference in sentencing behavior, although female judges were somewhat more likely to
sentence female convicts to prison). Interestingly, Sherry fits Justice O'Connor's conserva-
tive approach to criminal issues into her feminine paradigm by asserting that this is evi-
dence of a communitarian attitude: "If the community is more important than individual
rights, it is quite predictable that Justice O'Connor would be a strong law and order propo-
nent: she will protect the community from crime even at the expense of the individual
rights of criminal defendants." Sherry, supra note 267, at 604. Whether this desire for
community order or, alternatively, a preference for contextual evaluation, both of which
Sherry describes as feminine virtues, would take priority in the context of the Sentencing
Guidelines is debatable. In any event, the strong emphasis in feminist theory on contextual
values versus abstract rules would appear to be poignantly implicated in the context of the
Sentencing Guidelines. However, the presence of some doubt about how "different voice"
female attitudes cut on the Sentencing Guidelines question may also indicate that feminist
or feminine values do not provide a "coherent and consistent core of principles" to guide
actual decisionmaking in adjudication. See Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley,
Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 Ind. L.J. 891, 893 (1995) (contending that feminist juris-
prudence is insufficiently coherent to direct judges in deciding cases).
270 Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 886, 893 (1989).
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gender-based judging. Moreover, while previous studies have gener-
ally involved small numbers of female judges,2 71 our study involved 28
female judges, a reasonably healthy sample.
However, as with most other empirical studies that have found
limited support for a different female perspective in judging zrn sex
was not a significant variable in our study. Although female judges
rejected the constitutionality of the Guidelines at a slightly greater
rate than male judges (64% versus 61%), this difference was not sta-
tistically significant. Nor did sex emerge as a significant influence in
any of the deeper content analyses, in striking contrast to race, as dis-
cussed immediately below.273
Ordinarily, one should be cautious in drawing conclusions from
the absence of significance in statistical analysis. Nonetheless, in light
of the weak and sporadic findings of correlation between sex and judi-
cial behavior in past studies, and the considerable attention given this
subject in prior empirical research, it may be time to render at least a
tentative verdict. Whether because gender-based theories of differ-
ence are wrong or overstated, 74 because the judicial recruitment pro-
cess selects only women compatible with the views of the appointing
president,275 or because "differences between men and women judges
271 See, e.g., Gruhl, Spohn & Welch, supra note 28, at 313-14 (including seven female
judges in study and acknowledging that "findings need to be interpreted with caution");
Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 602 (including twelve female judges in study and even
fewer for certain tests).
272 See supra notes 29, 34-35 and accompanying text; see also Ashenfelter, Eisenberg &
Schwab, supra note 27, at 277-81 (finding that individual judge characteristics, including
sex, did not appear to substantially influence mass of cases decided by district court
judges). But see Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 131-32 (finding female judges
more supportive of claimants in employment discrimination cases, although w~hen con-
trolled for party of appointing President, variance declined and, for Republican-appointed
judges, disappeared); Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 604-11 (finding that female judges
were more deferential to positions taken by government in personal right and economic
regulations cases).
273 See infra Part V.A.2.
274 See Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 133 (suggesting possible reasons for
absence of differences in judging between male and female judges).
275 See Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 615 (suggesting that common sozialization
experiences of legal education and screening of selection process may mute gender differ-
ences). But see Sheldon Goldman, Carter's Judicial Appointments: A Lasting Legacy. 64
Judicature 344, 351-52 (1981) (finding President Carter's women appointees to federal
bench were less likely to have been political activists and less likely to have had prior
judicial experience); Elaine Martin, Women on the Federal Bench: A Comparative Profile,
65 Judicature 306, 310 (1982) (finding "several marked differences" in backgrounds of
women recently appointed to federal bench, including that they were -far more likely to
have been judges at the time of their appointment, far less likely to have been working for
a large corporate law firm, and much less likely to have been party activists"); Elliott E.
Slotnick, The Paths to the Federal Bench: Gender, Race and Judicial Recruitment Varia-
tion, 67 Judicature 371, 378-88 (1984) (finding distinctively different paths to federal bench
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are neutralized by the very nature of law and legal process, 2 76 "[t]he
weight of the evidence demonstrates that most female judges do not
decide cases in a distinctively feminist or feminine manner. '2 77 We
believe our results confirm the conclusion of one female judge who,
based upon six years experience on the federal bench, said that she
had "not seen any basis for believing that gender plays a role one way
or the other in any particular judge's ability or willingness to exercise
self-restraint. 278
2. Race
Examination of the possible influence of racial background on
judicial behavior remains a standard in empirical research.2 79 For ex-
ample, in the general context of criminal law, the thesis has been that
African American judges would be more liberal, and that liberal atti-
tudes might make them "more sympathetic to criminal defendants
than white judges are, since liberal views are associated with support
for the underdog and the poor, which defendants disproportionately
are. ' 280 One of the ostensible purposes of the Guidelines reform was
to reduce sentencing disparity, including unjustifiable differences for
for women, including alternative career backgrounds, such as being less likely to have held
elective political office, less likely to have been in prominent private practice, and fewer
years at bar).
276 Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 133; see also Fox & Van Sickel, supra note
29, at 22 (speculating that "a natural feminine voice may actually be 'socialized out' of a
woman judge's behavior over time (of course, this would still not account for the fact that
in our study, male judges sometimes displayed feminine voice traits more than did women
judges)"); Gruhl, Spohn & Welch, supra note 28, at 309 (suggesting that gender contrasts
may be diluted by "powerful influences of socialization to the legal profession and to the
judicial role" and influences of "courtroom 'workgroups"' such as prosecutors and defense
attorneys).
277 Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 269, at 919; see also Fox & Van Sickel, supra note
29, at 12, 16 (finding, in study of local criminal trial judges, that "there was no clear pattern
of women employing 'feminine voice traits' and men employing 'masculine voice traits"'
and concluding that results "offer almost no support for the contention that women judges,
by definition, bring to the judiciary a philosophy which embodies the feminine voice"). For
a fascinating empirical exploration of the "different voice" judging theory involving the
study of reasoning in opinions by five federal court of appeals judges, see Davis, supra note
150, at 148, 171 (finding that men adopted contextual approaches as often as women and
that both chose rule-based approaches more often, thus concluding that results "do not
provide empirical support for the theory that the presence of women judges will transform
the very nature of the law"). For a future study, the set of written opinions in these Sen-
tencing Guidelines constitutionality cases would provide an excellent source for evaluating
the language and approaches used by female and male judges through an empirical model
with a good number of women judges and involving the identical case problem.
278 Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, Women on the Federal Bench, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 39, 44
(1993).
279 See supra notes 29, 36-37 and accompanying text.
280 Welch, Combs & Gruhl, supra note 29, at 127.
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defendants of different races.2 1 Commentators have attacked the
Guidelines as perpetuating disparate treatment of racial and ethnic
minority defendants,m although these critiques generally arose after
281 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1988) (noting that Congress "relied upon
statistical studies" indicating disparities in sentencing across gender and race). Indeed, the
Sentencing Reform Act explicitly directs that the Guidelines are to be neutral as to the
offender's race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(d) (1994).
282 See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Dis-
parity, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 161, 204-05 (1991) (concluding that study of Guidelines in
four districts demonstrated disparate impact on Hispanic and African American defen-
dants); Jos6 Cabranes, Cabranes Rips Sentencing Rules, Legal Times, Apr. 11, 1994, at 17
(saying that "members of racial and ethnic minorities continue to fare worse under the
guidelines than wealthier non-minorities do") [hereinafter Cabranes, Rips Sentencing
Rules]. But see Joe B. Brown, The Sentencing Guidelines Are Reducing Disparity, 29 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 875, 877-78 (1992) (criticizing Heaney's interpretation of data as failing to
account for different categories of offenses). Somewhat ironically, given the charge of con-
tinued racial disparity under the Guidelines, a very recent study found that two-thirds of
the racial, gender, and economic disparities in federal sentencing are accounted for by the
relatively small number of cases involving judicial departures from the Guidelines, rather
than differential sentencing within the Guidelines. See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic
and Gender Disparities in Sentencing* Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts 17-20 tbl.6
(1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with the New York University Law Review).
In addition, the Sentencing Guidelines, or more accurately, the underlying mandatory
minimum sentence statutes, have been attacked as racially biased due to the heavier penal-
ties imposed for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine (more prevalent in mi-
nority communities) than powdered cocaine (more prevalent in white communities). See
Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 364-86 (1997) (discussing race and differences
in sentencing for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine); Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith:
The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 Harv. L Rev. 1270, 1276-79 (1993) (criticiz-
ing Randall Kennedy's analysis and characterizing sentencing disparity for crack versus
powder cocaine as racist); see also David H. Angei, A "Second Look" at Crack Cocaine
Sentencing Policies: One More Try for Federal Equal Protection, 34 Am. Crim. L Rev.
1211, 1213 (1997) (reporting that, in 1993, blacks accounted for 88.3% of federal crack
cocaine distribution convictions (while 4.1% were white), but only 27.4% aof those con-
victed of powder cocaine distribution (while 32% were white)) (citing United States Sen-
tencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing
Policy (1995)). However, while the first federal sentencing statute imposing harsher penal-
ties for trafficking in crack cocaine was enacted in 1986, see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, 31 U.S.C.), the controversy concerning the racially disparate effect of this differential
did not flare up until after the Sentencing Guidelines crisis and thus likely would not have
affected attitudes toward the Guidelines during the period relevant for this study. See
generally Kennedy, supra, at 364-80, 459-60 nn.39-44 (discussing and citing scholarly, me-
dia, and judicial treatment of crack versus powder cocaine differential in sentencing and
disparate racial impact, which illustrate greater attention to issue arising around 1993 with
a few earlier treatments dating to 1991). Indeed, as Randall Kennedy notes, about half of
the members of the Congressional Black Caucus voted in favor of the law in 1986. See id.
at 301. In any event, the crack versus powder cocaine differential is really more a conse-
quence of statutory minimum sentences than of the Guidelines themselves. Indeed, in
1995, the Sentencing Commission recommended that Congress narrow the differences in
sentencing for crack versus powder cocaine possession and distribution and proposed
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the period of constitutional challenges that we examine. The greater
severity of reform sentences for drug offenses had a predictably
greater impact on minority communities.283 Although it is unclear
whether the alleged negative effect of guideline sentencing on minor-
ity populations was recognized at the time of the constitutionality de-
cisions in 1988,284 by 1993 a leading federal judge could say that he
knew "of no federal trial judge from a minority group who could be
counted as a supporter of the federal guidelines. '2 5
For the most part, prior empirical research has failed to support
the claim that minority judges "have assumed a strong advocacy role
on behalf of any racial[ly] ...based interests. '28 6 Studies of trial
judges in the very context of criminal cases and criminal sentencing
have uncovered very little variation in the behavior of judges based
upon race.28 7 For that reason, researchers have postulated that legal
or judicial socialization or the judicial recruitment process "screen[s]
out those candidates with unconventional views. '288 Of course, an al-
ternative explanation would be that race is not a driving force for judi-
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines equalizing "sentences for offenses involving
similar amounts of crack cocaine and powder cocaine." United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg.
25,074, 25,076 (1995). However, Congress passed and President Clinton signed a bill disap-
proving these proposals. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval,
Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995).
3 See Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African
American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 1, 41-42 (1995). But
cf. Kennedy, supra note 282, at 8-12, 21-24, 351-86 (disputing charge that disproportionate
criminal prosecution and punishment of blacks for drug and other offenses reflect imper-
missible racial discrimination, and observing that, relative to their percentage of popula-
tion, blacks both commit more and are more likely to be victims of street crime, thus
leaving lawabiding black citizens in "dire need of protection against criminality").
284 None of the written opinions on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines
included in our study mentioned disparate racial impact as an issue.
285 Cabranes, Rips Sentencing Rules, supra note 282, at 17.
286 Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 614.
27 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 29, at 6; Spohn, supra note 29, at 1211-14; Uhlman,
supra note 29, at 891-94; Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 613-15; Welch, Combs &
Gruhl, supra note 29, at 131-35. The one exception appears to be a study of federal appel-
late judges, see Gottschall, supra note 29, at 171-73 (finding pronounced disparity in voting
by black and white judges in criminal cases).
288 Spohn, supra note 29, at 1212. See id. (suggesting that judicial socialization "pro-
duces a subculture of justice and encourages judges to adhere to prevailing norms, prac-
tices, and precedents" (citation omitted)); Uhlman, supra note 29, at 885 (suggesting that
"atypically successful pre-judicial careers, a rigorous process of legal socialization, and spe-
cial scrutiny for highly visible black jurists may attenuate the uniqueness of [a minority
judge's] role" (citations omitted)); Walker & Barrow, supra note 4, at 615 (suggesting that
judicial selection screening may mute differences among minority judges).
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cial behavior, that is, that in most cases "the law-not the judge-
dominates the outcome."2 9
In our study, although minority judges invalidated the Guidelines
by a larger percentage than white judges (71% versus 60%) ° this
difference was not statistically significant. Indeed, the RACE variable
does not approach significance in any of the multiple phases of our
study, with one powerful exception. Among those judges who ad-
dressed the claim that due process guarantees a defendant's right to
an individualized sentence imposed by a judge with full discretion,
RACE emerged as significant at the 99% probability level (Table 10).
With respect to this claim, RACE dramatically reduced the
probability of a positive constitutional ruling.291 Whereas 58% of all
289 Ashenfelter, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 27, at 277-81 (finding that individual
judge characteristics, including race, did not appear to influence mass of cases decided by
district court judges).
290 Of the 28 minority judges in our study-a relatively healthy sample in comparison
with many prior studies-20 (71%) invalidated the Guidelines and 8 (29%) upheld the
Guidelines.
291 The odds multiplier for RACE on the Due Process individualized sentencing issue is
.02. The odds multiplier, a standard way of measuring the size of a variable's influence, is
obtained by taking the antilog of the regression coefficient. See David V. Hosmer, Jr. &
Stanley Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression 40-41 (1989). The regression coefficients
for each independent variable are reported in the tables for this study. An odds multiplier
greater than 1.0 indicates that the variable's presence, holding other variables constant,
increases the chance of a positive outcome on the dependent variable. An odds multiplier
of less than 1.0 indicates that the presence of the variable reduces the chance of a positive
outcome on the dependent variable. See Kevin 1M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial
by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L Rev. 1124, 1146 (1992); Deborah
Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmia-
tive Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 Colum. L Rev. 199, 243 n.134 (1997). The greater
the distance from 1.0 in either direction, the more sizable the positive or negative influence
of the variable.
However, a "change in the 'odds' does not translate directly into a change in the
probability that the outcome would occur." Merritt & Reskin, supra, at 243 n.134; see also
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra, at 1146 n.54 (discussing difference between -odds" and
"probability"). For statisticians, "[t]he odds of an event occurring are defined as the ratio
of the probability that it will occur to the probability that it w~ill not." Marija J. Norusis,
SPSS Advanced Statistics User's Guide 49 (1990). Thus, when applying the odds multiplier
as a measure of the size of influence of a variable, "[t]he magnitude of the impact on
probability depends on the initial odds." Merritt & Reskin, supra, at 243 n.134. In other
words, we must first determine the initial odds ratio based upon the probabilities of the
event occurring and not occurring, apply the odds multiplier to those initial odds, and then
translate the increased or decreased odds into a probability percentage. See, e.g., id. at 257
n.178 (applying odds multiplier and translating result into probability); Norusis, supra, at
49-50 (applying odds multiplier).
With respect to the Due Process Claim dependent variable, 421,0 of judges ruling upon
this issue sustained the constitutionality of the Guidelines; thus, the "odds" of a ruling
upholding the Guidelines were approximately .72 (.42 divided by .58). As the odds multi-
plier for the RACE variable is .02, the odds of a ruling sustaining the constitutionality of
the Guidelines were decreased in the presence of this independent variable to approxi-
mately .01 (.02 multiplied by .72). These odds are equivalent to a probability of approxi-
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judges addressing the due process claim invalidated the Guidelines on
this basis, 90% of the minority judges did so (9 out of 10 nonwhite
judges in this category). 292
The due process theory was a somewhat irregular approach to the
Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality question. Although a major-
ity of the judges who actually addressed the due process issue ac-
cepted the individualized sentencing claim, the vast majority of judges
striking down the Guidelines chose to ground their rulings on separa-
tion of powers theories.293 Of the 179 judges who struck down the
Guidelines as unconstitutional, only 42 relied on the Due Process
Clause to do so. Moreover, the legal basis for the claim was weak,
even "absurd," in the minds of some.294 Indeed, pluralities of the
Supreme Court a decade prior had recited that, outside of death pen-
alty cases, the prevailing practice of individualized sentencing was a
matter of legislative policy, not constitutional command.295 Although
the Supreme Court did not address the due process claim in its
Mistretta v. United States296 opinion, every court of appeals subse-
quently rejected it.297
mately 1%. Thus, holding all other variables constant, the RACE variable reduces the
probability of a positive constitutionality ruling on the Due Process Claim from 42% to
1%.
292 The small number of minority judges in this sample (10) suggests some caution is due
in evaluating this finding or generalizing from it. However, we do note that prior empirical
studies of the influence of race on the behavior of judges also have involved relatively
small numbers of minority judges. See Spohn, supra note 29, at 1200 (describing study as
involving 13 black and 25 white judges); Uhlman, supra note 29, at 886 (contrasting judicial
performance of 16 black and 75 white judges); Welch, Combs & Gruhl, supra note 29, at
129 (describing data as including decisions made by 10 black judges and 130 white judges).
293 A judge striking the Guidelines as unconstitutional on one theory did not need to
address other challenges raised by the defendant, although some judges relied on multiple
constitutional grounds to invalidate the Guidelines. See supra Tables 5, 6. Thus, not all of
the judges addressed all four of the constitutional claims outlined in Part II.B.1. See supra
Tables 5, 6 and accompanying text.
294 See, e.g., Fried, supra note 82, at 165 & 239 n.61 (describing due process ruling in
United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Md. 1988), rev'd, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir.
1989), as example of "absurd" ground for constitutional challenge to Guidelines, as con-
trasted with serious separation of powers grounds).
295 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stating that "in
noncapital cases, the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on constitu-
tional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes"); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that "the prevailing practice of individ-
ualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than
a constitutional imperative").
296 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
297 For court of appeals decisions rejecting the due process individualized sentencing
challenge to the Guidelines, by order of circuit, see United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353,
356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 614-15 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 53-56 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Frank, 864
F.2d 992, 1008-10 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Bolding, 876 F.2d 21, 22-23 (4th Cir.
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Thus, our findings confirm a tendency of minority judges to adopt
a nonmainstream approach, even if these judges reached the same
general outcome at basically the same rate as 'white judges. Indeed,
the very fact that the outcome votes of minority judges were not sig-
nificantly different, while the reasoning of those judges varied sub-
stantially, suggests that prior research focusing on outcome and
ignoring reasoning may have neglected underlying evidence of influ-
ence. Moreover, the influence was in the direction hypothesized, that
is, a greater willingness to accept a theory that promoted the rights of
criminal defendants. Still, the significance of race in a reasoning cate-
gory rather than at the outcome level suggests caution in weighing the
importance of race as a factor in judicial behavior. While our findings
provide support for the conclusion that minority judges are more will-
ing to experiment with alternative theories, including theories that
support the claims of those that many would describe as disadvan-
taged (i.e., criminal defendants), the effect appears only at the mar-
gins. In other words, the RACE variable appears to affect the method
but not the ends of judging, at least in the context of our study. Thus,
while racial background has some impact, our study does not directly
support an ideological theory of race-based judging as a predictor of
outcomes.
3. Age
Although early studies found a judge's age to be significant, 2 s
even the best variable in accounting for variance in decision out-
comes,2 99 more recent empirical studies have seldom found age to be
of value in explaining judicial behavior.300 The thesis is that age
should "correlate positively with any question regarding the status
quo." 10' As Oliver Wendell Holmes colorfully framed the hypothesis,
1989); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Jacobs,
877 F.2d 460, 461-62 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 144-45 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Blackman, 897 F.2d 309, 318 (8th Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 904 F.2d
1250, 1258-59 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540,542-43 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Erves, SSO
F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir. 1989). See generally McCall, supra note 167, at 490-92 & n.129.
298 See Ulmer, supra note 33, at 625 (finding three factors-age at appointment, federal
administrative experience, and religious affiliation-to have some explanatory value for
decision variance in sample of 14 United States Supreme Court justices).
299 See Goldman, supra note 28, at 498-506 (finding age variable statistically significant
and, along with party affiliation, best in accounting for variance in decisions on political
measures by court of appeals judges).
300 See Gryski & Main, supra note 27, at 532-36 (finding chronological age significant in
one model but not holding significance through multivariate analysis).
301 Beverly Blair Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft Cases-1972, 42
U. Cin. L. Rev. 597, 623 (1973).
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"[]udges commonly are elderly men, and are more likely to hate at
sight any analysis to which they are not accustomed, and which dis-
turbs repose of mind, than to fall in love with novelties. '302
Since age of the judge competed in terms of multicollinearity with
seniority on the bench in our study, we were unable to include both in
a single regression. Because we concluded there was a stronger theo-
retical basis for including seniority, as discussed below, 303 and because
age has proven to be of little significance in recent empirical studies of
judicial behavior, we selected seniority over age for our standard set
of variables. However, we did conduct an alternative regression anal-
ysis with the variable AGE 304 substituted for SENIORITY,30 5 which
confirmed an absence of significance.306
4. Region
Although the South has been somewhat distinctive with respect
to certain matters, such as racial equality,30 7 geographic regions in the
United States are becoming more similar, at least judicially.308 In the
most comprehensive empirical study of federal district judges to date,
Rowland and Carp found that while sectional differences do still exist,
regional variations for judicial behavior have markedly declined?30 9
That decline is particularly marked in criminal cases.310 Rowland and
Carp attribute the change to a more national ideological cast to judi-
302 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443,
455 (1899).
303 See infra Part V.D.3.
304 For this AGE variable, each judge's age was recorded by a whole number for
number of years. For convenience, we simply subtracted the judge's year of birth from the
year 1988 (i.e., for a birthdate of 1946, the number to be recorded would be 42).
305 Documentation for these and other alternative analyses mentioned in this study but
not reported in the tables is available from the authors.
306 Not only was age not significant when included in an alternative regression on the
outcome dependent variable, but inclusion of this variable in the set did not substantially
affect the correlations of the other variables with the dependent variable. In particular, the
signs of the coefficients remained unchanged, and no variable that was insignificant in the
standard set analysis emerged as significant. The only variable that was significant in the
standard set but insignificant in the alternative analysis (PROMO-POT) slipped just below
significance at the 95% probability level. Indeed, the consistency of the alternative sets
tends to confirm the collinearity of AGE and SENIORITY as variables.
307 Cf. Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes: The Dramatic Story of the Southern Judges of the
Fifth Circuit Who Translated the Supreme Court's Brown Decision into a Revolution for
Equality (1981).
308 See Tate & Handberg, supra note 26, at 467 (suggesting political orientations of
American geographic regions likely have become more similar).
309 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 58-61, 85 (observing "that in aggregate, varia-
tions between judges in the North and South have markedly declined since 1977 although
they are still to be found for some specific case types").
310 See id. at 63-65 (noting that, in category of criminal cases, variation between North-
ern and Southern judges dropped dramatically after 1977).
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cial appointments since 1977 and a corresponding weakening of influ-
ence by home state senators and local political party bosses in the
selection of district court judges.31'
For two reasons, we chose not to include regional variables in our
standard set. First, studies of judicial behavior have found geographic
region to be of greatly diminishing significance. Second, little, if any-
thing, about the Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality question rec-
ommends it as a legal issue that might interact with regionality in any
coherent or meaningful manner.
However, in an effort to be complete and to explore alternative
possibilities, we did conduct an alternative analysis using regional
variables.3 12 In logistical regression analysis of the outcome depen-
dent variable, regional variables neither approached significance 3 13
nor did their inclusion materially affect other results.3 14 Accordingly,
we feel comfortable concluding that the geographic region to which a
district judge is assigned is not an explanatory factor in resolution of
the constitutional challenges to the Guidelines.
5. Crime Rate
A judge's resolution of a pending criminal case might be influ-
enced by the judge's perception of the crime problem in the commu-
nity. Because we were unable to effectively construct a crime rate
measure for each judge's particular city due to missing data for an
excessive number of judges,315 we adopted as the best alternative the
311 See id. at 66, 85; see also Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court
Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan 361 (1997) (stating that his comprehensive
study "suggests that presidential agendas and judicial selection are intimately tied and that
the policy agenda tends to predominate in times of political realignment").
312 Each judge was assigned to one of four geographical regions, based on the judge's
district, NORTHEAST, IvHDWEST, SOUTH, and VEST. See Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1994, at 625-26 app. 3 (1995).
313 Although the regional variables were found to be statistically significant at the 95%
probability level in an exploratory chi-square analysis, this result warrants relatively little
weight given the inherent limitations of chi-square analysis and the superiority of regres-
sion analysis in measuring the influence of independent variables.
314 Not only was region not significant when included in an alternative regression analy-
sis, but addition of this variable to the alternative set did not substantially affect the corre-
lations of the other variables with the dependent variable: the signs of the ceafficients
remained stable, only one variable that was significant in the standard set (PREC-CIR)
moved out of significance, and no variables that were not significant in the standard set
became significant. The consistent significance of PREC-CIR in nearly all other alterna-
tive analyses with substitute sets of variables independently confirms the significance of
that variable. Thus, our standard set is not meaningfully biased by the omission of regional
variables.
315 In a separate regression analysis, which is not reported in Table 4, we substituted the
Crime Index for the Metropolitan Statistical Areas for each judge for vhom we had infor-
mation. Because of missing data, particularly for the states of Illinois and Florida, the N
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total crime rate index for the state (the variable CRIME-RATE). 316
This index is not constructed from federal crimes and thus does not
directly gauge the criminal caseload of federal district judges, for
which we developed a separate set of variables.31 7 However, and
more importantly for this particular variable, the crime index should
generally indicate the rate of visible violent and property crime and
thus presumably the judge's sense of personal safety and of the risk of
crime.
One thesis was that a judge in a state with a higher crime rate
would view criminal behavior as a problem requiring more severe
measures, and thus be more likely to approve the strict and severe
Sentencing Guidelines. A prior study, including analysis of crime
rates in various counties, suggested that state trial judges indeed were
moved toward harsher sentencing behavior by concern over crime in
the jurisdiction.318
On the basic outcome question, crime rate did not significantly
correlate with either a positive or a negative decision on the constitu-
tionality of the Sentencing Guidelines. Nor was crime rate a signifi-
cant factor in assessing the basic validity of the Guidelines on any
particular constitutional theory.
Our crime rate variable emerged as significant only in one part of
the study where its presence makes little or no sense. As reported in
Table 7, CRIME-RATE was significant at the 95% probability level
when the dependent variable was receptivity of judges to the Justice
Department's argument that judges could disregard the statutory as-
signment of the Commission to the judicial branch and regard it as an
executive branch agency.319 Although the crime rate variable was re-
tained in the set of independent variables in this part of the study for
consistency and stability reasons, we can conceive of no relationship
was reduced from 291 to 240, which is why we concluded this crime rate measure was
unacceptable for our study. In any event, in this alternative regression analysis, the Crime
Index for Metropolitan Statistical Areas did not approach significance on the outcome
dependent variable.
316 See supra Part III.A (discussing CRIME-RATE variable).
317 See supra Part III.D.2 (discussing CASELOAD and CRIM-CASELOAD variables).
318 See James L. Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of Judges: A Rep-
resentational Model of Judicial Decision Making, 14 L. & Soc'y Rev. 343, 358-60 (1980)
(finding that "incidence of crime does indeed influence judges' decisions, accounting for
approximately one-sixth of the variance in sentencing behavior"). By contrast, another
study of federal district judges found a slight correlation between higher crime rates for a
city and milder sentences. See Cook, supra note 301, at 611. However, this study is limited
because it examined only sentencing for military draft offenders. One might expect judges
in high crime urban areas, when confronted with the basically passive misconduct of failure
to comply with military conscription laws, to view them less seriously for sentencing pur-
poses in comparison with more familiar and disturbing violent and property crimes.
319 See supra Table 7, Column 2.
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between the amount of crime in a judge's state and that judge's view
of the proper branch location for the Sentencing Commission.
6. Law School Education
Justice Frankfurter once opined that "the law is what the lawyers
are. And the law and lawyers are what the law schools make
them."320 Law school faculties in general,321 and those at the leading
law schools in particular,322 are ideologically unrepresentative of the
general population and tend to be identified with liberal causes and
attitudes. A study of federal appellate judges found that most self-
identified "innovators" (those judges more comfortable with judicial
lawmaking), had attended prestigious law schools, while most "inter-
preters" had not.323
Given the particular context of this study, our data do not offer
an opportunity to directly test support for the hypothesis that the ex-
320 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Mr. Rosenwald 3
(May 13, 1927) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School library), quoted in Rand
Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Decisions: The Changing Val-
ues of Women and Men Lawyers 156 (1989). But see James J. White, Letter to Judge
Harry Edwards, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2177,2188 (1993) (stating that "[w]ith characteristic arro-
gance, Justice Frankfurter exaggerates the role of law schools in 'making law and lawyers'"
and arguing that law professors "have a modest influence on the students and an even
more limited impact on the law").
321 See Neal Devins, The Interactive Constitution: An Essay on Clothing Emperors and
Searching for Constitutional Truth, 85 Geo. LJ. 691,704 n.92 (1997) (reporting that 80.4%
of law professors are Democrats, compared with 46.2% of full-time working population
(citing James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity, Speech to the National Association of Schol-
ars (Jan. 5, 1997))); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School
Faculty Hiring- The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 Tex. L Rev. 993, 1001 (1993) (observing
"the lack of conservative legal scholars on Paw school] faculties and the hugely dispropor-
tionate percentage of faculty members who are political Democrats"); Eugene Volokh,
Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 U.CLA. L Rev. 2059, 2073 n.23
(1996) (reporting that 12.9% of law professors are Republicans, compared with 41.0% of
working population (citing James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity tbl2 (unpublished manu-
script))); see also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (con-
trasting "views and values of the lawyer class" on homosexuality, as evidenced by -law-
school view" that disapproval of homosexuality is prejudice that must be "stamped out,"
with "the more plebeian attitudes" of members of Congress who have declined to extend
federal civil rights laws to homosexuals).
322 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 Stan. L Rev. 1647. 1652 (1993)
(stating that "faculties of the leading American law schools are now substantially to the left
of the judiciary... and of the public at large"); Christopher Wolfe, The Ideal of a (Catho-
lic) Law School, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 487,503 (1995) (stating that "political conservatives and
traditional religious believers are... little represented at 'big-name' law schools"). Nor is
this a new phenomenon. See Joan Chalmers Williams, At the Fusion of Horizons: Incom-
mensurability and the Public Interest, 20 Vt. L Rev. 625, 628 (1996) (describing Yale Law
School as "a center of liberal thought" in 1930s and 1940s, with many professors playing
central roles in New Deal).
323 See Howard, supra note 30, at 167-68.
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posure of law students to teachers at the elite law schools emboldens
their graduates toward a more activist view of judicial powers, includ-
ing a greater willingness to declare statutes unconstitutional. Indeed,
leading conservative jurists identified with judicial restraint, including
Justice Scalia,324 also voted to invalidate the Sentencing Guidelines on
constitutional grounds. As discussed further below with respect to
political/ideological variables, 32- the partisan or ideological implica-
tions of this discrete constitutional dispute are murky. Perhaps re-
flecting this ideological ambiguity, elite law school attendance was not
an explanatory factor with respect to either the general outcome on
the Guidelines constitutionality question or with any of the constitu-
tional theory dependent variables.
In fact, elite law school education was statistically significant only
with respect to one discrete aspect of the study-practical versus theo-
retical reasoning. Curiously, attendance at an elite law school was as-
sociated with a tendency toward practical reasoning, rather than the
kind of theoretical dissertation that we anticipated from exposure to
an elite law school education. As reported in Table 11, the association
for the variable LAW-SCHOOL is significant at the 95% probability
level and substantially affects the probability of adoption of practical
reasoning.326
As we acknowledged earlier,327 we harbored some doubt about
the objectivity of our coding for practical versus theoretical reasoning,
particularly a concern that an opinion that was more detailed in de-
scription might be coded as practical despite not insubstantial theoret-
ical content. In other words, our coding for practicality may have
been over-inclusive. To the extent that this error was introduced in
our coding, one possible interpretation of this finding would be that
graduates of elite law schools are more likely to be comprehensive
and exhaustive in opinion writing. Nevertheless, while the evidence
may not clearly demonstrate a greater disposition toward practical
reasoning, it does suggest a decreased affinity toward the opposite,
324 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,413-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia's dissent in Mistretta).
325 See infra Part V.B.
326 The odds multiplier for the variable LAW-SCHOOL on the Practical dependent va-
riable is 4.21, one of the higher values for significant variables derived in our study. For a
discussion of the odds multiplier, see supra note 291. With respect to the Practical depen-
dent variable, 34% of judges were coded as using practical reasoning, see supra Table 5;
thus the odds of practical reasoning for the universe of judges were approximately .52 (.34
divided by .66). As the odds multiplier for LAW-SCHOOL is 4.21, the odds of use of
practical reasoning were increased by the presence of this variable to approximately 2.19
(4.21 multiplied by .52). Thus, holding all other variables constant, the LAW-SCHOOL
variable increased the probability of use of practical reasoning from 34% to 69%.
327 See supra note 249.
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i.e., an opinion dominated by theoretical analysis. In sum, this finding
undermines the hypothesis that judges educated at elite law schools
are more attracted toward conceptual reasoning than judges educated
at nonelite schools.
B. Political/Ideological Variables
Previous empirical studies of judges' attributes have consistently
found political party to be an explanatory factor for variances in judi-
cial behavior.32 For our study, we focused upon the party of the ap-
pointing president rather than the party of the individual judge,
because prior studies indicate that the more useful proxy for ideology
is the identity of the appointing president.3 29 Moreover, because more
than 90% of federal judges are of the same party as the appointing
president,33 0 party of appointing president and party of judge compete
and cannot be used in the same statistical analysis. For these reasons,
and because that information is more readily and fully available than
the individual party affiliation of each judge, we adopted that measure
as the variable PARTY for our study.
It is difficult to "tag" the Sentencing Guidelines dispute ideologi-
cally, particularly at the outcome level. On the one hand, the Reagan
Administration Justice Department offered a somewhat schizophrenic
defense of the Sentencing Commission, 31 arguing that the Commis-
sion was unconstitutional in the judicial branch but could be saved by
relocation to the executive branch.332 In constitutional litigation, the
328 See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
329 See Scherer, supra note 43, at 5 (stating that "there is a large body of literature which
demonstrates that Presidents appoint judges who reflect their own political ideology"); see
also Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 183-84 (finding that with Carter and Reagan ap-
pointees, differences between judges of same and opposite political party appointed by
same President "have virtually disappeared"); Revesz, supra note 39, at 1718-19 (studying
"the impact that a judge's ideology, using as a proxy the views generally held by the party
of the appointing President, has on judicial decisionmaking" (footnote omitted)).
330 See Robert A. Carp & Ronald Stidham, Judicial Process in America 237,241 (3d ed.
1996).
331 See Fried, supra note 82, at 165 (saying that "[i]n their heart of hearts I suspect [the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel] felt the [Sentencing Reform] Act was un-
constitutional, and they were willing to see a defense go forward only on the most limited
terms"); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Attorney General's Lawyer 79 (1992) (agreeing that he,
as Assistant Attorney General in Department of Justice, was more concerned with consti-
tutional separation of powers questions than with uniformity of sentences). One of the
authors of this study was a member of the Department of Justice litigation team defending
the Guidelines and participated in several of the meetings in which the Department's posi-
tion was developed. He confirms the accuracy of Fried's and Kmiec's accounts and agrees
with their perception of the internal debate over whether and how to defend the Guide-
lines while maintaining the Administration's strict view of separation of powers.
332 See supra notes 86-89, 92 and accompanying text; see also Fried, supra note 82. at
165 (saying that as far as Department of Justice "was concerned, the guidelines would be
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Reagan Administration had consistently advanced "a vision about the
arrangement of governmental power: [T]he authority and responsibil-
ity of the President should be clear and unitary. ' 333 A judicial branch
entity with the power to issue general and substantive rules of criminal
punishment plainly transgressed the Administration's strict view of
separation of powers. Thus, one might have anticipated greater reluc-
tance on the part of Republican or at least Reagan judicial appointees
to approve the Sentencing Commission on separation of powers
grounds, as indeed demonstrated by the rejection of the Guidelines by
such stalwart conservative jurists (and Reagan appointees) as Justice
Scalia and Judge Kozinski.334
On the other hand, even though divided in its approach, the gov-
ernment did defend the Guidelines in court. The Sentencing Reform
Act was a bipartisan initiative that passed overwhelmingly in Con-
gress, had been advocated by the Justice Department, and was signed
by President Reagan.335 In the 1988 presidential campaign, which was
being fought simultaneously with the Guidelines battle, both candi-
dates were on record as supporting the Sentencing Commission.3 36
Given this ambiguity about the political pedigree of the Sentenc-
ing Commission and its Guidelines, it is perhaps not surprising that
our study found no significant variance between Republican- and
Democrat-appointed judges on constitutional validity. 337 Given the
prospect that judges appointed by certain presidents might demon-
strate tendencies one way or another-such as President Reagan's ap-
pointees being more skeptical of the Guidelines for separation of
powers reasons described above or President Nixon's appointees be-
ing more supportive of the reform as a "get tough on crime" mea-
sure338-we also explored this possible association. In an alternative
regression analysis not reported in Table 4, we substituted dummy
defended as an exercise of executive power-in spite of the words of the Act which lodged
the Commission in the Judicial Branch-or it would not be defended at all").
333 Fried, supra note 82, at 133. See generally id. at 132-71; Kmiec, supra note 331, at 47-
68.
334 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 422-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Guidelines violate separation of powers); Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857
F.2d 1245, 1251-66 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J.) (striking down Guidelines on separation of
powers grounds), vacated sub nom. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989);
see also supra notes 113-14; supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
335 See Fried, supra note 82, at 161-62; Cohen, supra note 21, at 185.
336 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 195.
337 See supra Table 4.
338 See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 47-48 (explaining that Nixon was associated
with law-and-order or "get tough on crime" political theme); Gottschall, supra note 29, at
168 (stating that Nixon focused on criminal issues when making judicial appointments)
(citing Jon Gottschall, Nixon Appointees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Impact of the
Law and Order Issue on the Rights of the Accused, ch. 1 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
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variables for the appointing presidents for the general variable of
presidential party,3 3 9 In this alternative run, none of the substituted
dummy variables emerged as statistically significant.
Some cases are "less openly ideological" than others, 40 which
may account for the absence of correlation in our study, especially
given the incomplete political dichotomy on the Sentencing Commis-
sion described earlier. However, even when moving beyond the gen-
eral outcome level to a dependent variable that more clearly evokes a
traditional liberal versus conservative division34 1-the due process
claim of a constitutional right to individualized sentencing (Table
10)-no partisan variation arises. Although the general bipartisan
support for the Guidelines may have overwhelmed other considera-
tions, one might still expect party or ideology to make a difference at
the margins, such as in the special category of due process claims,
which fell outside the mainstream approach to the issue taken by most
judges.342
Instead, party affiliation arises in two wholly unexpected
quarters. While partisan factors did not influence the general out-
come of the constitutionality question, they apparently did make a dif-
ference in the means to that end-but in the opposite direction from
what we expected. In an alternative regression analysis not reported
in Table 7, the dummy variable for Reagan-appointed judges was sig-
nificantly, substantially, and negatively correlated on the question of
the proper location of the Sentencing Commission in the tripartite
federal government.3 43 Judges appointed by President Reagan were
University of Massachusetts (Amherst))); Scherer, supra note 43, at 2 (explaining that
Nixon promised to appoint "law and order" judges to federal bench).
339 The base case, which was not included in the regression run to prevent collinearity,
was the combined dummy variable for judges appointed by Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy.
340 Ashenfelter, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 27, at 264 (comparing contract with
civil rights cases).
341 Prior empirical studies of judicial behavior on an ideological axis have often fastened
upon claims of individual rights as illustrating a classic liberallconservative split. See, e.g.,
Stidham, Carp & Songer, supra note 43, at 19 (describing judicial outcomes as liberal or
conservative based on rulings in civil rights and liberties cases); Walker & Barrow, supra
note 4, at 604 (same).
342 See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text (discussing nonmainstream nature of
due process rulings).
343 The REAGAN dummy variable was significant at the 95% probability level. The
odds multiplier was .11. For a discussion of the odds multiplier, see supra note 291. W\ith
respect to this dependent variable, 9% of judges addressing this issue located the Sentenc-
ing Commission in the executive branch; thus the odds of such a ruling were approximately
.10 (.09 divided by .91). As the odds multiplier for REAGAN is .11, the odds of a ruling
locating the Commission in the executive branch were decreased by the presence of this
variable to approximately .01 (.11 multiplied by .10). Thus, holding all other variables
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significantly less likely to accept the Department of Justice's argument
that the Sentencing Commission should be located in the executive
branch. Thus, the Reagan administration's "strong executive" separa-
tion of powers theory fell on deaf ears among the very district judges
appointed by that administration.
Party affiliation also arises on the question of originalist versus
nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.3 44 Given
the Reagan administration's very public advocacy of an "original in-
tent" approach to interpretation of the Constitution,345 we might have
expected a correlation between judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents in general or President Reagan in particular and the adoption of
this mode of constitutional reasoning. What we did not anticipate was
that the correlation would be negative. As reported above,3 46
Republican-appointed judges were significantly less likely to engage
in originalist reasoning. When we substituted a dummy variable for
judges appointed by President Reagan, as reported above,347 it like-
wise was negatively associated with originalist reasoning. And both
were rather powerful explanatory factors.348
How to explain these peculiar results? With respect to the branch
location issue, the Department of Justice's official position was that
the Guidelines should be upheld, but only if the statute creating the
Commission was rewritten in court to move the entity under the presi-
dent's authority to the executive branch. Thus, the Department was
encouraging judicial creativity to craft a government structure more
amenable to it, while Reagan judges were appointed because of their
aversion to such judicial activism. In sum, the Reagan administra-
tion's simultaneous advocacy of judicial restraint in general and judi-
cial revision of this statute in particular may have worked at cross-
constant, the REAGAN variable decreased the probability of a proexecutive branch ruling
from 9% to 1%.
344 See supra Table 12.
345 See Kmiec, supra note 331, at 17-46; see also Fried, supra note 82, at 61 (stating that
originalism "almost became the motto of the Meese Justice Department").
346 See supra Table 12, Column 1.
347 See supra Table 12, Column 2.
348 The odds multiplier on the Originalism dependent variable is .02 for the variable
PARTY and .01 for the variable REAGAN. For a discussion of the odds multiplier, see
supra note 291. With respect to the Originalism dependent variable, 34% of judges were
coded as using practical reasoning, see supra Table 5; thus the odds of practical reasoning
for the universe of judges were approximately .52 (.34 divided by .66). As the odds multi-
plier for PARTY is .02, the odds of originalist interpretation were decreased by the pres-
ence of this variable to approximately .01 (.02 multiplied by .52). As the odds multiplier
for REAGAN is .01, the odds of originalist interpretation were decreased by the presence
of this variable to less than .01. Thus, holding all other variables constant, the PARTY and
the REAGAN variables each decreased the probability of originalist reasoning from 34%
to 1%.
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purposes. For Reagan-appointed judges, the former may have tri-
umphed over the latter. If Reagan judges were disposed to uphold the
Guidelines, they were unlikely to do violence to the statute to do so.
Similarly, the surprising finding with respect to originalist reason-
ing and Reagan judges may provide a glimpse into partisan influences
lurking beneath the surface even at the basic outcome level. An
originalist approach to the separation of powers issue that was the
centerpiece of this litigation was nearly always fatal to the Sentencing
Commission. There is a tight fit between originalist reasoning and a
formalist or geometric view of separation of powers that leaves no
room for a rulemaking body lodged in the judicial branch. 49 Justice
Scalia and Circuit Judge Kozinski, two Reagan appointees promi-
nently identified with originalism, voted to invalidate the Guide-
lines350 In our study, thirteen of the fourteen judges who followed an
originalist approach voted to strike the Guidelines. To state it from
the opposite perspective, a judge determined to uphold the Guide-
lines would likely avoid an originalist mode of analysis. (Ironically-
or a critic of originalism might say, inevitably3 51-the aversion of
Reagan appointees in our study toward originalism suggests that even
those presumably disposed toward originalism in the abstract may dis-
card it in practice when it obstructs a preferred result.)
Thus, the "Republican/Reagan appointee equals anti-originalist"
finding might indicate a slight tendency of Republican appointees, or
at least Reagan appointees, to endorse the Sentencing Guidelines. At
least, this is the best explanation, if not interpretation, that we can
come up with for this otherwise odd result. In sum, beyond the usual
understanding that the null hypothesis cannot be proven by the ab-
sence of significant results, the counterintuitive finding at the original-
ist content analysis stage of our study may suggest that all is not as it
first appears even at the outcome stage. The possibility of partisan
349 See Krotoszynski, supra note 167, at 418 n.4 ("Formalists believe that the text of the
Constitution and the intent of the Framers concerning the proper relationship of the
branches (to the extent that their intent can be determined) should control separation of
powers analyses.").
350 See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
351 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 Tul. L Rev. 1599,
1622 (1989) ("When one examines the actual practice of constitutional interpretation, it
becomes quite clear that self-professed originalists... do not always (or even frequently)
adhere to originalism as a practical strategy for deciding cases and writing opinions."); see
also Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in Scalia, supra note 260, at 95, 112 (stating that dur-
ing era in which "the notions of principled judging and objective scholarship" have been
abandoned by judges and scholars "if textualism, structuralism, and originalism advance, it
can be predicted that selective deployment of textualism, structuralism, and originalism
will advance as well").
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influence underlying the Sentencing Guidelines decisions cannot be
dismissed.
C. Prior Employment Variables
Under a legalistic model, judges are "consciously to wash out the
influence of previous political or social experiences that affect every-
one's behavior. '352 By contrast, the behavioral model and proposed
revisions of the model assume that, consciously or unconsciously,
these influences inevitably affect judicial behavior.3 53 Prior empirical
research on the influence of social background variables has generally
found few satisfactory relationships.354 With prior career activities in
mind, Sheldon Goldman expressed doubt that experiences such as be-
ing a political candidate or a prosecutor "could be sufficiently uniform
to produce approximately the same conditioning experiences for all
sorts of people. '355 Although we initially shared that skepticism, our
study found nearly every prior employment variable of these judges,
with the exceptions of law professor and political experience (and per-
haps prosecutorial experience), to be significant in some manner.
Whether because of the nature of the Sentencing Guidelines issue in
stirring experience and bringing those influences to the surface, the
quality of our set of variables, or the greater depth of our study in
exploring influences beyond the crude outcome level, the behavioral
model finds substantial support in this category of factors.
1. Criminal Defense Lawyer
Together with promotion potential to the court of appeals,356
prior experience as a criminal defense lawyer was the most consist-
ently significant factor in multiple aspects of our study and was con-
sistently negative, that is, increasing the tendency to invalidate the
Guidelines. As reported above, 357 the DEFENSE variable was signif-
352 Glick, supra note 26, at 292.
353 For example, Rowland and Carp propose a revised model of judicial behavior
grounded in social cognition theory of human perception, memory, and interpretation of
ambiguous information. See Rowland & Carp, supra note 39, at 164-69. Under this the-
ory, human beings (including judges) respond to cues by reference to stored episodic or
impressionistic knowledge-memory "schemata" or frames-that may influence behavior
without conscious motivation. See id. Applying this theory to the Sentencing Guidelines
decisions, a judge with prior experience as a criminal defense attorney who observed par-
ticular instances of believed injustice in the sentencing of clients might, upon assuming the
bench, view sentencing issues through the framework of those personal experiences when
interpreting the importance of an element or the meaning of a circumstance.
354 See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
355 Goldman, supra note 28, at 500.
356 See infra Part V.E.
357 See supra Table 4, Column 2.
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icant at the 95% probability level on the basic outcome issue with an
alternative set of variables using a different measure of judge
caseload 58 DEFENSE also registers on the dependent variables of
"Separation of Powers-Judge Members" 35 9 and "Due Process Claim
Rulings. '360 With respect to the judge-membership separation-of-
powers issue, confidence in the significance of DEFENSE is not only
high (at the 99% probability level) but the variable also proves to be a
strong explanatory factor.3 61
The consistency and strength of this variable supports the hypoth-
esis that judges from a criminal defense background would resist the
new Sentencing Guidelines. As discussed earlier,3 62 the antipathy of
the criminal defense bar toward the Guidelines was powerful and ap-
parent from the beginning. Indeed, if one had inquired ex ante which
demographic or career group (other than, of course, criminal defen-
dants themselves) would be most aggrieved and offended by the new
Sentencing Guidelines regime, the answer would have been obvious-
criminal defense attorneys. The attitudes developed in a criminal de-
fense practice appear to have persisted beyond ascension to the fed-
eral bench, at least in the context of the Sentencing Guidelines.
358 In addition, on the basic outcome variable, DEFENSE was significant at the 90%
probability level on the standard set of variables, see supra Table 4, Column 1. On the
"Separation of Powers-Branch Location" dependent variable, DEFENSE was also signifi-
cant at the 90% probability level on the combined outcome subcategory, see supra Table 7,
Column 1. Although we would not report significance at less than the 95% level as worthy
of independent consideration, it does provide some additional support for the consistency
of significance of the DEFENSE variable across dependent variable anal)ses. Even when
it did not reach the 95% level, it frequently hovered close by.
359 See supra Table 8.
360 See supra Table 10.
361 Tihe odds multiplier for DEFENSE on the "Separation of Powers-Judge Members"
dependent variable is .08. The odds multiplier for DEFENSE on the "Due Process Claim
Rulings" dependent variable is even stronger, at .03. For a discussion of the odds multi-
plier, see supra note 291. With respect to the "Separation of Powers-Judge Members"
dependent variable, 35% of judges upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines against
this challenge, see supra Table 5; thus the odds of a ruling upholding the Guidelines were
approximately .54 (.35 divided by .65). As the odds multiplier for DEFENSE is .03, the
odds of a ruling sustaining the constitutionality of the Guidelines were decreased by the
presence of this variable to approximately .04 (.08 multiplied by .54). Thus, holding all
other variables constant, the DEFENSE variable decreased the probability of a positive
constitutionality ruling on the Separation of Powers-Judge Members issue from 35% to
4%. With respect to the Due Process Claim dependent variable, 42% of judges deciding
this issue upheld the Guidelines, see supra Table 5; thus the odds of a ruling upholding the
Guidelines against this challenge were approximately .72 (.42 divided .58). As the odds
multiplier for DEFENSE here is .03, the odds of a ruling sustaining the Guidelines were
decreased to approximately .02 (.03 multiplied by .72). Thus, the DEFENSE variable de-
creased the probability of a positive constitutionality ruling on the Due Process Claim issue
from 42% to 2%.
362 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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Two possible theories, either alternatively or together, can be of-
fered for this apparent influence: First, in contrast to other life exper-
iences and even other legal practices, criminal defense attorneys may
be molded by their environment or be distinctive in the convictions
that lead them into criminal practice. Either by virtue of self-selection
for the work or because of events and encounters in the course of such
practice, criminal defense lawyers may develop a distinct shared
worldview, at least with respect to the legal system in general and the
criminal justice system in particular. 363 Thus, in contrast with or at
least to a greater degree than other career tracks, criminal defense
practice may be a truly conditioning experience.
Second, the Sentencing Guidelines, and the attendant reshaping
of the criminal justice system, may have been uniquely provocative to
those with criminal defense backgrounds. Every person, and thus
every judge, may encounter certain matters to which the person is pe-
culiarly sensitive or sensitized. Thus, every judge has some character-
istic or personal identity that may at some point be directly implicated
by the type of case before the court. Under relatively narrow circum-
stances, personal attributes which are ordinarily submerged within the
judicial role emerge and take precedence in behavior.
For example, Sue Davis, Susan Haire, and Donald R. Songer, in a
study of federal courts of appeals judges, found no significant differ-
ences between male and female judges in behavior, with the striking
exception of employment discrimination cases.3 64 As these research-
ers suggest, "[w]omen may support plaintiffs in employment discrimi-
nation cases because they identify with members of subordinate
groups. '365 Or, more personally, female judges may have experienced
discrimination in their path to the bench, through life and legal career,
and thus "feel a close affinity with those" who have alleged discrimi-
nation.366 Similarly, a criminal defense background and the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines may be an example of a direct collision of deeply felt
363 See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 118-19 (1995)
(describing "the ideology that sustains some of the most zealous criminal defense lawyers"
as "sense of 'heroism"' against government and suggesting that "the ideologically commit-
ted defense lawyer... sees the solidarity of the defense bar as a critical counterbalance to
overzealous prosecutors").
364 See Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 131-32 (noting that significant differ-
ences between male and female judges in criminal procedure cases disappeared once con-
trol for appointing president's party was added). But see Gryski & Main, supra note 27, at
531-32, 536 (finding sex not to be significant influence in study of state high court judges in
sex discrimination cases, although number of female judges was too small for reliable
conclusions).
365 Davis, Haire & Songer, supra note 28, at 133.
366 Id.
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convictions drawn from poignant experience and a matter that imme-
diately and pointedly threatens the meaning of that experience.
However, it also bears emphasis that, despite the obvious hostility
of the criminal defense bar to the Sentencing Guidelines, and the
strength of that background influence on judicial decisions in this con-
text, ten of thirty-nine judges with criminal defense employment back-
grounds nonetheless upheld the constitutional validity of the
Guidelines. In sum, despite powerful antipathetic feelings by this con-
stituency, a substantial number of judges with this former affiliation
felt bound to rule contrary to their presumptive personal preferences.
2. Government/Political Positions
a. Prosecutorial Experience. The counterpart to the criminal
defense lawyer in the legal system is of course the criminal prosecutor.
Thus, just as criminal defense attorneys would have been expected to
oppose the new Sentencing Guidelines, prosecutors would have been
expected to favor them.3 67 In his study of a set of Sentencing Guide-
lines decisions, Cohen found prior occupation as a prosecutor to be
significant, but only at the 90% probability level. 30
In our study, the variable PROSECUTOR did not approach sig-
nificance on the basic outcome dependent variable.3 69 It surfaced,
however, in one variation of a parallel dependent variable. As re-
ported above,370 PROSECUTOR is correlated at the 95% probability
level with a substantially increased tendency to approve the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines against the particular constitutional objection of re-
quired judicial membership on the Sentencing Commission. 71
367 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 196 (stating that tendency of prosecutors to uphold
Guidelines "could have been anticipated based on the overwhelming support that govern-
ment prosecutors have expressed for the Commission"); Tate & Handbarg, supra note 26,
at 471 (stating that "prosecutor's job is to look after the legal interests of the
government").
3Ss See Cohen, supra note 21, at 196; see also Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 32. at
1190 (finding prosecutorial experience significant at 90% probability level); Nagel, supra
note 32, at 336 (finding in early study that former prosecutors were significantly more
likely to rule against defense in criminal cases); Tate & Handberg, supra note 26, at 474-76
(finding prosecutorial experience significant at 90% probability level).
369 See supra Table 4.
370 See supra Table 8, Column 2.
371 The odds multiplier for the PROSECUTOR variable in this alternative analysis (sub-
stituting the CRIM-CASELOAD variable for the CASELOAD variable in the standard
set) on the "Separation of Powers-Judge Members" dependent variable is the moderately
strong 2.46. For a discussion of the odds multiplier, see supra note 291. With respect to the
Separation of Powers-Judge Members dependent variable, 35% of judges upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Guidelines against this challenge, see supra Table 5; thus the odds of a
ruling sustaining the constitutionality of the Guidelines were approximately .54 (.35 di-
vided by .65). As the odds multiplier for PROSECUTOR is 2.46, the odds of a ruling
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Because this was one of the primary constitutional challenges to the
Guidelines,372 and the issue was addressed by the vast majority of
judges writing or joining written opinions (170 of 188 judges),3 73 this
dependent variable could be regarded as a close cousin to the basic
outcome variable.
The emergence of this variable only in an alternative analysis and
only on a parallel theoretical variable but not on the basic outcome
variable-without a consistent and strong explanation for appearance
at one point and not the other-decreases our confidence in the ex-
planatory value of this factor.374 Moreover, prosecutorial experience
does not emerge as a significant influence in the study with the consis-
tency of such other variables as criminal defense experience. How-
ever, our findings provide at least some support for the influence of
prosecutorial experience in a criminal case and in the predicted
direction.
b. Political Experience. Prior political experience in elected of-
fice (other than elected judgeship) or high-level administrative office
would presumably make a person "more deferential to governmental
bodies. ' 375 Viewed collectively, then, prior political experience
should predispose judges to approve the Sentencing Guidelines, which
had been adopted by the political branches with overwhelming bipar-
tisan support. However, in his study of Sentencing Guidelines deci-
sions, Cohen found judges who had served in elected public office
were significantly more likely to invalidate the Guidelines, while those
who had served in appointed public office were significantly more
upholding the Guidelines against this challenge were increased by the presence of this
variable to approximately 1.33 (2.46 multiplied by .54). Thus, holding all other variables
constant, the PROSECUTOR variable increased the probability of a positive constitution-
ality ruling on the Separation of Powers-Judge Members issue from 35% to 57%.
372 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
373 See supra Tables 5, 6.
374 Prosecutors are accustomed to performing multiple roles-exercising prosecutorial
discretion in an almost judicial manner and then serving as advocates once the decision to
prosecute is made. This could explain why judges with prosecutorial experience were fa-
vorably disposed toward judges performing multiple roles by participating on the Sentenc-
ing Commission. However, if judges with prosecutorial experience were indeed more
supportive of the Commission's structure, it is difficult to explain why this positive disposi-
tion would not also be reflected in the basic outcome variable. Why would a judge's strong
sympathy toward judicial service on the Commission not translate directly into approval of
the Commission's validity? Moreover, as noted, even on the Separation of Powers-Judge
Members dependent variable, PROSECUTOR was significant only on one of two alterna-
tive regression runs. Thus, while a possible explanation exists, in part, we are reluctant to
promote it strongly.
375 Aliotta, supra note 39, at 279; see also Howard, supra note 30, at 169 (concluding,
based upon interviews with judges, that "[t]he most active former politicians, contrary to
lawyers' myths, did not become judicial activists").
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likely to uphold the Guidelines.3 76 Given the conflicting directions of
influence that Cohen found for prior elective versus prior appointive
public office, it is perhaps not surprising that our composite political
experience variable with officials of both types-POLITICAL-did
not register as significant with any set of independent variables or on
any dependent variable in our study.
To more closely replicate Cohen's study, we also conducted an
alternative regression analysis on the outcome dependent variable,
substituting two components for the POLITICAL variable: (1) state
and federal elected office, which we denominated ELECTED, and (2)
state and federal high-level administrative appointed office, which we
denominated APPOINTED. 377 However, even in this alternative
analysis (not reported in Table 4), neither ELECTED nor AP-
POINTED approached statistical significance in either direction while
other variables remained stable. Thus, in our expanded study and
with an independent set of variables, we were unable to confirm
Cohen's findings on this category of prior employment.
c. Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Positions. One of the pri-
mary dividing lines in the Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality
cases was whether the Sentencing Commission was properly located in
the judicial branch or whether, as the Department of Justice re-
quested, it should be relocated to the executive branch. Thus, it
seemed fitting to explore whether a judge's prior employment experi-
ence in one or another branch might affect the judge's view about the
proper location of this unique governmental entity. As reported
above,378 we developed dependent variables testing approval of the
Justice Department's executive branch theory versus the Sentencing
Commission's judicial branch theory. For both, we substituted for the
variable POLITICAL379 two component variables denominated EX-
ECUTIVE (consisting of elected or appointed high-level administra-
376 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 194 (regression analysis), 196-97.
377 See supra note 192. From Cohen's article, it is not clear how he implemented his
"Public Official (appointed)" and "Public Official (elected)" variables. In particular, we do
not know whether he attempted to include county and municipal offices, for which infor-
mation about the nature of selection to office is difficult to find. However, because his cell
counts for these two variables approaches ours, even accounting for the larger number of
judges overall included in our study (294 versus 196), we believe it likely that we adopted
similar measures. Cohen coded 12 judges as holding appointed public office compared to
10 judges included in our APPOINTED variable, and he coded 11 judges as holding
elected public office, compared to 23 judges in our ELECTED variable. See id. at 191.
378 See supra Table 7, Columns 2, 3.
379 For these analyses reported in Table 7, Columns 2 and 3, we also excluded the varia-
ble PROSECUTOR because of concerns that it was collinear and thus competed with the
EXECUTIVE category.
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tive positions in both the state and federal government)38 0 and
LEGISLATIVE (consisting of membership in Congress or a state
legislature).
On this dependent variable, the EXECUTIVE variable was very
close to significance at the 95% probability level.38 ' Executive experi-
ence increased the likelihood of a judge to accept the Department of
Justice's position that the Sentencing Commission should be regarded
as located in the executive branch. Moreover, although not techni-
cally statistically significant, such experience appeared to be a power-
ful explanatory factor.382 On the other hand, only nine judges had
prior executive branch experience (as defined for this study383), which
counsels caution. This case involved a rather direct test of executive
380 We debated what implementation of the EXECUTIVE variable would most appro-
priately measure an individual's identification with and perhaps loyalty to this branch of
our tripartite government. We agreed from the outset that the positions would have to be
high-level ones that steeped a person in the policymaking activities of the executive
branch, as opposed to lower-level governmental service. Accordingly, we limited it to se-
lected state administrative offices listed by the Council of State Governments and to fed-
eral offices requiring Senate confirmation. We then developed three alternatives: "Strict
Executive" (including only those who had served in high-level state administrative posi-
tions or federal executive branch positions requiring Senate confirmation), "Executive +
Independent Agencies" (adding those who had served in positions requiring Senate confir-
mation in federal independent agencies), and "Expanded Executive" (adding federal pros-
ecutors). We rejected the third alternative as unduly expansive and also because we
doubted that service as a prosecutor in a United States Attorney's office engenders the
same high-degree of association with the executive branch. Between the first and second
alternatives, we chose the second (including both strictly executive branch and indepen-
dent agency offices requiring Senate confirmation) as less narrowly defined than the
stricter first alternative. In any event, the difference between the two alternatives was a
single judge (who had served in an independent agency).
381 In this study, we have adhered strictly to the traditional 95% probability level as the
minimum threshold for reporting significance, other than noting near significance above
the 90% level on alternative analyses for variables that independently met the 95% stan-
dard in a reported regression analysis. In this particular case, however, the significance
figure is p<.0508, thus meaning it falls short only due to rounding and by less than a tenth
of a percentage point. Moreover, in certain preliminary alternative regression analyses,
EXECUTIVE surpassed the mark. For these reasons, we believe it worthy of mention and
explanation.
382 The odds multiplier for EXECUTIVE on this "Sentencing Commission in Executive
Branch" dependent variable is among the highest found for any significant variable on any
analysis in this study-31.84. However, the small cell count could account for this excep-
tionally high multiplier. For a discussion of the odds multiplier, see supra note 291. With
respect to this dependent variable, 9% of judges addressing this issue located the Sentenc-
ing Commission in the executive branch. Thus, the odds of a proexecutive branch ruling
were approximately .10 (.09 divided by .91). As the odds multiplier for EXECUTIVE is
31.84, the odds of a ruling locating the Commission in the executive branch were increased
by the presence of this variable to approximately 3.18 (31.84 multiplied by .10). Thus,
holding all other variables constant, the EXECUTIVE variable increased the probability
of a proexecutive branch ruling on the branch location issue from 9% to 76%.
383 See supra note 380.
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branch jurisdiction and a judge's prior policymaking involvement in
the executive branch (state or federal) appears to predispose that
judge toward protecting executive authority. However, greater sup-
port for the executive branch location did not translate into stronger
aversion to the judicial branch location, as EXECUTIVE was not sig-
nificant on the dependent variable measuring support for the judicial
location. By contrast, neither LEGISLATIVE nor JUDGE (which is
discussed further belov 384) was an explanatory factor for approving or
disapproving one location against another.
3. State or Local Judge
In prior studies, judicial experience prior to ascending to the fed-
eral bench has infrequently been an explanatory factor and, when oc-
casionally correlated with judicial behavior, has been a weak
influence.385 Prior studies have related judicial experience to judicial
liberalism.3 86 Moreover, "the insulation from popular sentiments that
the judicial office often provides" should make a judge with prior judi-
cial experience "more willing to support potentially unpopular
claims." 38 Extrapolating that general hypothesis to the present con-
text, we would expect federal judges who have become even more
accustomed to the independent judicial role through prior state or lo-
cal judging to be more willing to set aside a popular reform like the
Sentencing Reform Act if they believe it offends constitutional princi-
ples. Even more importantly, the Sentencing Guidelines were accu-
rately perceived as a direct reduction in judicial discretion and thus
judicial power. Judges with a stronger role identification, enhanced by
prior judicial experience at the state and local level, would presumably
be more offended by the restraints of the Guidelines.
Notably, our findings suggest precisely the opposite. As reported
above,388 under both the standard and alternative set of variable anal-
ysis for the outcome dependent variable, JUDGE is significant at the
95% probability level with a positive coefficient. Thus, prior judicial
experience at the state or local level was indeed significantly corre-
lated, but in the unanticipated direction of greater approval of the
Sentencing Guidelines. The consistency of the finding under two sets
of independent variables suggests a degree of stability for this factor,
394 See infra Part V.C.3.
385 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
386 See Aliotta, supra note 39, at 278-80; see also Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 32, at
1190 (finding that judges with prior judicial experience treated racial equal protection
claims more favorably).
387 Aliotta, supra note 39, at 279 (speaking of Supreme Court justices with prior judicial
experience).
388 See supra Table 4.
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although it does not arise in any alternative dependent variable test
included in our study. It proves to be a moderate explanatory
factor.389
What might account for this result? Might state and local judges,
particularly if subject to electoral approval, be more deferential to the
product of the political branches, such as the Sentencing Guidelines?
But surely even elected state and local judges are less immediately
responsive to popular control than ordinary politicians, and yet as dis-
cussed above, prior political experience is not a significant factor in
our study while prior judicial experience is. Are state and local judges
more constrained in available choices and thus less accustomed to ju-
dicial discretion (and thus less aggrieved by its loss)? Or perhaps be-
cause state judges enjoy less independence and accord greater
deference to prosecutors at the sentencing phase, are former state
judges less likely to find fault with a sentencing system that shifts
power away from the bench and toward the prosecution? A satisfac-
tory answer is difficult to formulate. However, our study suggests that
the effect of prior judicial experience cannot be dismissed in empirical
study and bears further investigation in other contexts.
4. Military Service
Military experience has received little attention in empirical stud-
ies as a potential influence on judicial behavior.3 90 We postulated that
a military background would condition a person to be accepting of
detailed directions and the loss of individual discretion. Thus, a plau-
sible hypothesis is that those judges who had served in the military
would be more likely to accept the Guidelines approach to sentencing
and be more willing to uphold it against constitutional challenge.
389 The odds multiplier for JUDGE on the outcome dependent variable is 1.85 with the
standard set of variables and 1.81 with the alternative set. For a discussion of the odds
multiplier, see supra note 291. On the general outcome dependent variable, 39% of judges
upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines, see supra Table 5. Thus, the odds of a ruling
sustaining the constitutionality of the Guidelines were approximately .64 (.39 divided by
.61). As the odds multiplier for JUDGE is 1.85 with the standard set and 1.81 with the
alternative set, the odds of a ruling in favor of the Guidelines were increased by the pres-
ence of this variable to approximately 1.18 (1.85 multiplied by .64) and 1.16 (1.81 multi-
plied by .64), respectively. Thus, holding all other variables constant, the JUDGE variable
increased the probability of a positive constitutionality ruling from 39% to approximately
54% for both the standard set and the alternative set of variables.
390 In a study of criminal sentencing, Beverly Blair Cook hypothesized that judges with
military experience would impose more severe punishment, but found the opposite. See
Cook, supra note 301, at 624. Given the particular context of sentences for military draft
offenders, she concluded that "more lenient sentences [by a judge with military experience
might be] compensation for his known association with the military" or that he might have
"no motivation to prove his devotion to national security by giving severe sentences since
he already had earned his credentials." Id. at 624-25. That prior study thus provides little
guidance in formulating a hypothesis for the effect of military background in our case.
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With respect to the basic dividing line of constitutional versus un-
constitutional rulings, the variable MILITARY proved insignificant
across all parallel analyses. However, it did emerge in one part of our
study and, at least in retrospect, in a predictable manner. As reported
above,391 MILITARY was significantly and strongly correlated with a
judge's resistance to the Department of Justice's plea to relocate the
Sentencing Commission from the judicial branch to the executive
branch.392 Given that the statute does clearly designate the entity as
"an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United
States,"3 93 we might conclude that a former soldier recognizes a direct
order when he hears it.
5. Law Professor
Law professors are distinctively unrepresentative of the general
population in terms of ideology, identifying themselves as Democrats
nearly twice as often as members of the general publics 94 Given the
uncertain ideological dimensions of the Sentencing Guidelines is-
sue,395 as well as the nonrandom selection of professorial candidates
for the federal bench,396 it was unlikely from the outset that this varia-
ble would prove to be an explanatory factor. That prediction was
borne out. Even on the judicial choice between practical and theoreti-
391 See supra Table 7, Column 2.
392 The variable MILITARY is significant at the 95% probability level and negatively
correlated with the Department of Justice's position that the Commission could be moved
to the executive branch, see supra Table 7, Column 2. The odds multiplier for MILITARY
is .25. For a discussion of the odds multiplier, see supra note 291. With respect to this
dependent variable, 9% of judges addressing this issue located the Sentencing Commission
in the executive branch. Thus, the odds of a proexecutive branch ruling were approxi-
mately .10 (.09 divided by .91). As the odds multiplier for MILITARY is .25, the adds of a
ruling locating the Commission in the executive branch were decreased by the presence of
this variable to approximately .03 (.25 multiplied by .10). Thus, holding all other variables
constant, the MILITARY variable decreased the probability of a proexecutive branch rul-
ing on the branch location issue from 9% to between 2% and 3%.
393 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994).
394 See Devins, supra note 321 (reporting that 80.4% of law professors are Democrats,
compared with 46.2% of full-time working population (citing James Lindgren, Measuring
Diversity, Speech to the National Association of Scholars (Jan. 5, 1997))); see also supra
notes 321-22 and accompanying text (discussing disproportionate liberalism of law
faculties).
395 See supra Part V.B.
396 See Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President's Men? A Study
of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 Colum. L Rev. 766,
779 n.66 (1987) (finding in study of courts of appeals judges that "four of the five 'aca-
demic' Reagan judges studied... were more conservative than other Republican appoin-
tees"). During the 1980's, a common joke in conservative circles was that President
Reagan was decimating the ranks of conservative law professors at leading law schools by
appointing them to the federal bench.
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cal reasoning,397 where one would imagine that any law professor
might wax philosophical irrespective of ideology, background as a full-
time law professor was not significant.
D. Judicial Role or Institution Variables
We developed three variables to gauge the influence upon deci-
sionmaking of the judge's perceived qualifications upon initial ap-
pointment to the district court, the judge's workload measured in
terms of total caseload and alternative fraction of caseload devoted to
criminal matters, and the judge's seniority on the federal bench. Each
of these three variables is designed to measure an aspect of the federal
judicial role or institutional environment.
1. American Bar Association Rating
The American Bar Association's (ABA) Standing Committee on
the Federal Judiciary conducts an investigation of possible nominees
for the federal courts and reports a qualification rating for each candi-
date nominated by the president.398 The ABA rating variable proved
influential in this study. Judges with different ABA ratings did not
vote differently on the general outcome question of whether the Sen-
tencing Guidelines were or were not constitutional. But a statistically
significant and moderately strong variance did arise on the two depen-
dent variables that indicate an unorthodox path toward invalidation of
the Guidelines. As reported above,39 9 the variable ABA-AQ nega-
tively correlated (that is, associated with unconstitutionality results) at
the 95% probability level on both the Non-Delegation Doctrine and
the Due Process Claims dependent variables. 400
397 See supra Table 11.
398 See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
399 See supra Tables 9, 10.
400 The odds multiplier for ABA-AQ on the "Non-Delegation Doctrine" dependent va-
riable is .34 and on the "Due Process Claims" dependent variable is .24. For a discussion of
the odds multiplier, see supra note 291. With respect to the Non-Delegation Doctrine
dependent variable, 69% of judges upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines, see supra
Table 5; thus, the odds of a ruling sustaining the constitutionality of the Guidelines were
approximately 2.23 (.69 divided by .31). As the odds multiplier for ABA-AQ on this de-
pendent variable is .34, the odds of a ruling favoring the Guidelines were decreased by the
presence of this variable to approximately .76 (.34 multiplied by 2.23). Thus, holding all
other variables constant, the ABA-AQ variable decreased the probability of a positive
constitutionality ruling on the Non-Delegation Doctrine challenge from 69% to 43%.
With respect to the Due Process Claims dependent variable, 42% of judges upheld the
constitutionality of the Guidelines, see supra Table 5; thus, the odds of a ruling sustaining
the constitutionality of the Guidelines were approximately .72 (.42 divided by .58). As the
odds multiplier for ABA-AQ on this dependent variable is .24, the odds of a ruling uphold-
ing the Guidelines was decreased by the presence of this variable to approximately .17 (.24
multiplied by .72). Thus, holding all other variables constant, the ABA-AQ variable do-
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Whereas most judges who found the Guidelines unconstitutional
did so on the conventional grounds of separation of powers, a minor-
ity of judges adopted the nondelegation doctrine or the Due Process
Clause as their rationale. Of the 179 judges who struck the Guidelines
as unconstitutional, only 42 invoked the Due Process Clause to do
so.'4 1 While judges opposed the Guidelines overall by 61% to 39%,
judges upheld the Guidelines against the particular nondelegation
doctrine challenge by 68% to 32%. Yet among the smaller band of
judges who found a due process right to individualized sentencing or
an improper delegation of legislative power to the Sentencing Com-
mission, judges who had received ABA ratings higher than Qualified
were disproportionately represented.
In sum, judges with higher ABA ratings (ABA-AQ) were signifi-
cantly more likely to strike out from the mainstream and adopt margi-
nal theories in their path to the outcome. By contrast, although not
reported in Tables 9 and 10,402 judges receiving mere "Qualified" rat-
ings were significantly more likely to reject the alternative nondelega-
tion doctrine and due process claims. In other words, just as judges
with higher ABA ratings tended to be iconoclastic, judges with basic
qualified ratings tended not to stray from the crowd.
Caution must be used in relying upon ratings by the ABA
Standing Committee as accurate or objective evaluations of the
professional qualifications of a judicial nominee. The Standing
Committee has been criticized as biased in its process,403 as well as for
creased the probability of a positive constitutionality ruling on the Due Process Claim chal-
lenge from 42% to 15%.
401 See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text (explaining how Due Process Clause
objection was outside mainstream in Guidelines litigation).
4M Because the dummy variable for judges receiving a Qualified rating (ABA-Q) was
used as the reference, it is not reported with ABA-AQ and ABA-BQ in Tables 9 and 10.
However, when we conducted alternative regression analyses, in which ABA-AQ was used
as the reference, ABA-Q emerged as significant at the 95% probability level with a posi-
tive coefficient (i.e., association with a constitutional result) on both the Non-Delegation
Doctrine and Due Process Claims dependent variables.
403 Historically, the committee has given lower ratings to female and minority nominees.
See Elliot E. Slotnick, The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: A Contempo-
rary Assessment-Part 2, 66 Judicature 385, 387 (1983); see also Henry J. Reske, ABA
Judicial Ratings Draw Fire, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994. at 38-39 (reporting charge that "the
ABA's system for evaluating judges is erratic, racist and weighted in favor of lawyers who
have worked for silk-stocking firms"). Incidents of apparent religious discrimination by
the Committee have been reported. See Victor Williams, The ABA Judgemaker Commit-
tee Is Exposed, Albeit Shaded from FACA Sunshine, 12 Geo. Mason L Rev. 249, 260-62
(1990). Others view the Committee as elitist as well as biased in favor of those with prior
judicial experience and trial lawyers. See Glick, supra note 26, at 141 (-Critics complain
that the ABA procedures are highly elitist, since the committee mainly consults prominent
lawyers and presidents of local bar associations in producing its judicial ratings."); Posner,
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allowing the practice of split rating votes to be turned to political
purposes.4°4
For these reasons, we do not attribute the variance in voting on
the nondelegation doctrine and due process claims to a true and ob-
jective difference in quality among the judges. Thus, we do not con-
clude that "better" judges were more likely to adopt a nondelegation
doctrine or due process objection to the Guidelines simply because
judges who had received a higher ABA rating were so closely corre-
lated in our study. Yet the significance of the findings for those re-
ceiving an "Exceptionally Well Qualified" and "Well Qualified"-and
the opposite for judges receiving a mere "Qualified" rating-remains.
Alternatively, the ABA ratings may have the effect of playing to
the ego of some judges who fare well in the process. While the rating
is a most uncertain measure of objective qualifications, it may have an
effect upon the subjective self-image of the judges receiving the rating.
Indeed, if the ABA process does favor candidates who attended elite
law schools, maintained traditional large firm practices, and had
higher earnings prior to appointment, 40 5 the higher ratings would be
awarded to those who already have achieved great success in life. The
high ABA rating would be the icing on the cake. The recipient may
perceive it as further evidence of his or her own exceptional
qualifications.
As a consequence, a judge who receives a higher ABA rating-
with the implicit endorsement of greater ability-may tend to be
bolder in action, more willing to blaze a new trail through the law,
more activist in the judicial role. In other words, the ABA rating may
be the insignia for, or even an intensification of, the confident over-
achiever who is compelled to distinguish himself or herself. If so, then
Federal Courts, supra note 155, at 19 & n.27 (criticizing preference of Committee for for-
mer judges and trial lawyers).
404 The most controversial example of this purported politicization of the Committee
was the minority rating of "Not Qualified" given to Supreme Court nominee Robert H.
Bork in 1987-allegedly based upon disagreement with his views on constitutional princi-
ples rather than his professional qualifications-by four members of the Standing Commit-
tee who were identified in the press as political opponents of the Reagan Administration.
See Williams, supra note 403, at 264-66 (discussing ABA Committee's rating of Judge
Bork, with citations to Senate reports and reports in various newspapers and legal periodi-
cals); see also Bork, supra note 255, at 292-93 (describing ABA Committee's split vote as
"extremely damaging to [his] nomination since the judgment was nominally about profes-
sionalism" and attributing this action to political opponents on Committee). Because of
alleged politicization of the ABA, the Republican chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee
recently terminated the Standing Committee's official role in confirmation proceedings,
although the Clinton Administration intends to continue sending names of potential nomi-
nees to the Committee for evaluation. See Harvey Berkman, Hatch to ABA: You're Out.
ABA: So What, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at A6.
405 See Slotnick, supra note 403, at 393.
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those who wish to introduce greater restraint and moderation in judi-
cial behavior may be well advised to be skeptical of the individual who
is able to secure a high rating from the ABA.40 6 The ABA rating may,
in at least some cases at the margins, induce or reflect a self-
confidence and independence that produces measurable consequences
for behavior in the judicial role.
We may be guilty of amateur psychoanalysis in this attempt to
impose meaning upon a statistical finding4 7 or be mistaken in under-
standing an ABA rating as a trophy for the recipients. 40 The ABA
rating has received little attention in empirical studies of judicial be-
havior, as either a prediction of quality or a proxy for attitudes or
predispositions in decisions.4°9 At the least, our findings should pro-
voke further exploration in other contexts.
2. Caseload/Workload
Under an economic model, judges, like all human beings, are "lei-
sure-seeking" actors with "an aversion to any sort of 'hassle,' as well
as to sheer hard work. '410 "As the workload in a judge's district in-
creases, that judge enjoys less leisure time, has a heavier backlog of
406 In addition, the ABA Committee's recent elimination of the "Exceptionally Well
Qualified" rating may be a healthy development by preventing rated judges from thinking
too highly of themselves as jurisprudential leaders. See American Bar Association, The
ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: What It Is and How It Works 7 (1991)
(describing three current ratings for judicial nominees). But see William G. Ross, Partici-
pation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 43 Vand. L Rev. 1, 67 (1990)
("[T]here is no merit to the argument that the ABA should simplify its ratings system and
deem each candidate to be merely 'Qualified' or 'Unqualified.' The existing gradations
help to distinguish exceptional candidates from marginal ones.").
407 However, we at least are willing to present a hypothesis for further investigation.
After all, "statistics is a methodology and not a substitute for creative thinking." Frederick
D. Herzon & Michael Hooper, Introduction to Statistics for the Social Sciences 7 (1976).
408 See Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 Am. U. L Rev.
699, 737 (1995) (writing, in context of whether federal judges feel obligation of gratitude
toward benefactors responsible for placing judge on bench, that "a poor rating by the ABA
can doom a candidate, but a favorable rating provides no guarantee of confirmation" and
thus "a nominee who is eventually confirmed is, in most instances, likely to view a
favorable ABA rating as one of many hurdles in the process, rather than a benefit requir-
ing repayment in some form"). Whether this view is accurate or reflects the sentiments of
judges receiving the higher ABA ratings, rather than a mere favorable Qualified rating,
requires further empirical study.
409 In a very recent study, Professors William Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael
Solimine measured the influence of individual federal court of appeals judges by citations
to their published opinions and found that judges who had received unqualified ratings
were significantly less influential with their peers. See William M. Landes, Lawrence
Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of
Appeals Judges, 27 J. Legal Stud. 271, 325 (1998).
410 Posner, What Do Judges Maximize, supra note 52, at 20.
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cases, and has less 'job satisfaction.'"411 For judges, the wellspring of
work is of course the neverending stream of new cases to be resolved.
However, while it never runs dry, the force of the current will ebb and
flow and some cases may be deeper than others. Thus, under this
model, the question is whether the Sentencing Guidelines entail more
work and hassle or ease the judicial burden. The conventional wis-
dom was that judges feared the more severe Guidelines would dis-
courage criminal defendants from accepting plea bargains and thus
increase the number of criminal cases going to trial,412 although these
fears apparently proved groundless. 413 In his study, Mark Cohen pos-
tulated that district judges would tend to oppose the Guidelines more
fervently if they carried heavier dockets.414 His findings supported
that hypothesized relationship, as he found a significant negative cor-
relation between both civil and criminal workload variables and sup-
port for the Guidelines.415
By contrast, our study produced the opposite result. Our stan-
dard CASELOAD variable (combined civil and criminal filings per
authorized judge in each district) was not significant on any pertinent
dependent variable in our study.41 6 But the alternative CRIM-
CASELOAD variable, which measures the proportion of a judge's to-
tal caseload that consists of criminal filings, was significant or nearly
so on more than one test, confirming its stability as an influence. First,
CRIM-CASELOAD is significant at the 95% probability level on the
general constitutional/unconstitutional outcome variable.41 7 But it has
a positive coefficient and therefore correlates with a tendency to up-
411 Cohen, supra note 209, at 16.
412 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 187.
413 See id.; see also Karle & Sager, supra note 165, at 444 (concluding, in statistical study
of sentencing under Guidelines, that they have not measurably affected plea bargain rates).
414 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 187, 193.
415 See id. at 193-94.
416 The CASELOAD variable was significant at the 99% probability level on the depen-
dent variable for "Practical v. Theoretical" reasoning, as reported in Table 11, and posi-
tively correlated with theoretical reasoning. In our view, this result is likely meaningless,
as there is little reason why a judge's workload would influence the style of reasoning. At
most, one could hypothesize that practical reasoning, which demands attention to detail
and an evaluation of the factual setting, is more time-consuming and thus that a busy judge
would prefer a theoretical dismissal of a claim. On the other hand, the constitutional ques-
tion in the Sentencing Guidelines cases was largely abstract and divorced from the facts,
such that practical reasoning might have been the path of least resistance here. Moreover,
one could just as easily assume that a judge with a heavier workload would lack the time or
patience to engage in high-level conceptual reasoning and feel compelled by circumstances
to render a decision that is firmly and practically grounded. In any event, whether or not a
valid explanation can be given for the significance of CASELOAD on this dependent vari-
able, it would be distinct from and shed no light on the influence of workload on the
judge's resolution of the constitutional challenge to the Guidelines.
417 See supra Table 4.
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hold the Guidelines, not to reject them. Second, on the "Separation
of Powers-Judge Members" dependent variable, in the alternative
regression analysis, CRIM-CASELOAD fell just below significance at
the 95% probability level,418 again with a positive coefficient. 419
Why would the association be positive and diametrically opposed
to Cohen's findings?420 One reason for the contrary finding might be
that our study included the entire universe of 294 decisions, while
Cohen's study included only a partial set of 196 observations, and that
we created a somewhat different set of independent variables for anal-
ysis. But the reason for a different statistical result does not provide
an explanation for the finding.
For the coauthor -with greatest prior exposure to these issues
(having litigated Guidelines constitutionality cases on behalf of the
government in 1988), this result was surprising. Interestingly, the
other two did not find the positive result so remarkable, as they inde-
pendently had postulated that the Sentencing Guidelines could be
perceived by judges as a laborrelieving measure that would streamline
and coordinate the sentencing process. In addition, we might specu-
late that judges with a larger criminal docket may have appreciated
more poignantly the problem of sentencing disparity that the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines were designed to reduce.
In terms of the economic model, both the prior Cohen study and
our present one confirm that the judges' workload, measured in terms
of size and proportion of criminal docket, indeed influences judicial
behavior. The difference between the two is how. Once again, this
study is best understood as the point of departure for further explora-
tion of the effect of caseload upon resolution of cases or issues in the
courts.
418 See supra Table 8.
419 The variable CRIM-CASELOAD was above the 94% probability level on this test.
While we would not report this second result without the independent significance finding
above the 95% level on the outcome test, this separation of powers test closely tracks and
thus confirms findings at the outcome level. The separation of powers challenge to re-
quired judicial membership on the Commission was one of the primary objections and was
addressed by 170 of the 188 judges who authored or participated in written opinions. See
supra Tables 5, 6.
420 To begin with, the possibility of an error exists. As an additional test, we conducted
an alternative regression analysis on the outcome variable with still another substitute
measure of workload in the form of the raw criminal filings per district judge (that is,
without comparison to total filings in the form of a ratio). This substitute criminal caseload
variable was likewise both significant and positive. Going even one step further, we con-
ducted yet another regression analysis with the criminal filings variable in which we ex-
cluded the CRIME-RATE variable to avoid any possible collinearity between the level of
crime in the locality and the judge's criminal caseload-CRIM-CASELOAD remained sig-
nificant and still positive.
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3. Seniority on Federal Bench
In prior research, the hypothesis has been that years of seniority
on the bench "test hardening not of the biological arteries [as would
age] but rather of the bureaucratic judicial arteries. '421 Indeed, at the
time of the Sentencing Guidelines constitutionality decisions, anecdo-
tal evidence suggested that more senior judges especially resented the
limitations placed on judicial discretion by the new Guidelines system,
while those more recently appointed welcomed or at least tolerated
the assistance in the exercise of discretion that the Guidelines
presented.422 If this hypothesis were confirmed by the study, it would
suggest that life tenure permits federal judges to become entrenched
in their ways and resistant to new ideas or, alternatively, assists judges
in recognizing and protecting the institutional integrity of the judicial
branch.
Our study does not confirm the hypothesis. The variable SEN-
IORITY does not correlate with approval or disapproval of the
Guidelines on either the basic outcome dependent variable or any of
the constitutional theory dependent variables. This could mean either
that, contrary to the impressionistic view at the time, the Guidelines
were not less popular with more senior compared to more junior
judges, or instead that judges with longer tenure and stronger antipa-
thy to the Guidelines were able to separate their personal policy pref-
erences from their constitutional judgments to a comforting degree.
Instead, seniority on the bench proved significant in two unsur-
prising and consistent ways, both involving basic reasoning style
rather than general outcome. Long tenure on the federal bench posi-
tively correlated with practical reasoning423 and negatively correlated
with originalism.424 Thus, one could hypothesize that greater seniority
421 Goldman, supra note 28, at 499. Goldman found little relationship between years of
judicial experience and judicial voting behavior. See id. at 499-500.
422 See Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 72, at 712 n.121 (stating that, in author's
experience as prosecutor, "judges appointed since 1987 are much less resistant to the
Guidelines than their predecessors," and that "[r]ecently appointed judges may not unani-
mously embrace the Guidelines, but many.., seem to welcome the guidance afforded by a
set of sentencing standards").
423 See supra Table 11.
424 As reported in Table 12, SENIORITY is significant at the 95% probability level in
Column 2, which was an alternative regression analysis in which the dummy variable
REAGAN was substituted for PARTY. With the standard set of variables, reported in
Column 1, SENIORITY just barely fell below the 95% probability level (SENIORITY
was significant at p<.06).
For continuous variables, the odds multiplier represents the effect of a unit increase in
the variable. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 291, at 1146. Accordingly, for contin-
uous variables included in this study, such as those representing caseload, seniority of
judges, promotion potential, and precedent, determining and explaining the size of the
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tends to make a judge more worldly-wise (practical) and less taken
with jurisprudential trends (nonoriginalist). Moreover, given that the
mean length of seniority for the judges in this study was nine and one-
half years,425 judges with longer tenure would have been appointed
before the originalism debate moved to the forefront of the constitu-
tional interpretation discussion during the 1980's. Accordingly, the
more theoretical, and less pragmatic, originalist approach not only
would have been less visible during the formative early years on the
bench for judges with longer tenure, it would have little if any role in
judicial recruitment in the pre-Reagan era.
E. Promotion Potential Factor
The "structure of the 'independent' judiciary," by conferring life
tenure upon judges, "is designed to remove judges from the day-to-
day pressures and temptations of ordinary political office."42 6 Thus, as
Richard Epstein explains, judges do not fit easily within public choice
theory, which "presupposes that what drives politicians is the desire
for reelection to office, election to higher office, or influence and
power within office."427 But while federal judges, by conscious design,
may be "insulated from these electoral sanctions," 428 they are not im-
mune from the temptations of higher office within the judiciary it-
influence is more difficult. Indeed, for the CRIM-CASELOAD ratio, the PROMO-POT
factor score, and the PREC-CIR special ratio, identifying the unit and providing an easily
accessible explanation is either impossible or more trouble than it is worth. However, for
SENIORITY the unit is the familiar one of months and thus the odds multiplier can be
translated into an understandable probability. The odds multiplier for SENIORITY on
the "Practical versus Theoretical" dependent variable is 1.01 and on the "Originalist versus
Non-Originalist" dependent variable is .95. With respect to the Practical dependent v-aria-
ble, 34% of judges adopted practical reasoning, see supra Table 5; thus the odds of adop-
tion of practical reasoning were approximately .52 (.34 divided by .66). As the odds
multiplier for SENIORITY on this dependent variable is 1.01, the odds of practical reason-
ing were increased by the presence of this variable to approximately .53 (1.01 multiplied by
.52). Thus, holding all other variables constant, the SENIORITY variable increased the
probability of use of practical reasoning from 34% to 35%. With respect to the Originalist
dependent variable, 34% of judges adopted originalist interpretation, see supra Table 5;
thus the odds of adoption of originalist interpretation were also approximately .52 (.34
divided by .66). As the odds multiplier for SENIORITY here was .95, the odds of use of
originalist interpretation were decreased to approximately A9 (.95 multiplied by 52).
Thus, the SENIORITY variable decreased the probability of use of originalist interpreta-
tion from 34% to 33%. Although these probability changes may seem very small, the unit
again is months of seniority, and the sizable nature of these changes can be appreciated by
considering how these changes would accumulate as a judge gains in tenure month-by-
month.
425 See supra Table 2.
426 Epstein, supra note 51, at 831-32.
427 Id. at 836.
428 Id.
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self-an ambition that depends upon the approval of the political
branches for success. While aspirations for the Supreme Court may
be foolish fancy for all but a select few,429 forty percent of circuit
judges are promoted from the ranks of the district judges.430
The lure of a circuit court appointment as an influence upon dis-
trict judge decisionmaking was a centerpiece of Cohen's earlier work
with the Sentencing Guidelines decisions. Cohen conceptualized
"promotion potential" in terms of competition among district court
judges for available positions (measured by the ratio of district judges
in a state to circuit judgeships in that state), the presence or absence
of vacancies for circuit judgeships, and the age of the oldest active
circuit judge in the state (as a rough estimate of when the next va-
cancy will occur).43' He hypothesized that judges with a greater po-
tential for promotion would be motivated to uphold the Guidelines,
because an "unconstitutional ruling would clearly place the judge at
odds with the Justice Department, Congress, and the White House-
all of whom publicly supported the Commission. '432 The results of
Cohen's study strongly confirmed this thesis, as he found his promo-
tion potential factor variable significant at the 99% probability level
and positively correlated with a constitutional ruling.433
429 Even for the select few under consideration for a Supreme Court appointment, the
ability to enhance promotion prospects through decisionmaking is most uncertain. Fifth
Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham wrote an opinion highlighting criticism by commenta-
tors of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but ultimately stating that he was constrained by
Supreme Court opinions to strike a restrictive Louisiana abortion statute. See Margaret S.
v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 995-99 (5th Cir. 1986). Another member of the panel who sepa-
rately concurred was critical of Higginbotham's use of a circuit opinion to suggest disap-
proval of a Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 999-1000 (Williams, J., specially
concurring). Ironically, when Higginbotham's name was floated for a possible Supreme
Court nomination, some anti-abortion groups opposed his nomination on the grounds that
he had authored an opinion striking the statute, ignoring his indirect statement of opposi-
tion to Roe. See Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us
About American Politics, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 293, 323 (1994) ("[P]ro-life interests scuttled
the planned nomination of federal appeals court Judge Patrick Higginbotham to the
Supreme Court because he recognized-albeit reluctantly-Roe to be the law of the land
in one of his opinions.") (book review). If Higginbotham was attempting to signal his
hostility to Roe as a means of gaining promotion to the Supreme Court, the effort failed.
See also Posner, What Do Judges Maximize, supra note 52, at 5 (questioning impact of any
particular decision on prospects for promotion from court of appeals to Supreme Court,
saying "[s]ome decisions have no impact at all on those prospects and in the case of almost
all the remaining decisions the impact is unpredictable-the decision may offend as many
influential people as it pleases").
430 See Deborah J. Barrow, Gary Zuk & Gerard S. Gryski, The Federal Judiciary and
Institutional Change 80 (1996); Posner, The Federal Courts, supra note 155, at 350.
431 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 192.
432 Id. at 188.
433 See id. at 193-94. Subsequently, in a longitudinal study of district court rulings in the
context of criminal antitrust sanctions, Cohen also found that promotion potential ex-
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At the outset of our study, when formulating hypotheses, we be-
lieved the promotion potential thesis to be counterintuitive in this par-
ticular context, especially for Republican-appointed district judges
anticipating elevation to the circuit bench by a Republican president.
As was generally known at the time, and is discussed at length earlier
in this article,434 the Reagan Administration Department of Justice
was divided over the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission
under separation of powers analysis. Indeed, the Department of Jus-
tice and the Sentencing Commission filed separate briefs and argued
separately before the district courts, the courts of appeals, and ulti-
mately the Supreme Court. Before the district and appellate courts,
the Department of Justice essentially acknowledged that the Sentenc-
ing Commission could not constitutionally be located within the judi-
cial branch, but urged that this invalid part of the Sentencing Reform
Act could be severed from the rest of the statute and the Sentencing
Commission could be recognized as an executive branch body.
Given this sharp division within the Administration itself on the
merits of the case, we thought it unlikely that Republican-appointed
district judges would have feared that invalidation of the Guidelines
might alienate the influential individuals in the Department of Justice
who evaluate candidates for nomination to the appeals court. In this
regard, it is notable that at least two prominent appellate judges who
rejected the Sentencing Guidelines were regarded as leading expo-
nents of the Reagan judicial philosophy.435
Moreover, as an informal test, we identified eleven district judges
issuing Guidelines rulings in 1988 who actually did achieve subsequent
promotion to the court of appeals (as of August 1997).436 These
judges were almost perfectly balanced between those who voted to
uphold the constitutionality of the Guidelines (six) and those who
voted to strike the Guidelines as unconstitutional (five).437 Thus, ac-
plained a significant portion of the variance in corporate criminal antitrust penalties. See
Cohen, supra note 209, at 27. Thus, Cohen has successfully replicated his findings in an-
other context.
434 See supra notes 86-92, 317-23 and accompanying text.
435 See supra note 334 and accompanying text (discussing Sentencing Guidelines consti-
tutionality opinions of Justice Scalia and Judge Kozinski).
436 There were other district court judges serving in 1988 who subsequently were pro-
moted to the courts of appeals, but who had not issued any ruling on the constitutionality
of the Sentencing Guidelines and thus are outside the scope of this study.
437 At the time Cohen conducted his study, five district judges who had ruled on the
Guidelines had been elevated to the courts of appeals, and four of these five had upheld
the constitutionality of the Commission, thus supporting his hypothesis. See Cohen, supra
note 21, at 189. The fact that the judges who were elevated relatively soon after the Sen-
tencing Guidelines Crisis were disproportionately favorable to the Guidelines may indicate
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tual experience suggests that a negative ruling on the Guidelines did
not adversely affect promotion prospects.
At the general level, our study strongly confirms Cohen's findings
on the association between promotion potential and constitutional
rulings. Adopting Cohen's formula for this variable, with some revi-
sions,438 we found the PROMO-POT factor variable to be positively
associated with the general outcome dependent variable. 439 Although
the confidence level in our study at the outcome level is not as high as
in Cohen's study-ours is at the 95% probability level while Cohen's
was at the 99% probability level-the significance of the variable is
further confirmed in our study by its consistency across dependent
variables. As reported above,440 promotion potential is also positively
correlated with rejection of both the separation of powers challenge to
required judicial membership on the Commission and the nondelega-
tion doctrine claim.441 Moreover, on two out of the three regression
analyses reported for these two dependent variables, PROMO-POT is
significant at or near the 99% probability level.
The story does not end there, however. If district judges truly
were angling for promotions to the court of appeals, they presumably
would be most attentive to the position advocated by the Department
of Justice, which of course plays an influential role in judicial recruit-
ment. Thus, we would expect district judges with a higher expectation
for promotion potential-particularly those appointed by Republican
presidents and thus most eligible for advancement by President
Reagan or his then-hopeful-successor Vice President Bush-to have a
greater tendency to accept the Department of Justice's argument that
the Sentencing Commission should be removed from the judicial
branch and upheld as an executive branch agency, if at all.442 This
thesis is not confirmed by our study. With respect to the dependent
variable measuring rulings on the Department of Justice's executive
branch scenario, the PROMO-POT variable does not approach signif-
icance. 443 Even when we control for political party, in an alternative
that these decisions played a more significant role in promotion decisions at that time, but
was of declining interest to those involved in judicial discretion over time.
438 See supra Part III.A.6.
439 See supra Table 4.
440 See supra Tables 8, 9.
441 PROMO-POT is also significant at the 95% probability level for an alternative anal-
ysis on the general "Separation of Powers-Branch Location" dependent variable, when the
variable CRIM-CASELOAD is added to the set of independent variables. This is further
evidence of the consistency of influence of the PROMO-POT variable.
442 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (describing Department of Justice
position).
443 See supra Table 7, Column 2.
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analysis limited to district judges appointed by Republican Presidents,
this promotion potential variable does not emerge as significant.
How to explain the inconsistency between the influence of pro-
motion potential at the general outcome level and its absence upon
deeper exploration at the constitutional theory level? One explana-
tion would be that judges appreciated the career implications of the
Sentencing Guidelines ruling only in the most general sense, that is, in
terms of general support for the Guidelines on any basis. However,
this rationale is difficult to credit. The importance to the Reagan Ad-
ministration of the unitary executive concept, and its implications for
the Sentencing Commission, were well known. And the district judges
were made pointedly aware of that position-and its significance-by
the conflicting arguments presented in the Department of Justice's
brief and the Sentencing Commission's brief.444 Thus, it is unlikely
that the district judges were ignorant of or insufficiently sophisticated
to appreciate the promotion potential consequences of an acceptance
or rejection of the Department of Justice position on the particular
"branch location" issue.
The clue to solving this mystery may lie in partisan factors, that is,
the possibility of a variance between Republican-appointed and
Democrat-appointed judges in response to the promotion potential
variable.445 As noted earlier, we had theoretical doubts at the outset
that an adverse ruling on the Guidelines would have been detrimental
to a district judge's prospects for promotion from a Republican ad-
ministration. Recognizing that judges appointed to the district court
bench by Republican presidents were most likely to be eligible for
promotion to the circuit bench by President Reagan or then-candidate
George Bush, a full exploration of the influence of promotion poten-
tial should include an analysis that controls for political party.
To investigate our theory that partisan factors may have affected
the promotion potential influence in this instance, we performed an
alternative regression analysis on the general outcome dependent va-
riable with the addition of a new independent variable designed to
measure this factor. We constructed an interaction term (PARTY -
PROMO-POT).446 When adding this variable to the regression analy-
444 See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (describing model briefs presented by
Department of Justice and Sentencing Commission).
445 Cohen did not control for political party in his promotion potential analysis. See
Cohen, supra note 21, at 193.
446 Because our theory suggests that the primary positive interaction is between judges
appointed by Democratic presidents and promotion potential, we reversed the PARTY
coding for this interaction term. Whereas we had coded Republican-appointed judges as
"1" for the PARTY variable, we coded Democrat-appointed judges as "1" for the INTER-
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sis, PROMO-POT falls out of significance and the newly created IN-
TERACT variable is significant only to the 90% probability level
(although it is positive and thus in the hypothesized direction). Thus,
while the INTERACT variable does not reach the conventional 95%
probability level for a declaration of significance, it nonetheless ap-
pears to be an important factor given its substantial dampening effect
on the significance of PROMO-POT, while the results for the other
independent variables remained remarkably stable. In sum, some-
thing is going on here, and the standard regression run showing
PROMO-POT to be highly significant cannot be accepted at face
value.
To further explore this factor, although recognizing that this is not
theoretically the most appropriate technique,447 we also separated
Republican- and Democrat-appointed judges into separate categories
for independent regression analysis. In other words, we alternatively
controlled for partisanship by separate regressions on judges ap-
pointed by presidents of each political party. When only Republican-
appointed judges are analyzed, the PROMO-POT variable falls well
outside of significance. By contrast, when Democrat-appointed
judges are separately analyzed, the significance of promotion potential
increases to nearly the 99% probability level.
Accordingly, these two alternative regression runs, considered
separately or cumulatively, suggest that Republican-appointed district
judges indeed may have responded differently in light of the mixed
signals on the issue sent by the Republican administration. And if
promotion potential was not an influence in terms of general outcome
for Republican-appointed judges, it is unsurprising that these judges
were likewise unmoved by particular constitutional theories. As dis-
cussed earlier,448 Reagan-appointed judges were significantly less
likely to support relocation of the Sentencing Commission from one
branch to another, promotion potential aside. Thus, even if the poten-
ACT variable so that both PARTY and PROMO-POT would be pointing in a positive
direction for purposes of this construction.
447 Unless we believe that a particular variable (in this case PARTY) systematically dis-
tinguishes judges across background variables, then all judges should be included in the
same equation. Because we have no basis for concluding that Democrat-appointed judges
are systematically distinguishable from Republican-appointed judges on other independent
variables, a division of these judges into separate regression equations is not theoretically
appropriate. Nonetheless, because the single equation approach confirms that the statisti-
cal significance of PROMO-POT is destroyed by the introduction of the INTERACT term,
our use of the separate equations approach for supplemental investigation may have some
probative value. Indeed, the interesting and strikingly contrasting results for Republican-
and Democrat-appointed judges-in a manner directly consistent with our hypothesis-
suggest this approach had commonsense worth, however theoretically contraindicated.
448 See supra Part V.B (discussing party variables).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
1492 [Vol. 73:1377
HeinOnline -- 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1492 1998
JUDICIAL REASONING
tial for promotion to a vacant circuit judgeship was high, these judges
may have thought it better to demonstrate consistent antipathy to cre-
ative judicial remedies (including rewriting statutes in court) than to
bend to the government's contrary importunings in one case.
By contrast, for district court judges appointed by a Democratic
president, the potential for promotion to any court of appeals vacancy
was likely dependent upon the election of candidate Michael Dukakis,
whose prospects appeared excellent at the time that most of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines decisions were rendered. 449 Given that Dukakis
had endorsed the Sentencing Commission,450 the signal from the puta-
tive Dukakis Administration was clear. For that reason, a significant
correlation with a positive constitutionality ruling at the outcome level
is not surprising. Furthermore, since Democrat-appointed judges
were unlikely to get the nod for elevation from a Republican presi-
dent in any event, there was certainly no reason to give closer atten-
tion to the Reagan Administration Department of Justice's position
on branch location of the Commission.
In conclusion, while confirming Cohen's finding at the general
level, our deeper exploration of this variable may have uncovered a
partisan variation on this influence,45 1 one that is not surprising in
light of the full circumstances. Given the consistency of the influence
of this variable in our study, across different dependent variables, we
and Cohen have both confirmed that promotion potential is a factor in
understanding lower federal court behavior. At the same time, we
have discovered that this variable does not operate in isolation but
evolves with the circumstances of the litigation and the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the case.
F. Precedential Influences
When the Sentencing Guidelines Crisis erupted at the beginning
of 1988, there was no precedent from the Supreme Court or any court
of appeals directly on point. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, how-
ever, the Supreme Court had rendered a series of decisions that ap-
peared to embrace the formalist view of separation of powers 4 52
449 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 193.
450 See id. at 195.
451 In a subsequent study, in the context of antitrust criminal sanctions by district judges,
Cohen added political party components to the promotion potential factor, and found that
the promotion potential effect was more pronounced for Democrat judges than for Repub-
lican judges. See Cohen, supra note 209, at 16-27.
452 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (ruling that executive function of
determining how to implement budget reductions could not be conferred upon legislative
branch officer); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951-59 (1983)
(invalidating on separation of powers grounds "legislative veto," by committee or house of
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thereby indicating that an entity with the power to issue substantive
rules or regulations located outside of the executive branch would be
on tenuous constitutional ground. Indeed, the invalidation of the
Guidelines by 61% of the district court judges, most on separation of
powers grounds, may in part reflect the influence of the Supreme
Court's then-recent precedents invigorating separation of powers ju-
risprudence during this period.453
In June 1988, after about two-thirds of the district court rulings
had already been rendered, the Supreme Court approved the judicial
appointment of independent counsel to investigate and prosecute
criminal wrongdoing by high officials in Morrison v. Olson.454 In ret-
rospect, the Supreme Court was signaling a course correction in its
separation of powers doctrine, which it later confirmed by upholding
the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta v. United States on decidedly
pragmatic and nonformalistic grounds.455 But the significance of
Morrison was not fully appreciated at the time.4 5 6 In the first of the
Congress, that would overturn executive decision or rule without passage of legislation by
both houses); see also Fried, supra note 82, at 133, 158 (describing early successes of
Reagan Administration's separation of powers struggle in Chadha and Bowshcr), For
more on the formalist view of separation of powers, see supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
453 For recent empirical research on the influence of Supreme Court precedent on lower
federal court decisionmaking, see Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision
Making: Lower Federal Court Use of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 L. & Soc'y Rev. 325,
338-39 (1987) (finding that lower courts pay attention to Supreme Court decisions in deci-
sionmaking, especially when facts, issues, or litigants are generally similar between cases);
Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice:
Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 673, 690-94 (1994) (finding that courts of appeals were highly responsive to chang-
ing policy trends in Supreme Court on criminal search and seizure, although there was still
room for pursuing their own policy preferences).
454 487 U.S. 654, 685-97 (1988).
455 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); see also Fried, supra note 82, at
170 (describing Mistretta as "another nail in the coffin of a rigorous view of the separation
of powers"); id. at 161-71 (discussing reasoning of Mistretta decision).
456 Prior to the confirmation of the Supreme Court's departure from a formalist ap-
proach to separation of powers in Mistretta, leading scholarly experts expressed doubt and
uncertainty about whether the Morrison decision evidenced a significant shift in the direc-
tion of separation of powers jurisprudence. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Independent
Counsel Mess, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 105, 105-07 (1988) (acknowledging that "the method that
the majority employed in Morrison is markedly different from the one that the Justices
have recently used to decide separation of powers cases" but suggesting that, "far from
signalling a change in direction," Morrison "might herald the Supreme Court's resolution
to stay the course" in sustaining legitimacy of independent federal agencies); Krent, supra
note 87, at 1310-22 (suggesting that inconsistency of Morrison's approval of federal prose-
cutor independent of executive control with structural approach to separation of powers
was "more apparent than real" given power of Congress to specify means that executive
must employ to enforce criminal laws, and adhering to position that Sentencing Commis-
sion's formulation of sentencing policy exceeded constitutional powers of judiciary and
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two court of appeals decisions on the Guidelines, the court invalidated
the Guidelines notwithstanding the intervening Supreme Court opin-
ion in Morrison.457 Moreover, the district courts continued to reject
the Guidelines by nearly an identical margin after that decision. 4 s
For our study, we created a dummy variable for district court deci-
sions postdating Morrison and found no significant variation.
On August 23, 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit struck down the Guidelines as unconstitutional on sepa-
ration of powers grounds. 459 Accordingly, for the next three months,
there was a single circuit court precedent directly on point and it cut
hard against the Guidelines' validity. During this period, district
judges in other circuits (no district judges in the Ninth Circuit issued
subsequent rulings since the appellate opinion was binding authority)
invalidated the Guidelines by a margin of 16 (73%) to 6 (27%), as
compared to the overall 61% to 39% margin for reversal of the
Guidelines. However, when we controlled for other variables by ad-
ding a dummy variable for post-Ninth Circuit decisions, we found no
significant variation, perhaps due to the small number of decisions in
this category. On November 14, 1988, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit sustained the Guidelines against constitu-
tional challenge.460 Accordingly, for the very few district court
decisions issued after that late date, circuit court precedent was evenly
divided and thus without direction.
constituted "a glaring departure from the case or controversy limitation on judicial ac-
tion"). But see Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics
and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 Iowa L Rev. 1079, 1082-83 (1988) (stating that
Morrison demonstrated "a new willingness to reappraise [the Court's] separation of pow-
ers decisions" and arguing that stricter separation of powers rule "undermines the political
branches' ability to fashion creative solutions to evolving problems").
457 See Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom.
United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989).
458 The proportion of district court rulings on the Sentencing Guidelines was remarkably
consistent across time, with 128 (60.4%) judges invalidating the Guidelines and 84 (39.6%)
upholding the Guidelines prior to the Morrison decision in late June 1988, and with 51
(62.2%) striking the Guidelines and 31 (37.8%) approving the Guidelines after Morrison.
In his earlier study, Cohen used only those Sentencing Guidelines decisions that were ren-
dered between January and July of 1988. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 190. He suggests
that termination of his study at that interim point was justified by the intervention of the
Supreme Court's Morrison decision. See id. at 184 & n.4. Thus, he apparently believed
that the precedential effect of Morrison, presumably suggesting the Court was amenable to
a judicial branch Sentencing Commission, would control subsequent district court rulings.
In retrospect, Cohen was correct that Morrison presaged the Mistretta decision, but was
mistaken in believing that Morrison would influence district court rulings.
459 See Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1266.
460 See United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1095
(1989).
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From the day after the very first district court decision at the be-
ginning of the Sentencing Guidelines Crisis, there was of course prece-
dent in the form of decisions by other district judges. District court
judges are not obliged to follow decisions rendered by other district
judges, even within the same district. Nevertheless, Richard Posner
suggests "there is... more genuine adherence to precedent than cyn-
ics will admit, even to precedent that is not binding because it is not
the precedent of the same or a higher court. '461 Based upon our
study, that tendency appears to be at work in these Sentencing Guide-
lines decisions.
The variable PREC-CIR, which measures the relative weight of
prior positive and negative district court rulings within a particular
circuit at the time of each judge's ruling, was significant at the 95%
probability level. The variable was coded so that the sign was positive
when the weight of decisions supported the validity of the Guidelines
and was negative when the weight of decisions went against the
Guidelines. Thus, the significant positive finding reflects that district
judges were indeed inclined to follow the weight of precedent within
their circuit. Moreover, this precedent variable was consistently sig-
nificant on both the standard set of independent variables and the al-
ternative analysis on the outcome dependent variable.462
In his study, Cohen also developed ratio variables for precedents
(apparently simple ratios) of prior decisions upholding and rejecting
the Guidelines at the district, circuit, and national levels. 463 However,
none of Cohen's precedent variables was significant. 464 Whether be-
cause of the larger universe of decisions, the independent set of vari-
ables, or the different formula to measure precedent in our study, the
positive finding for persuasive precedent in our study contrasts with
Cohen's. Cohen did find that the presence of one or more prior un-
constitutional decisions in the same district was related to a negative
constitutional decision.465 Cohen conjectured that the politically safe,
if personally undesirable, decision was to uphold the Sentencing Com-
mission, but "[o]nce one of their colleagues [took] the initiative to
461 Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 155, at 373.
462 See supra Table 4. Because the PREC-CIR variable measured precedent only in
terms of general outcome, that is, by whether decisions held the Guidelines constitutional
or unconstitutional, we could apply it only on the general outcome dependent variable. In
a future study, we plan to explore precedential influence at the constitutional theory/rea-
soning level, creating additional precedent variables based on the written opinions.
463 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 194-96.
464 See id.
465 See id. at 195-96.
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vote [his] true feelings on this issue it [was] easier for others to
folloW."4 6 6
Returning to our findings, judges appear to find the written opin-
ions of other judges valuable as persuasive precedent when they con-
front difficult issues and there is no binding higher authority.
Cynically,467 or realistically, one might regard reliance upon decisions
by other judges as simply following the crowd, that judges find utility
in going with the flow and avoiding unfavorable attention by breaking
ranks.468 In an economic analysis of precedent, William Landes and
Richard Posner theorize that judges are likely to follow the precedents
laid down by other judges because the refusal to do so would weaken
the practice of decision by precedent and thus undermine the prece-
dential value of their own decisions in the future.469 However, this
rational choice theory applies more directly in the context of stare
decisis and has less force for following persuasive authority.
Alternatively, and more idealistically perhaps, the legal model ex-
pects judges to follow precedent, both mandatory and persuasive, so
as to promote "legal stability and continuity.' 470 One of the "main
defenses against judicial lawmaking" is the "control of precedent," 471
which is strongest when it is binding authority from higher tribunals or
stare decisis in the form of prior decisions by the same court directly
on point. However, giving substantial weight to persuasive precedent
by sister tribunals in other districts or circuits also constrains the exer-
cise of discretion and ensures greater consistency across geographic
lines.
Of course, these two theories are not inconsistent. The public
choice hypothesis that judges seek utility in the forms of popularity
with their colleagues and enhanced reputation with the legal profes-
sion at large4 72 and the legal model's expectation that judges attend to
466 Id. at 196.
467 See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. Legal Educ. 490,
490 (1996) (describing public choice theory as "pessimistic model of human behavior").
468 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 190 (expecting that district court decisions on Sentenc-
ing Guidelines would reflect "an overall trend toward an unconstitutional ruling (as a re-
sult of the decrease in discretion) as well as toward a 'follow the leader' mentality as a
result of the concern for peer recognition").
469 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & Econ. 249, 272-73 (1976) (discussing different motivations
judges might have for following precedents); see also Posner, What Do Judges Maximize,
supra note 52, at 18 ("[B]y refusing to follow their predecessors' decisions and thus weak-
ening the practice of decision according to precedent, they reduce the likelihood that their
successors will follow their decisions.").
470 Glick, supra note 26, at 295.
471 Howard, supra note 30, at xxiii.
472 See Posner, What Do Judges Maximize, supra note 52, at 15.
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persuasive precedent and preserve legal stability may converge.473
Utility maximization and the interests of the legal system may rein-
force one another in this context. In any event, however theorized,
precedent is plainly a legal element. In the past, "[e]xplanations of
judicial decision making [have tended] to emphasize personal and en-
vironmental factors while downplaying legal factors. '474 While our
study has certainly indicated the influence of a variety of extra-legal
factors, the study also confirms the explanatory role of one of the
main components of traditional legal theory-precedent.
VI
CONCLUSION
For adherents to the legal model of judging-impartiality, objec-
tivity, suppression of personal experiences and attitudes, and exclusive
attention to legal doctrine and rules-this study may be a sobering
splash in the face with cold reality. For students of the behavioral
school, the plethora of variables that were found influential at one
level or another offers some encouragement-there is still life in that
aging vessel. Indeed, the opportunity for greater depth of study by
exploring judicial reasoning in opinions rendered in an identical case
scenario may have allowed demographic and experiential influences
previously submerged in aggregate vote outcomes to fully emerge.
For public choice theorists, the study provides confirmation that
judges act in a utility-maximizing manner. Both the impact of
caseload upon job satisfaction and the opportunity for career advance-
ment through elevation in the judiciary appear to influence
adjudication.
Yet, as is often the case with empirical research, our study pro-
vides both comfort and challenges to all camps, again reminding us
that judicial behavior is too complex for easy conclusions about influ-
ences and patterns. With respect to the legal method model, neither
this study, nor any other, can undermine its persistent normative ap-
peal. Despite "the fact that the real world makes classical judging an
aspiration but not always a reality, that model should remain a
goal. '475 Indeed, greater awareness of the powerful influences of per-
473 Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 469, at 292 (stating, in context of proposed eco-
nomic model for judicial adherence to precedent, that "[t]he concept of precedent is at the
heart of the way in which lawyers think about the legal system").
474 Johnson, supra note 453, at 338.
475 Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 269, at 910. See Kent Greenawalt, Private Con-
sciences and Public Reasons 142 (1995):
[T]he traditional model posits as a desirable aspiration an ideal that legal deci-
sion not depend on the personality of the judge. The aspiration is not fully
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sonal background and attitudes may be necessary to encourage
greater self-conscious impartiality and objectivity among judges and
perhaps to inform the rest of us of the need to better constrain judicial
discretion with law.476 And in one vital particular-the attention of
judges to precedent, even when not obliged to do so-our study dem-
onstrates that legal factors remain vital in the process of judging.
Likewise, the behavioral model is simultaneously bolstered and
buffeted. While the greater than expected influence of several back-
ground variables is consistent with the behavioral hypothesis, the in-
fluence of other environmental and legal factors reveals the
inadequacy of behavioralism as a fully explanatory model. The impli-
cations of the study for the public choice model remain somewhat un-
certain, given that the direction of influence of criminal caseload was
not easily explained. Moreover, future studies will have to be increas-
ingly sophisticated in exploring the utility-maximizing behavior of
judges. As would be anticipated with a model based upon rational
choice, the strong influence of promotion potential at the general out-
come level proved dependent upon evolving circumstances.
Finally, and perhaps as further consolation for legal theorists, we
offer a qualitative impression based upon our review of the opinions
in the study. Richard Posner mentions that judges may also find util-
ity through the "intrinsic pleasure" of writing and exercising analytical
prowess.477 In reading the many Sentencing Guidelines decisions, it
was impossible not to be captivated by the excitement, the devotion to
legal analysis, the depth and rigor of constitutional analysis, and, yes,
the true pleasure revealed by the judges in their engagement with a
meaningful legal problem. As we conducted this phase of the study, it
was difficult at times to escape the feeling that we were languishing at
the side show and missing the main event in the center ring. Our cod-
ing of reasoning categories and theoretical themes cannot fully convey
the richness of the legal debate in which the judges were engaged, and
into which they sought to draw the readers of their opinions.
achievable even if all judges are intelligent, well-trained, and conscientious, but
it is worth striving for by emphasizing that bases of legal judgment should be
open and available to all.
Id.; see also Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers 128 (1994) (stating that classi-
cal judges were "openly resigned to the fact that total objectivity is an unattainable goal,"
but nonetheless insisted upon striving for impartiality and restraining their biases).
476 See Cross, supra note 48, at 326 (considering "the law to be ropes binding a judicial
Houdini," consideration of empirical research may help us "understand which brand of
rope and which type of knot are the most effective and inescapable").
477 Posner, What Do Judges Maximize, supra note 52, at 19.
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Legal concepts, lines of precedent, and doctrinal themes may not
be sufficient for understanding judicial decisionmaking, 478 but they
are surely essential. Legal analysis, as a distinct method of human
reasoning, cannot be reduced to any methodology borrowed from an-
other discipline.479 The judge brings to bear "not only a range of per-
sonal and political preferences, but also a specialized cultural
competence-his knowledge of and experience in 'the law." 480 Back-
grounds will vary, attitudes will differ, environments will change, but
the law remains the alpha and omega of judicial decisionmaking.
478 See Joel Levin, How Judges Reason ix (1992) (arguing that "getting legal concepts
and lines of precedent straight and in good order is not enough" in judging, because plural-
ist and democratic views of justice and fairness also count).
479 See Richard H. Fallon, Non-Legal Theory in Judicial Decisionmaking, 17 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 87, 88 (1994) ("American law cannot be reduced to any other discipline, nor
can legal analysis be reduced to any other methodology."); Charles Fried, The Artificial
Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 35, 57 (1981) (arguing that
legal reasoning is "distinct method" of "analogy and precedent" that involves "the applica-
tion of a trained, disciplined intuition where the manifold of particulars is too extensive to
allow our minds to work on it deductively").
480 Posner, What Do Judges Maximize, supra note 52, at 24-25.
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